Resilience in the social and physical realms: lessons from the Gulf Coast by Carpenter, Ann Marie
RESILIENCE IN THE SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL REALMS:  



























In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctorate in the 








Georgia Institute of Technology 
August 2013 
COPYRIGHT 2013 BY ANN CARPENTER 
  
RESILIENCE IN THE SOCIAL AND PHYSICAL REALMS:  











Approved by:   
   
Dr. Michael Elliott, Advisor 
School of City and Regional Planning 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Harley Etienne 
Taubman College of Architecture and 
Urban Planning 
University of Michigan 
   
Dr. Dan Immergluck 
School of City and Regional Planning 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. John Peponis 
School of Architecture 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. Steven French 
School of City and Regional Planning 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
  
   
























I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Michael Elliott, and the rest of my committee – Dr. 
Harley Etienne, Dr. Steven French, Dr. Dan Immergluck, and Dr. John Peponis – for their 
diverse input. 
In addition to my exceptional committee, I wish to thank Todd Greene, Vice President, 
and Karen Leone de Nie, Research Director, both of Economic and Community Development at 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, for their support of me in developing and completing this 
research.  I would also like to thank Nancy Montoya, Senior Regional Community Development 
Manager for the Gulf Coast at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s New Orleans branch, for 
sharing her knowledge and her enthusiasm and planting the seed for this research.   
I would also like to thank Leigh McCook, Socio-Technical Systems Division Chief, 
Information and Communications Laboratory, Georgia Tech Research Institute for her support 
and flexibility throughout this process.   
I also thank my fellow doctoral students in City and Regional Planning and Architecture, 
particularly Alice Vialard and Francisco Valdés.  
 
 v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS iv 
LIST OF TABLES vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ix 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS xi 
SUMMARY xiii 
CHAPTERS 1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 6 
Resilience 6 
Disasters 9 
The Built Environment 16 
Social Networks 17 
Social Networks and Resilience 19 
The Built Environment and Social Networks 23 
The Built Environment, Social Networks, and Disaster Resilience 27 
CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND ON THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 30 
Early History 30 
Late Colonial Period 32 
Antebellum Period 35 
Post-Civil War Era 36 
Modern Era 38 
Hurricane Katrina 41 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN 48 
Conceptual Model 48 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 51 
Methodology 55 
Stage 1: Testing the Model with Empirical Data 57 
Stage 2: Case Study Analysis 61 
CHAPTER 5: STAGE 1 RESULTS 65 
Model Variables 66 
Descriptive Statistics 78 
Discussion of Model Results 79 
CHAPTER 6: STAGE 2 92 
Results: Social Networks 103 
Results: Resilience 112 
 vi 
Results: Built Environment 116 
Results: Other Reasons for Resilience 125 
Results: Reasons for Lack of Resilience 132 
Discussion of Stage 2 Results 139 
CHAPTER 7: SYNTHESIS OF STAGE 1 AND STAGE 2 RESULTS 144 
1) Does a certain type of built environment result in a more resilient community? 144 
2) Do those properties of the built environment make communities more conducive to social 
networking activity? 151 
3) How does the effect of the built environment measure against other factors that are 
significant in forming robust social networks? 153 
Additional Research Propositions 154 
CHAPTER 8: EXAMINATION OF POST-KATRINA COMPREHENSIVE PLANS 157 
CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY AND PLANNING IMPLICATIONS 166 
Conceptual Model Revisited 166 
Discussion of Built Environment Variables and Resilience 170 
Discussion of Additional Resilience Factors Related to Planning 172 
Ideas for Further Research 178 
Conclusion 179 
APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 181 
APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM 183 
APPENDIX C: RECRUITMENT MATERIALS 186 





LIST OF TABLES 
Page 
Table 1: Mean number of disasters per county during the period from 1965 to 2008 47 
Table 2: Equation variables 60 
Table 3: SIC codes used in social organization density measure 70 
Table 4: Variables, variable descriptions, and data sources 75 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics (N=3,222 blocks) 78 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of transformed variables 79 
Table 7: OLS model results with local spatial fixed effects 80 
Table 8: Statistically significant local fixed effects 88 
Table 9: Comparison of OLS model with and without local fixed effects 88 
Table 10: Global Moran's I Summary 89 
Table 11: SL model results without local spatial fixed effects 90 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics, case study communities 96 
Table 13: Interview questions for Stage 2 analysis 101 
Table 14: Total and average number of social networks by resilience category 104 
Table 15: Total and average number of social networks by case study community 107 
Table 16: 990 data by case study community, 2001 to 2011 110 
Table 17: 990 data for Pascagoula without credit unions, 2001to 2011 110 
Table 18: 990 data by organizations named in interviews 112 
Table 19: Average resilience rating by resilience category 113 
Table 20: Average resilience rating by case study community 113 
Table 21: Sites and places mentioned by resilience category 116 
Table 22: Sites and places mentioned by case study community 118 
 viii 
Table 23: Types of networks and places mentioned by resilience category 123 
Table 24: Community resilience indicators 126 
Table 25: Community resilience scores using DROP model data for Gulfport-Biloxi 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 127 
Table 26: Interview subjects’ responses, alternative reasons for resilience 128 
Table 27: Interview subjects’ reasons for lack of resilience 132 
Table 28: Elements found in goals of plans 159 
Table 29: Elements found in vision statements of plans 160 
 
 ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 Page 
Figure 1: Relationships between elements in the research questions 3 
Figure 2: Adaptive cycle 8 
Figure 3: Map of New Orleans to Mobile railroad and population centers, circa 1890 37 
Figure 4: Historic hurricane tracks and level of impact to Mississippi Coast 38 
Figure 5: NOAA Hurricane Katrina forecast on August 28, 2005 43 
Figure 6: Hurricane strikes versus population, three coastal Mississippi counties 1850 to 2010 46 
Figure 7: Conceptual model 49 
Figure 8: Research hypotheses 53 
Figure 9: Research methodology 57 
Figure 10: Matrix of case study selection criteria 62 
Figure 11: Example data for selection of case study communities in Mississippi 63 
Figure 12: Example of FEMA remote sensing data 73 
Figure 13: Communities chosen by resilience and built environment characteristics 93 
Figure 14: Map depicting locations of four case study communities. 94 
Figure 15: Types of networks by resilience category 105 
Figure 16: Types of networks by case study community 108 
Figure 17: Comparison of ZIP code and study area geometries 111 
Figure 18: Relationship between number of networks and resilience rating 115 
Figure 19: Relationship between years lived in community and resilience rating 115 
Figure 20: Types of sites and places mentioned by resilience category 118 
Figure 21: Types of sites and places mentioned by case study community 119 
Figure 22: Heat map and convex hull geometries of sites and places by case study community121 
 x 
Figure 23: Detail of heat maps of site and place density by case study community 122 
Figure 24: Relationship between number of social networks and number significant places 
identified in interviews 123 
Figure 25: Unrestored portion of the Ohr-O’Keefe Museum of Art in East Biloxi 125 
Figure 26: Interview subjects’ alternative reasons for resilience 129 
Figure 27: Interview subjects’ responses for lack of resilience 133 
Figure 28: East Biloxi Library 142 
Figure 29: Contrast between local facilities (Fleur de Lis French club, left) and casinos (Palace 
Casino, right) 149 
Figure 30: Simplified conceptual model 167 
Figure 31: Barrier islands of Mississippi 176 
 xi 
LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
APA  American Planning Association 
CDC  U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CNU  Congress for New Urbanism 
CRS   Community Rating System 
DROP   Disaster Resilience of Place model 
FEMA  U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FHA  Federal Housing Administration 
FIRM  Flood Insurance Rate Map 
GCCDS   MS State University College of Architecture Gulf Coast Community Design Studio 
GIS  Geographic Information Systems 
GORR  Mississippi Governor’s Office of Recovery and Renewal 
GRPC  Gulf Regional Planning Commission 
HUD  U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
IRB  Georgia Tech Institutional Review Board 
IRS   U.S. Internal Revenue Service 
MARIS   Mississippi Automated Resource Information System 
MCIDTF   Mississippi Coast Interfaith Disaster Task Force 
MDAH   Mississippi Department of Archives and History 
MEMA  Mississippi Emergency Management Agency  
NEMIS   National Emergency Management Information System  
NGA  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
NLCD   U.S. Department of Agriculture National Land Cover Database 
 xii 
NOAA  U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration  
NRHP  U.S. National Register of Historic Places 
SEOC  Mississippi State Emergency Operations Center 
SIC   Standard Industrial Classification System 
TIGER  Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing 
USACE  U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 





Community resilience to disasters is defined as an affected area’s ability to rebound after 
a catastrophic event.  The mounting frequency and scale of natural disasters, increasing 
urbanization, a growing reliance on interdependent technologies and infrastructure systems, 
inflated expectations of interventions, and the emergence of a just-in-time economy are 
responsible for greater disaster vulnerability and demonstrate the need to develop more resilient 
communities.  Given the increasing shocks of natural disasters, a more complete understanding 
of resilience is important for creating safer, more sustainable communities.  
One factor that is known to impact resilience is social networking.  Planners recognize 
the importance of social networks in planning more resilient communities and in informing the 
planning process in general, but it remains a fuzzy concept, as networks can be difficult to 
identify and measure.  However, the built environment has been shown to influence social 
networks.  Urban planning research has shown that walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods can 
encourage the development of social capital and place attachment through an increase in 
interactions and a higher likelihood of neighborhood amenities, including characteristics of the 
built environment that influence social networks, such as varied land uses and pedestrian-
oriented design.  The built environment is a physical, social, and symbolic anchor to everyday 
habits, a familiar framework of orientation, and a support system for social networks.  In short, 
the built environment connects residents to a place and can serve as a benchmark for 
recovery.  Therefore, it is possible that the traditional planning domain of urban design can be 
harnessed to foster greater resilience by facilitating stronger social networks. 
In order to determine the legitimacy of this supposition, the proposed research asks how 
social networks and the built environment reinforce one another to create greater resilience to 
disasters. Given that social networks increase community resilience to all types of disasters, 
social networks are shown to be influenced by certain types of space, and the built environment 
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is a common intervention for planners, this research explores the potential for creating cities that 
are more resilient by creating spaces that foster social networks. 
The Mississippi Gulf Coast was chosen as a case study area in order to explore the above 
relationships.  In 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck at roughly the Mississippi-Louisiana border, 
resulting in massive wind and storm surge damage to the Mississippi Coast.  Communities in the 
area have recovered at varying rates and levels.  Therefore, this region provided an opportunity 
to contrast higher and lower resilience communities and to test the research questions. 
The research was conducted in two stages.  In the first stage, a quantitative model was 
developed in order to address whether there are statistically significant effects on resilience due 
to the built environment.  A metric of resilience was the dependent variable and built 
environment metrics were among the independent variables in a multivariate linear regression 
model.  Control or test variables, such as socio-demographic variables, were also included as 
independent variables in the model.  In the second stage, a qualitative case study analysis of 
communities was undertaken using interviews with local residents.  Four case study communities 
were selected for further investigation based on results the initial analysis, specifically on 
measures of resilience and built environment configurations.  Case study communities were 
classified by 1) their ability to withstand and recover from the hurricane, or their resilience and 
2) the type of built environment found in the community. 
The results demonstrate that certain aspects of the built environment are associated with 
greater resilience, including intersection density, net residential density, the density of historic 
sites, and the density of community amenities where social networks gather.  These types of 
features were also shown to be linked to formal and informal social networks in the interview 
process.  Faith-based groups were the most common social networks that interview subjects 
engaged with.  Residents of high-resilience communities tended to have greater local ties to 
friends, schools, businesses and local nonprofits, networks with concentrated local ties.  In 
contrast, residents of low-resilience communities tended to have greater ties to federal, state, 




CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Natural disasters have received increased attention from the media, governments, 
nonprofit organizations, and the public at large.  The mounting frequency and scale of such 
events, an increase in urbanization, a growing reliance on interdependent technologies, raising 
expectations of interventions, and the emergence of a just-in-time economy have demonstrated 
the need to plan for catastrophic events to ensure resilient communities.   
Resilience is defined as a ‘‘…measure of the persistence of systems and their ability to 
absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or 
state variables” (Holling, 1973).  When applied to disasters, resilience is defined as an affected 
area’s ability to rebound after a catastrophic event.  This may mean a community returns to its 
previous state or status quo or that the community stabilizes into a new regime.   Although the 
relative resilience of a community is only fully known after the fact, there are patterns of 
community characteristics that contribute to resilience. Understanding the contributing factors to 
resilience can save lives and reduce the costs to communities facing disasters.  Therefore, given 
the increasing shocks of natural disasters, a greater understanding of resilience is important for 
creating safer, more sustainable communities.  
One factor that is widely believed to impact resilience is the presence of strong social 
networks.  Planners recognize the importance of social networks in planning more resilient 
communities and in informing the planning process in general (Healey, 1998), but it remains a 
fuzzy concept in some ways, as networks can be difficult to identify and measure.  However, 
particularly when telephone and electricity services are interrupted, as after Katrina, our 
geographically based social ties are important for household- and community-level disaster 
resilience.  
The built environment has been shown to influence social networks (Entwisle, 2007; 
Fischer et al., 1977; Rutten, Westlund, & Boekema, 2010).  The built environment also matters 
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for resilience, as it is a physical, social, and symbolic anchor to everyday habits, a familiar 
framework of orientation, and a support system for social networks.  In short, the built 
environment connects residents to a place and can serve as a benchmark for recovery.  Therefore, 
it is possible that the traditional planning domain of urban design can be harnessed to foster 
greater resilience by facilitating stronger social networks. 
In order to determine the legitimacy of this supposition, this research asked how social 
networks and the built environment reinforce one another to create greater resilience to disasters. 
Given that 1) social networks increase community resilience to all types of disasters, 2) social 
networks are shown to be influenced by certain types of built environments, and 3) the built 
environment is a common intervention for planners, this study explored the potential for creating 
cities that are more resilient by creating a built environment that fosters social networks. 
The specific research questions (diagrammed in Figure 1) included 
1) Does a certain type of built environment result in a more resilient community?   
2) Do those properties of the built environment make communities more conducive 
to social networking activity? 
3) How does the effect of the built environment measure against other factors that 
are significant in forming robust social networks?   




Figure 1: Relationships between elements in the research questions 
 
It was hypothesized that communities with viable public spaces such as parks, with 
walkable street networks, with densities that are conducive to social interaction, with many 
historic properties and neighborhoods, and with other strong “sense of place” characteristics 
produce stronger social networks and, as a result, these communities exhibit greater resilience.  
Conversely, communities with characteristics of the built environment such as disconnected 
street networks, lack of open space, or concentrations of poverty that are known to produce 
marginalization and undermine the generation of social ties exhibit less resilience. 
To allow for comparison across many types of communities, this research focused on the 
response of various communities to a specific disaster that has resulted in uneven recovery: the 
2005 Gulf Coast hurricane season.  Evidence from a previous study conducted through the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta suggests that Katrina recovery has produced an increase in 
social mobilization, which is thought to increase adaptive capacity of communities through the 
strengthening of social networks (Carpenter & Montoya, 2011).  As part of the Federal Reserve 
study, interviews with neighborhood residents of Bay St Louis, Mississippi and Broadmoor, New 
Orleans, Louisiana also highlighted the importance of the built environment, including the 
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rebuilding and preservation of historic districts and the restoration of major infrastructure, such 
as bridges and causeways (crucial features given the coastal topography).  These structures are 
more than gathering places and thoroughfares; they embody the collective memory of residents, 
the bricks and mortar that make a community a physical manifestation of the achievements and 
aspirations of people.  Furthermore, certain community groups characterized by strong social 
networks have organized or strengthened in the wake of the 2005 hurricane season with 
transformative effects, and other communities lacking strong social ties have faltered. 
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast in August 2005, with wind and storm surges 
causing devastating losses of life and property.  The landfall location and strength of the storm 
made it among the deadliest and the most costly hurricane in U.S. history, with more than 1,300 
dead, one million people displaced, $80 billion in property damage, and 90,000 square miles of 
land impacted (Cutter et al., 2006).  Social systems in the region were significantly altered: 
individuals, households, extended families, businesses, entire communities, as well as local, 
state, and regional agencies and organizations were affected.  For months after the storm, the 
stories and images transmitted from the region were grim.  Research from a variety of disciplines 
has since examined how the area responded, often focusing on success and reform from the 
grassroots.   
This research used a mixed methods approach including first a quantitative model 
followed by qualitative interviews with residents in four case study communities.   The study 
area was limited to Mississippi, although the storm impacted Louisiana and Alabama as well.  
The type of damage and response was very different in each area, with Mississippi sustaining 
wind and storm surge damage typical of a strong hurricane, while New Orleans struggled with 
levee failures and prolonged flooding.  Investigation of the Mississippi Gulf Coast allowed 
comparison of a wide variety of communities impacted by a catastrophic event at a common 
point in time.  A variety of development patterns exist in Mississippi, including high- to 
medium-density urban, pre-war single family neighborhoods, post-war suburbs, traditional small 
towns, waterfront resort communities, rural areas, and many others.  Therefore, comparison 
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among and across several of these typologies was possible.  This allowed the ability to categorize 
communities by built environment and to compare initial versus present conditions in order to 
develop theories about the interrelated issues of social networks and the built environment.   
The findings dovetailed with findings from psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, 
and disaster management experts.  As expected, social networks were found to be critical for 
disseminating information and resources and providing emotional support among residents.  
These types of social interactions are rooted in space, naturally. In interviews, residents spoke of 
the importance of specific places or landmarks, even those that had been destroyed by storm 
damage. What emerged from this research was the notion that the built environment – the 
universe of buildings and other spaces constructed by humans – has an impact on resilience by 
supporting and reinforcing social networks. The built environment provides opportunities for 
interaction but is also imbued with cultural meaning and identity over time. 
We are an increasingly mobile and technologically linked society, but our desire to make 
our homes in “livable” communities has intensified in recent decades.  Creating the kinds of 
spaces that support triangulation , or the phenomenon in which activity and social interaction 
prompt one another (Whyte, 1980), has many economic and social benefits and is associated 
with safer, more resilient communities.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research questions are better understood with a brief background of the core 
concepts.  Studies concerning resilience, natural disasters, social networks, and the built 
environment can be found in a number of disciplines.  The following literature review defines 
and reviews relevant work related to each concept as well as connections that have been made 
between the concepts. 
Resilience 
Resilience has been defined as a ‘‘…measure of the persistence of systems and their 
ability to absorb change and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between 
populations or state variables” (Holling, 1973).  Thus, when applied to disasters, resilience is an 
affected area’s ability to rebound after a catastrophic event.  For most communities, this would 
mean first the return of lifeline infrastructures such as utilities, food and water, and shelter.  
Longer term, this would mean the return of households and businesses and a return to self-
sufficiency and effective governance.  Most sources argue that resilience is achieved when 
resources and capabilities are drawn from within the community to bring these systems back 
online (Paton, 2000).  A community’s adaptability to change or adaptive capacity is strongly 
related to resilience; collectively, individuals can influence resilience by affecting and 
responding to change in the system (B. Walker, Holling, Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004).  Reliance 
on one method or system can lead to instability, whereas flexibility and redundancies in a 
community allow for contingencies in case of a catastrophe, which is particularly evident in 
interdependent infrastructure systems such as the information technology and energy sectors 
(Cutter et al., 2008).  
Cycles of change in social and ecological systems can be illustrated through the adaptive 
cycle (Peeples, Barton, & Schmich, 2006) (Figure 2).  Within the cycle, there are four stages of 
rapid growth, conservation, release (or crisis), and reorganization.  The rapid growth stage is 
characterized by weak connections and regulation; during the conservation stage connectivity is 
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improved and resources are accumulated (specialization and economies of scale begin to appear), 
and vulnerability increases due to changing conditions; the release stage occurs when major 
events or crises are sufficiently intense to upend the system (this includes the breaking of 
connections and weakening of control); and reorganization is the rebuilding stage that is 
experimental, inventive, and includes the creation of new connections.  Rapid growth and 
conservation are often called the fore loop of the adaptive cycle and reorganization and release 
are termed the back loop.  Fore loop processes are stable and predictable and allow the 
accumulation of capital, back loop processes are characterized by uncertainty and loss of capital. 
Although back loop reorganization can throw a system into disarray, it can also have positive 
results for a system lodged in a conservative fore loop phase.  Different stages of the cycle can 
be experienced at different scales in a system (this phenomenon is called a panarchy, or a 
hierarchy encompassing all possible levels of systems) (Gunderson & Holling, 2002).  Though 
social-ecological systems are affected by many variables, a few important often slow-moving 
variables drive change in the system.  The adaptive cycle and panarchy concepts can be applied 
to urban systems in general and social systems in particular and inform our understanding of how 
disturbances affect communities.  Identifying the stages of the adaptive cycle as they relate to a 
particular community may be useful both before and after a disaster. 
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Figure 2: Adaptive cycle 
Source: (Peeples et al., 2006) 
 
The disaster resilience literature has drawn from the above concepts and contributed 
additional notions about the factors and processes involved in whether or not a community is 
able to rebound after a traumatic event.  From a disaster planning perspective, a conceptual 
framework has been developed, consisting of interrelated technical, organizational, social, and 
economic (“TOSE”)  dimensions that contribute to and affect resilience (Bruneau et al., 2003).  
Technical and organizational factors relate to infrastructure and local agencies and governance 
and social and economic factors are entrenched in the community at large.  All four TOSE 
dimensions describe contributions to a community’s capacity for resilience.  In addition, there 
are four resilience dimensions (the “four R’s”) by which resilience can be measured, including 
robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity (Bruneau et al., 2003).  Robustness refers 
to the overall strength of a system, or its ability to withstand a stressor without failing.  
Redundancy is the existence of substitutable elements in the system, allowing continuation of 
necessary services even when some elements fail.  Resourcefulness includes the ability to plan 
and implement disaster recovery based on established priorities and goals.  Rapidity is the simply 
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the ability to carry out these activities quickly.  The TOSE dimensions and community-level 
disaster resilience in general can be evaluated along each of the four R’s. 
Disasters 
Disaster and natural hazards research has originated from scholars in a wide array of 
fields, although this literature review focuses on the fields of urban planning and sociology, 
which are most relevant for the research.  It should be noted that disasters research can be found 
in a number of additional fields, many of which focus on climatologic or geologic phenomena.  
Although this work is certainly important for forecasting disaster risk, a compelling argument 
has been made that disasters should be conceived of as not strictly external forces that cause 
upheaval, but rather socially constructed events, which informs our understanding of and 
approach to disaster response (Mileti, 1999).  In fact, disasters should be viewed in terms of 
social vulnerability, as various social and economic consequences arise from not only the 
physical damage incurred, but the various short and long term effects to housing, health, the 
economy, and social structures and cohesion (French, Lee, & Anderson, 2010).  The field of 
disaster research has expanded accordingly to take into account social, cultural, and economic 
factors along with technical solutions.   
Relevant past work in the areas of urban planning and sociology can be divided into two 
distinct categories – those that examined strategies for pre-disaster mitigation and those that 
focused on post-mortem analysis of events.  In terms of pre-disaster work, there are several 
approaches that have been taken to exploring the effectiveness of mitigation and other pre-
disaster planning activities.  Perhaps the earliest views on interactions between natural disasters 
and human systems focused on flood plain development and the protection of property (White, 
1936, 1937).  Land use planning and zoning were early tools employed by planners to prevent 
encroachment in waterways in order to protect human property from flood damage.  This work 
also recognized the need to evaluate flood stages based on land use changes in floodplains and 
drainage areas and engineering interventions such as levees and reservoirs, rather than on past 
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flooding trends alone.  Although the impacts of flooding on social stability and prosperity of 
communities were acknowledged decades before, measuring these impacts was not addressed in 
earnest until the early 1950s (Tierney, 1989).   
More recently, the role of planning in effective disaster mitigation has been advanced.  
For example, including mitigation in either standalone hazard plans or comprehensive plans has 
been shown to be a potential strategy for encouraging safer development and garnering public 
support for mitigation (Burby et al., 1999).  Currently, federal programs focused on insuring at-
risk property and providing aid after a disaster tend to discourage or even undermine local 
government planning efforts, as there are few incentives to plan independently.  Unfortunately, 
development continues unabated by local government in many high risk areas.  For example, 
despite state and local efforts to limit residential exposure and regardless of plan conformity and 
quality, there has been no significant effect on growth in vulnerable coastal areas in Florida 
(Deyle, Chapin, & Baker, 2008).  It has also been shown that although land use management in 
flood plains has great potential in mitigating risk, communities that adopt this strategy tend to 
have already created a problem with previous flood plain development (Burby & French, 1981). 
Pre-disaster planning in general is necessary and is most effective when combined with 
strong public involvement.  High-quality plans informed by local interest groups were found to 
have the greatest impact on environmental problems, and natural hazards in particular, and to 
increase levels of commitment in elected officials (Burby & May, 1998).  Based on these 
findings, it was recommended that constituencies be created for the solution of environmental 
problems to include a broader cross section of the population in the planning process and 
facilitate adoption of household-level mitigation practices through the dissemination of 
information about risk.  In effect, strong, politically oriented social networks improve the 
commitment of public servants and the capacity of a community. 
Building on the importance of commitment and capacity, scholars subsequently have 
advocated incorporating disaster mitigation in sustainability, adding disaster resilience to the 
existing list of economic, environmental, and social goals of sustainability (Godschalk et al., 
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1999).  Sustainability already incorporates techniques that protect the environment while 
increasing the effectiveness of human systems, for example by recommending the use of 
bioswales for drainage.  A resilient development approach adds additional complexity to 
sustainability, taking into account potential natural hazards, with the intent of creating an 
appropriately strong and flexible built environment.  The commitment to disaster mitigation 
should be driven by community leaders and combined with increased capacity to plan and 
implement mitigation programs.  This demands a proactive and context-specific approach 
justified by sustainability’s doctrine of meeting the needs of future generations. 
In addition to land use planning, building codes, and other structural or engineering 
solutions, local communities have also used policy-based mitigation measures to stem property 
damage risk and minimize casualties caused by localized flooding (Brody, Zahran, Highfield, 
Bernhardt, & Vedlitz, 2009).  This includes adaptive or flexible strategies for land and water 
management, public outreach, preparedness, and other approaches.  Based on an examination of 
less adaptive, more prescriptive policy levers under FEMA’s Community Rating System (CRS), 
localities were most likely to choose “low-hanging fruit” or the least expensive strategies rather 
than choosing strategies according to effectiveness.  However, locally driven policies adapted 
over time were shown to be effective in mitigating property loss (Brody et al., 2009). 
Individual households bear a considerable amount of financial burden after a disaster; 
however, there often appears to be a general lack of interest in household-level mitigation such 
as voluntary insurance programs, despite the potentially large financial losses from a low-
probability, high-impact event such as a major hurricane (Kunreuther, 2006).  Households have 
limited resources and fail to consider disaster risk in long term financial planning.  They may 
also be following a local trend, not wishing to be the lone residence undertaking dramatic 
structural protection measures, when others will certainly rely on government aid.  This is yet 
another argument for supplementing voluntary preventative measures with local planning and 
policies, including building codes, tax incentives, and required hazard insurance similar to 
requirements under the FEMA National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 
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In the second category of disaster research, post-disaster analysis has generally 
concentrated on case studies or other accounts of particular disasters, often comparing and 
drawing conclusions from patterns across time.  For example, a recent case study tracked the 
rebuilding process in New Orleans, Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina from the perspective of 
urban planning professionals (Olshansky & Johnson, 2010).  This work recognized the tensions 
between a swift recovery and a careful assessment of the situation to ensure decisions are most 
beneficial.  Ensuring public participation and building consensus tended to be more difficult 
during the conflict, when past frictions were often amplified; therefore effective leadership and a 
clear message to the public was essential.  According to Olshansky and Johnson, public meetings 
that informed the post-Katrina Unified New Orleans Plan were well attended and citizens were 
savvy enough to follow the planning discussions, but the claims of various public and private 
entities leading the rebuilding process were not consistent or clear. 
Several studies have examined the impacts on social systems as well as the responses by 
formal and informal networks.  For example, work has been done to examine the post-effects of 
disasters on social systems, including social networks (Tierney, 1989).  Again, disasters are 
defined by Tierney as the damage and disruption to both physical and social structures.  
According to observations by Tierney, after a crisis, community organizations reform along two 
dimensions.  The first is the dimension of tasks, which are either routine or nonroutine compared 
with pre-disaster activities, and the second is the dimension of structure, which can either remain 
constant or expand.  Reforms along these dimensions allow organizations to respond accordingly 
to household recovery needs, conflicts, and community mental health needs.  Pre-disaster 
working relationships between organizations are also important post-disaster and can affect 
coordination of disaster response activities.   
In terms of local government and other formal municipal networks, in a case study of the 
Northridge, California earthquake of 1994, major disaster losses were suffered due to individual, 
organizational, and governmental decisions regarding planning and mitigation techniques, in 
addition to structural issues resulting from development patterns and building code standards and 
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enforcement (Tierney, 1995).  Post-disaster, local governments frequently find it difficult to 
make use of disaster aid resources due to a lack of organizational capacity (Berke, Kartez, & 
Wenger, 1993).  In a meta study of past disasters, a high degree of horizontal integration, or 
many connections between local networks, produced open communication and collaboration on 
local problem solving, increasing local capacity for disaster recovery and resilience (Berke, 
1993).  Vertical integration was also important, or ties between local and external or higher-order 
organizations.  These two networking forces are most effective when operating simultaneously, 
working toward a common goal of recovery. 
Such formal organizations are clearly important after a disaster.  Sociologists have also 
examined the role of community social capital in recovery, specifically the informal networks 
and resources brought to bear through connections among residents.  These connections have 
been shown to influence recovery at least as effectively as material resources, if not more 
(Aldrich, 2012).  The mechanisms through which this is made possible include the creation of a 
kind of informal insurance or pool of financial aid, the ability to collectively solve common 
problems that interfere with recovery, and a deepening of the social fabric, which in turn 
increases the potency of the local voice.  Further discussion of the specific role of social 
networks on resilience is discussed in a later section of this literature review. 
Planning’s post-disaster role in restoring the torn social fabric of a community as well as 
the built environment has also been explored.  In response to the questionable effectiveness of 
some existing federal policies and programs like CRS, the argument has been made to reform 
and strengthen the state and federal regulatory roles in order to provide guidance and shore up 
local pre- and post-disaster efforts, which can suffer from the aforementioned lack of 
commitment (Berke & Campanella, 2006).  This includes explicitly requiring land use 
management for risk reduction and infrastructure insurance at the local level.  In addition to 
federal interventions, strong, local grassroots networks that empower citizens with lasting skills 
combined with greater ties between local formal networks are believed to improve recovery.  
These efforts can mend the torn social fabric. 
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Research regarding post-disaster recovery in the built environment has shown that among 
the various types of structures impacted by a disaster, residential damage typically constitutes the 
majority of total damage after a disaster and therefore housing is a major planning-related factor 
in post-disaster recovery.  The U.S. system for rebuilding housing is largely designed to aid 
single-family, owner-occupied units.  For the most vulnerable low-income households, short- to 
midterm housing is only available through Red Cross shelters and over the long term, large 
proportions of the affordable multifamily housing stock are not replaced (Comerio, 1997).  The 
lack of rental housing is a recurring problem in many other case studies. 
In fact, entire neighborhoods can be at risk.  After the Mexico City earthquake in 1995, 
the government planned to clear a devastated inner-city slum and move residents outside of the 
city.  Residents successfully organized to protest this decision.  In that instance, social 
mobilization successfully challenged and reversed forced relocation and gentrification of the 
area; however, this is not always the case.  Data from Hurricane Andrew in 1992 showed that 
long term single-family home recovery was weaker among ethnic or racial minority 
neighborhoods and renter-occupied households (Zhang & Peacock, 2009).  Abandonment of 
property and long term volatility in the market were also persistent problems in recovery after 
Andrew. 
Recovery of nonresidential sectors often experience greater delays post-disaster.  After 
the Coalinga, California earthquake of 1983, housing recovery was relatively rapid, 
demonstrated by a spike in building permits following the earthquake, but the central business 
district and other businesses were slower to recover (French, Ewing, & Isaacson, 1984). Local 
residents were strongly committed to rebuilding the community, and the local development 
authority was instrumental in assisting the commercial sector.  Overall, the impacts to the social 
and political fabric were less severe than they might have been due to prompt, effective 
rebuilding efforts.  Indeed, the prompt recovery of housing as well as infrastructure is important 
in facilitating the return of the business sector (Olshansky, Johnson, & Topping, 2006).   
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Given the challenges in providing affordable housing post-disaster, it is not surprising 
that the dimensions of social vulnerability have been well documented in post-disaster 
assessments.  Wealth and age have been found to be the most significant factors and other social 
vulnerability factors commonly cited include race, ethnicity, gender, family structure, and tenure 
(Cutter, Boruff, & Shirley, 2003).  As an example, following a 1982 Paris, Texas tornado, 
African American residents in the community were privy to fewer economic aid resources such 
as Small Business Administration (SBA) loans and were more dependent on family and kin 
networks of support in emotional (but not financial) recovery (Bolin, 1986).  Women are also 
known to be particularly vulnerable to disasters.  Work in developing countries has demonstrated 
effects such as more pronounced and prolonged emotional distress and fewer financial resources 
in single parent, female headed households (Bolin, Jackson, & Crist, 1998).  Despite these 
differences, disaster research continues to focus on families in recovery to the detriment of 
single-parent female or other female head of household situations.   
Socioeconomic factors have also been shown to contribute to post-disaster conflicts 
(Bolin & Stanford, 1991).  To protect vulnerable populations, adequate and representative citizen 
participation should be included in recovery activities.  The likelihood that casualties are 
encountered by flooding, for example, increases with population density, and the presence of 
socially vulnerable populations, in addition to obvious factors such as precipitation rates, flood 
duration, and property damage (Zahran, Brody, Peacock, Vedlitz, & Grover, 2008).  Social 
vulnerability, in particular among minorities, lower-income groups, and the aged, is associated 
with delayed evacuation, greater incurred damage, fewer resources, and slower rates of 
rebuilding (VanZandt et al., 2012).  Furthermore, as a result of these phenomena, disasters cause 
neighborhood change including increased socioeconomic disparity as populations relocate (Lee, 
2012).  
Overall, disaster research has advanced tremendously in past decades, in part due to 
several events causing large-scale damage to urban areas in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s, 
when that magnitude of destruction was thought to be unique to developing countries (Comerio, 
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1997). However, the growing reach, complexity, and interdependencies in the built environment 
have made determining appropriate mitigation techniques increasingly difficult.   
The Built Environment 
The term built environment literally refers to all types of developed land such as cities, 
suburbs, and rural towns, or any other element constructed by humans.  Thus, this includes 
structures from huts to high-rises, streets and sidewalks, lighting, signage, public art, and 
parkscapes.  Naturally, the built environment also includes contents of those types of features 
such as walls, furniture, and other objects.  There are many theories about the connection 
between people and place and the types of phenomena and behaviors that are influenced by the 
built environment.   
Creating an ideal built environment has been central to planning and architecture for 
millennia.  The past hundred years or so are particularly rich in various planning movements.  
Ebenezer Howard introduced “Garden Cities” in 1898, which promoted freedom from the city, 
including ample green space, with a mix of agriculture, industry, and housing and overall self-
sufficiency in carefully planned and controlled towns (Howard, 1965). Only a few such towns 
were realized in England, but the concept was influential in the U.S.  For example, Clarence 
Perry developed the idea for an idealized neighborhood unit in 1929, meant to encourage 
community and strengthen family life through neighborhood anchors such as schools and parks 
(Lawhon, 2009).  Perry’s sometime-collaborator Clarence Stein, seeking to replicate Garden 
Cities in the U.S., later introduced hierarchical circulation patterns separating pedestrians, local, 
and through traffic at Radburn (Stein, 1949).  Although they were once planning outsiders, the 
radical ideas of Frank Lloyd Wright’s “Broadacre City” and Le Corbusier’s “Radiant City” also 
attempted to revolutionize urban design for modern society (Fishman, 2003).  More recently, 
Kevin Lynch went to great lengths to systematically understand how humans perceive their 
environments and navigate in a complex urban area (Lynch, 1960).  Perhaps the most influential 
planning movements in recent decades has been New Urbanism, which has promoted a return to 
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traditional patterns of development, including walkable, mixed-use neighborhoods (Katz, Scully, 
& Bressi, 1994).  
Scholars have extensively analyzed the purported outcomes of planning movements and 
other built environment techniques.   Common research topics included the impacts of the built 
environment on travel, particularly trip length and mode choice (Ewing & Cervero, 2001); the 
effects of factors such as housing, isolation, and transportation infrastructure on  public health 
and mental health (Srinivasan, O’Fallon, & Dearry, 2003); and building-level up to community-
level impacts of the built environment on the natural environment (Forsberg & VonMalmborg, 
2004).  Studies also have examined the impact of catastrophic events on the built environment, 
such as climate change (Wilby, 2007). 
Research on the built environment extends well beyond the planning and architecture 
domains.  A December 2012 Google Scholar search on the term “built environment” (in quotes) 
returned 17,200 works in 2012 alone.   
Social Networks 
Social networks are assemblages of individuals or groups related to one another through 
connections such as familial ties, friendship, similar interests, similar beliefs, or other types of 
common circumstances.  Although theories related to social networking date back at least to 
Durkheim at the turn of the last century, the body of knowledge has become increasingly 
sophisticated, spurred by an infusion of ideas from the fields of physics and graph theory and a 
rich laboratory of web environments (Facebook, Twitter, Second Life, etc.).  A social network 
can be conceptualized as a web of nodes (individuals or groups) and ties (links between nodes).   
Within a network, nodes can be described by degree centrality (number of node connections), 
betweenness (how many connections include a certain node within a network), and closeness (on 
average, how close a node is to all other nodes).  These values can be used to characterize the 
strength and topology of an entire network or the importance or influence of a single node 
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(Freeman, 1978).  Other methods of measuring networks include elasticity, sociometrics, and 
graphing. 
Social network analysis and other social network approaches can be included in many 
aspects of planning, including forging an understanding of power structures, fostering 
cooperation, and improving the flow of information (Dempwolf & Lyles, 2012).  Perhaps the 
most applicable with respect to community-level networks is in understanding relationships 
involving multiple layers of government as well as informal networks in planning.   Recent 
studies have examined the spatial impacts of networks, generally finding that community exists 
independent of space.  However, social networks impact the planning of space in that they can be 
drawn upon in public participation and economic development activities.   
Social networks may exist independent of physical space; however, networks are often 
organized or biased geographically.  Particularly in times of need, ad hoc networks may form 
locally to mobilize resources.  It should be noted that although a social network may provide 
economic benefits, this is not the primary motivation for joining a network (Lin, Cook, & Burt, 
2001).  Robust social networks are associated with many benefits to individuals, households, and 
organizations: physical, psychological, and social well-being (Aday, 1994; Berkman, Glass, 
Brissette, & Seeman, 2000); employment opportunities (Granovetter, 1973; Montgomery, 1991); 
access to financial resources (Ben-Porath, 1980); information seeking and utilization of social 
services (Birkel & Reppucci, 1983); and community mobilization (Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-
Olson, 1980).  Isolation or lack of social network support is associated with the inverse of these 
conditions, and yet a significant population remains on the margins, unable or unwilling to 
associate with these supportive networks.   
Social networks are considered a conduit for social capital, defined as “investment in 
social relations with expected returns” (Lin et al., 2001).  In connecting individuals, social 
networks allow social capital to be transferred and accumulated in a community.  Social capital 
has two constituent facets, which are strongly correlated: social trust and civic engagement 
(Putnam, 2000).  Therefore, participation in formal social networking organizations, or 
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associational membership, promotes more trusting citizens and greater social capital.  The 
percentage of the population participating in formal networks such as church groups, unions, 
parent teacher associations, has been declining for years (Putnam, 2000), creating a society with 
fewer formal ties through organizations, if not through other social interactions.  Putnam’s work 
outlines the benefits of association activity and the problems connected with weakening 
community engagements, a macro trend that does not appear to be subsiding.   
Critics of Putnam and the wave of interest his work generated in social capital argue that 
social capital is improperly defined, misinterpreted, and conflated with other concepts such as 
Tocqueville’s notion of civil society and that many findings lack empirical rigor (DeFilippis, 
2001).  However, this argument applies chiefly to work that focuses on capital or economic 
growth and neglects dense social networks that lack access to resources but provide other 
benefits.   
Social Networks and Resilience 
In addition to the general advantages that membership in social networks confers 
regarding social and economic position, networks are also instrumental in helping people cope 
with and recover from disasters.  With respect to disaster resilience, social networks have been 
shown to be important for reducing vulnerability in preparing for and responding to a disaster 
(Cutter et al., 2003), for facilitating response and mitigation tactics such as evacuations from the 
bottom-up (Aguirre, 2006), and for improving household-level disaster preparedness by 
increasing the perception of the availability of resources (Paton, 2003).  In terms of associational 
membership, there has been excellent research demonstrating the positive impacts of community 
groups in recovery efforts (Patterson, Weil, & Patel, 2010).  However, disasters impact social 
networks by straining the support network and limiting the effectiveness of individuals that 
would have otherwise provided support to the more vulnerable.  Although surges in support 
through social networks occur after a disaster (so-called new “synthetic communities”), these 
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support networks fall prey to pre-existing conflicts and tend to dissolve even while recovery is 
underway (Tobin, 1999).   
During a disaster, various types of social networks are utilized or formed including 
familial, religious, political, economic, medical, educational, scientific, legal, risk management 
(insurance and first responders, etc.), mass media, communications, transportation, energy, food, 
water, leisure, entertainment, construction, rebuilding, land use, and environmental regulation 
and protection (Aguirre, 2006).  Many such networks, such as faith-based organizations or 
citizen volunteer groups, operate in response to a disaster or emergency but are not part of formal 
disaster planning and management.  Other networks may not have been part of original disaster 
planning and management plans but may become formalized and incorporated into plans and 
preparations for future emergencies.  These types of networks are vital to surviving and 
recovering from disasters and either are or may become a trusted foundation for future resilience. 
According to psychologists (Kaniasty & Norris, 1995), “[r]esearch strongly documents 
this role of social support as a provider of emotional comfort, material goods, self-esteem, or 
information” (p. 396). The authors outline two modes of social network support: the stress buffer 
and main effects models.  Stress buffering encompasses how individuals in crisis are protected 
from resultant stress by the presence of social networks.  According to this model, the benefit 
occurs when the stressor is applied.  In contrast, main effects encompass how social support 
inherently benefits physical and psychological health, regardless of the situation.  The benefits 
for community resilience therefore are more apparent when stress is applied; however, the 
authors believe the inherent benefits also protect the community from physical and mental health 
vulnerabilities ahead of a disaster.  This work focused on three measures of social support: 
support from kin, support from nonkin and general social participation in order to show that 
social networks mediate stress due to disaster events.  Furthermore, the authors showed that 
stress-inducing events act as triggers for mobilizing social support.   
Another study operationalized “sense of community” as one of several “social cognitive 
variables” that can be used to predict preparedness and resilience to a natural hazard (Paton, 
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2003).   Feelings of belonging related to social justice, trust, participation, and empowerment 
within the system were measured.  People with strong feelings of belonging to a place were 
shown to be more likely to convert intentions of preparedness into actual household preparations.  
An earlier piece by the same author (Paton & Johnston, 2001) examined resilience more broadly 
and found that involvement in community activities increases the ability to resist and recover 
from natural hazards and that consensus building in decision making is a significant opportunity 
for empowering residents and promoting resilience.   
The uneven topography of networks across socioeconomic status may impact resilience.  
As social and employment structures evolved in past century and economic conditions have 
deteriorated in inner-city poor neighborhoods, the working-class social network composition and 
some forms of organizational participation have been affected by neighborhood poverty (Rankin 
& Quane, 2000).  These communities tend to lack the social networks ties that may help alleviate 
poverty through better employment or access to resources.  Areas of concentrated poverty tend to 
have lower participation rates in institutional resources such as businesses, schools, social clubs, 
and other organizations (Rankin & Quane, 2000).  Furthermore, poor communities are plagued 
by lower levels of trust and lowered expectations of reciprocal behavior (Stack, 1979).  
Therefore, there is a diminished chance that neighborhoods will aid one another and restricted 
social support in the face of a disaster or other crisis.  Not all impoverished communities lack 
strong social ties – others have found that the inner-city poor and other disenfranchised groups 
are as well-networked as anyone else (Gans, 1962).  However, they are less likely to have 
financial reserves in these networks to recover from a disaster. 
An example of the recovery inequality faced by those without access to social networks 
occurred following Hurricane Andrew.  In one analysis of the disaster (Peacock, Morrow, & 
Gladwin, 1997), communities were compared to ecological systems given the complex, 
interacting social ties.  Community elements were seen as connected through nonhierarchical, 
dynamic contingency linkages through which information, resources, and even individual 
members flowed.  All nodes in the network were dependent on others although 
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interdependencies were not purely reciprocal.  Given the socioeconomic conditions in Miami, 
recovery from the storm was greatly impacted by its pre-existing social ecology, including its 
pervasive inequalities.  For example, the Cuban community benefitted from greater access to 
resources than other minority groups and was thus able to recover more quickly than similarly 
situated networks.  Recovery was impacted by levels of economic development, divisions of 
labor, the political system, and the size of network sub-populations. 
Environmental scientists have also used a social-ecological model to explain disaster 
recovery in coastal areas, similar to the ecological systems model used in the Hurricane Andrew 
analysis (Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockstrom, 2005).  The social-ecological model 
draws upon the recovery and resilience functions of natural ecosystems in framing the parallel 
role of social support networks after a disaster.  For example, after a catastrophic event, 
ecosystems are equipped with a “memory” of biological legacies that allow diverse but 
intertwined organisms to reorganize as before.  Similarly, social memory comes from a diverse 
group of individuals and institutions combining their practices, knowledge, values, and 
worldviews.  This pooled learning creates a more resilient system, able to withstand disasters and 
other major disturbances.  These processes could be observed after the 2004 Asian tsunami, as 
fishing communities on Simelue Island near Sumatra used inherited social memory as well as 
local institutional preparedness to survive despite being close to the earthquake’s epicenter.  
Formal and informal institutions with deep social and environmental knowledge, and 
accordingly, the networks inherent in these institutions, are vital for mitigating the effects of 
disasters. 
A recent study examined earthquake recovery in two incidents in Japan and India with a 
focus on the strength of social networks in recovery and rebuilding (Nakagawa & Shaw, 2004).  
Similar neighborhoods in Kobe, Japan (affected by a 1995 earthquake) and Gujarat, India 
(affected by a 2001 earthquake) were studied.  In this study, social networks defined as bonding, 
bridging, and linking social capital, were found to account for differences in levels of recovery.  
Victims were surveyed using the “Integrated Questionnaires for the Measurement of Social 
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Capital” developed by the United Nations. Based on the results of the survey, the communities 
with the highest levels of social capital (including external and internal networks), displayed the 
fastest recovery despite lower income levels.  The Kobe earthquake shifted Japan’s national 
focus of disaster management from an engineering issue to a social and technical issue.   
Social networks are consistently upheld as an important factor in resilience.  However, 
criticisms generally focus on the difficult in defining both of these terms.  Resilience is difficult 
to measure or even recognize in certain situations.  The time necessary for a community to 
recover may vary by the scale of the disaster and size of the community, therefore, a community 
may spend many years in the reorganization stage of the adaptive cycle before returning to a 
stage of growth.  Similarly, social networks are difficult to identify and measure.  Despite this, 
many studies have attempted to operationalize these concepts and their practical usage has not 
waned. 
The Built Environment and Social Networks 
The influence of the built environment on social networking opportunities and the 
ultimate structures of social networks is a common topic among scholars of various disciplines.  
The spatial configuration of a region impacts the social networking opportunities, particularly 
within and between residents and businesses. Social networks with the most potential for 
resiliency are rooted in the built environment, with the nature, strength, and quantity of social 
ties influenced by development patterns.   
Building on the work of Jane Jacobs, urban planning research has shown that walkable, 
mixed-use neighborhoods can encourage the development of social capital and place attachment 
through an increase in interactions and a higher likelihood of neighborhood amenities, including 
characteristics of the built environment that influence social networks, such as varied land uses 
and pedestrian-oriented design (Leyden, 2003).  New Urbanism claims that factors that influence 
social capital include density, street connectivity, design, and land uses.  However, physical 
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design actually increases the probability of community building through interaction rather than 
creating sense of community prima facie (Talen, 1999).   
A study of Diggs Town (Norfolk, Virginia) (Bothwell, Gindroz, & Lang, 1998) 
demonstrated the ability of neighborhood design to directly improve social interaction by 
surveying residents of a housing project after its redesign from modernist bunkers to New 
Urbanism-style units with front porches and defined lawns. Residents found the new layout safer 
in terms of traffic control and crime and led to greater sense of community and self-esteem.  
Planners have long desired to create a sense of community through urban design and have more 
recently sought to measure and define the relationship between the social and physical realms. 
Problems with the social doctrine of New Urbanism and related trends have been 
presented.  The lack of direct evidence and role of nonenvironmental factors, for example, 
weaken the argument that neotraditional design can encourage social mixing and social capital 
(Talen, 1999).  Although studies have validated certain claims of New Urbanism, such as 
increases in pedestrian travel (Lund, 2003) and property values (Tu & Eppli, 1999) , its espoused 
sense of community has been questioned. 
Anthropologists and sociologists have also examined how the built environment reflects 
and influences our social connections and communications.  However, in contrast to most 
planners and architects, the focus is on the built environment and its constituent elements as 
experienced by cognitive schemata and therefore spaces need not be physically defined.  Spaces 
exist in individuals’ cognitive maps of their surroundings, defined by the activities that take 
place there (Rapoport, 1994).  Development patterns are influenced by politics, codes, and 
ideologies, and many elements of the built environment remain fixed over time (with new 
generations utilizing them).  Spaces therefore transmit cultural meaning and identity over time 
and correspond to and promulgate social structures.   
Social space can also be broken into objective and subjective components (Wilson, 
1980).  Objective components include the nature of people’s interaction in space, which is a 
critical variable contributing to how individuals experience space.  Activity patterns can 
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therefore be predicted from the type of space in question.  The subjective component includes the 
“city of the mind,” or cognitive maps.  These fields provide a basis for understanding how the 
built environment, even after catastrophic damage, exists in human and collective memory and is 
assigned greater value than the bricks and mortar from which it is crafted.  Differences in 
theories behind physical design and social interaction are common among social ecologists, but 
the field has a unified intellectual tradition that space and physical design influences social 
structure (Bothwell et al., 1998).   
Place attachment is also a significant topic in discussions of human interaction with the 
built environment.  Place attachment is based on our past interactions and the potential for future 
interactions between ourselves and our physical surroundings (Milligan, 1998).  Geographic 
space is the stage to which we assign meaning and in which social interactions are set.  The 
bonding of people to place occurs through personal, group, or cultural processes, notably those 
related to social networks. Studies of destruction of place, through natural disasters or slum 
clearance, have been used to illustrate the strong connection between a society or community and 
the specific place in which it resides.  Recent work in Louisiana (Burley, Jenkins, Laska, & 
Davis, 2007 ) found that cross-generational social and economic ties inspired residents of bayou 
communities to fight for wetland protection.  Residents correctly believed that government- and 
industry-funded land losses exacerbated naturally occurring erosion and limited coastal 
protection from hurricanes.  In spite of and because of the growing fragility of their community, 
residents of coastal Louisiana towns continued to experience strong attachment to the unique 
landscape and culture in which they lived.  This attachment varies by community, in that it may 
be tied to specific sites such as unique ecosystems, cafés or parks, architectural styles, or historic 
development patterns.  
Rooted in the field of architecture, space syntax argues that the functions of society 
follow form, or that various social phenomenon are likely to occur because of physical structures 
(Hillier, 2008).  These theories are also influenced by sociology, geography, and anthropology 
and provide a method for measuring and analyzing the impact of space on behavior.  Space 
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syntax literature focuses on the organizing structures that dictate human behavior, such as 
connectivity and sight lines that influence choice and movement in space.  Specific measures 
include metric reach and angular reach, which quantify the connectivity of streets by identifying 
the length of street network accessible within a given distance or number of direction changes 
(Peponis, Bafna, & Zhang, 2008).   Specific to space syntax, previous studies have shown that 
the spatial configuration of spaces affects social behavior. For example, retail and other 
movement-seeking land uses gravitate toward higher movement locations, which are statistically 
more likely to be well integrated with the urban grid (Hillier, 1999a). Additionally, it has been 
shown that the level of development of a neighborhood is contingent upon its embeddedness in 
the circulation system of a city, either preventing or encouraging economic activity and social 
capital (Hillier, 1999b).   Finally, many factors that relate to resilience have been associated with 
integration, reach, and other syntax measures.  These include urban poverty, economic activity, 
social interactions, and the distribution of land uses, among others.   
The relationship between space and poverty (which is correlated with fewer networking 
opportunities) has been investigated and defined by recent space syntax research (Carpenter & 
Peponis, 2010; Vaughan, 2007; Vaughan, Chatford Clark, Sahbaz, & Haklay, 2005).  Generally, 
access to economic and social opportunities through well-integrated spaces has been associated 
with a higher incidence of wealth at the smallest levels of analysis (parcels and block faces).  
According to Vaughan (2007), the relationship between space and poverty has been discounted 
by researchers and decision-makers.  However, Vaughan showed that  space at least partially 
explains the causes and persistence of poverty (Vaughan et al., 2005).  Street integration was 
shown to greatly affect the distribution of social classes in London. There, higher-class streets 
tended to be significantly longer with much more direct accessibility (in terms of directional 
reach) than lower-class streets (Vaughan, 2005).   The concentration of poverty in urban areas 
and increased isolation from the wealthy has been well documented (Massey, 1996).  Since the 
formation of the earliest settlements, the density of impoverished households has been increasing 
in cities, with the greatest extremes seen in the current post-industrial era.  
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There are differences in levels of social networking among impoverished and isolated 
communities, however.  In addition to the inherent differences in networking based on the built 
environment, there may be cultural or historical conditions that lead to atypical networking 
behavior.  In fact, certain groups form local solidarity networks with positive benefits.  As early 
as 1925, research from the Chicago School identified “natural areas” or neighborhoods formed 
by proximity and social contact (VanKempen, 1994).  These units are analogous to and informed 
thinking on ghettos and slums and other sub-ecologies of poverty found in cities.  Social 
isolation has been shown to be a contributing factor to persistent poverty and is most prevalent 
where real estate in undesirable and impervious to gentrification.  These spaces are found 
clustered in cheap, dilapidated, and inaccessible areas, such as inner-ring suburbs in the U.S.  
Despite the limitations of exclusion, homogeneity (of income, ethnicity, or similar) may also 
strengthen social support ties through solidarity (Bolt, Burgers, & VanKempen, 1998).  Social 
and geographical similarities provide necessary resources such as employment, entrepreneurial 
support, informal economies, and family services like child care. 
Overall, the built environment is shown to impact social systems and social networks 
through a variety of mechanisms.  Critics have questioned methodological approaches and 
theoretical models, as nonenvironmental factors may also be at play.  However, increased 
sophistication in the field and greater mainstream interest has ensured its continuation. 
The Built Environment, Social Networks, and Disaster Resilience 
Although the link between the built environment, social networks, and disaster resilience 
has not been expressly connected, a few studies have identified physical manifestations of the 
link between social networks and disaster resilience, or artifacts of the built environment that can 
predict resilience.   
For example, physical structures that facilitate social networks were found to contribute 
significantly to day-to-day recovery activities in a case study of five flood-impacted communities 
in the Midwest (Sherraden & Fox, 1997).  In this instance, networks were most effective in 
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recovery when they have an organizational base, or a physical address in which activities could 
be centralized and staged.   
A second example of the influence of the built environment on social networks and the 
impact of this relationship on disaster resilience is the Chicago heat wave of 1995.  Prolonged 
temperatures above 100 degrees Fahrenheit, scattered power outages, loss of fire hydrant 
pressure, and surges in emergency room and hospital demand taxed the city’s resources.  
Overall, 485 people died due to heat-related causes over the course of one week, far exceeding 
the 222-bay holding capacity of the morgue.  A social and geographical analysis of the event 
(Klinenberg, 2002) illustrated the grim patterns of vulnerability in Chicago, a city described as 
famously divided, with distinct borders separating regions and groups that touch but do not 
interpenetrate.  The losses of life were disproportionately felt in socially and spatially 
disenfranchised communities.   Victims tended to be social outcasts, including the elderly, the 
poor, minorities, and the isolated.  Geographically, these deaths were concentrated in low-
income, ethnic or racial minority, and violent regions of Chicago.  Further, the elderly, who 
comprised 73 percent of the casualties, were concentrated in public and for-profit single room 
occupancy dwellings in poor neighborhoods.  Chicago’s social problems were reflected in and 
reinforced by the spatial distribution of disenfranchised populations and un-networked 
households, reducing its overall resilience to the heat wave crisis.  
In another study of the Chicago heat wave of 1995, The U.S. Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) and Prevention conducted 339 matched-pair surveys of victims and control survivors and 
included social networks and living conditions in their data collection (Semenza et al., 1996).  
The results of these interviews and ensuing statistical analysis showed that living alone more 
than doubled the risk of death, participation in group activities reduced the risk, having friends in 
the Chicago area reduced the risk, not leaving the home increased the risk of death, and having a 
pet in the home reduced the risk.  The empirical evidence offered by the CDC illustrates the 
impact of living arrangements and social networks on the loss of lives.   
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Kevin Lynch argued that “A city is hard to kill, in part because of its strategic geographic 
location, its concentrated, persisting stock of physical capital, and even more because of the 
memories, motives, and skills of its inhabitants” (Vale & Campanella, 2005).  The desire to 
rebuild rather than retreat is somehow imprinted in society, at least in part through the social 
structures that transmit the emotional and cultural meanings of a place.  Overall, the literature 
supports the notions that social networks promote resilience, that the built environment impacts 
social networks (and social networks influence the built environment), and that elements of the 
built environment may therefore be beneficial to disaster resilience.  A number of theories exist 
as to how aspects of the social and built environments impact disaster recovery and overall 
community resilience.  Although many conceptual models of these relationships are offered, 
there is consensus that socially engaged communities are most resilient and that an underlying 
urban design that includes well-connected streets and diverse spaces encourages social 
engagement.  Therefore, this research sought to establish an empirical link by comparing data 
before and after Hurricane Katrina. 
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CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND ON THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 
The Mississippi Gulf Coast, three counties nestled between New Orleans, Louisiana and 
Mobile, Alabama, is an historic region marked by river valleys, estuaries, bays, and an 81-mile 
long lagoon, the Mississippi Sound.  Before European settlers altered the landscape, small barrier 
islands protected a coastline thick with magnolia, live oaks, and great pine barrens up to 90 feet 
in height.  Geopolitical conflicts, immigration, and emerging technologies have led to significant 
changes to the area over several centuries.  Despite prolific development beginning in World 
War I, the Mississippi Gulf Coast remains a humble and provincial enclave, with a distinctive 
culture.  The built environment has also been repeatedly transformed by frequent destructive 
hurricanes. 
Early History 
Evidence of Paleo-American sites has been located along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, 
dating back to around 12,000 BCE ("Hancock County Historical Society," 2011).  However, 
Native Americans populations, including the Biloxis, the Pascagoulas, the Acolopissas, and two 
or three small tribes whose names have been lost to history (Riley, 1915), peaked and began to 
decline even before the arrival of Europeans.  The three larger tribes each encompassed 300 to 
500 members around the time that Europeans arrived.  They were hunter-gatherers and 
subsistence farmers and lived in fortified river villages in palmetto-thatched huts.  Their decline 
was undoubtedly hastened by the arrival of Europeans, as tribal settlements were introduced to 
foreign diseases and suffered a loss of tribal control.   
Following the expedition of Columbus in 1492, Spanish explorers and conquistadors 
came to the Mississippi Coast on violent missions to discover gold.  Spain’s dominance over the 
region declined in the late 1600s, when French and English explorers began migrating from 
Canada and the Atlantic coast, respectively, to gain control of the Mississippi River and to claim 
colonial lands.   
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The first attempt at a permanent European settlement was by the French-Canadian 
explorer Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville in 1699.  France funded Iberville to control of the Gulf of 
Mexico coast.  On a suitable deep-water natural harbor now called Ship Island, he plotted the 
first European fort, settlement, and capital in the area (predating the founding of New Orleans).  
Iberville established Fort Maurepas in present-day Ocean Springs, then known as Biloxi after the 
tribe.  An alliance made between the French and the three native tribes lasted, more or less, for 
64 years.  Along with its strategic harbor, Biloxi was considered optimal for observing the 
Spanish settlement in Pensacola and the English settlements in Georgia, both of whom were 
eager to expand their land holdings in North America. 
The original fortification at Biloxi stood only a few years before being moved east in 
1702 to Mobile, Alabama.  At this point, France and Spain had allied in a war against England, 
and thus the seat of French control was moved closer to the Spanish fort at Pensacola to 
capitalize on the strategic relationship between the two powers.  Iberville was commissioned 
elsewhere, leaving his brother Jean Baptiste LeMoyne, Sieur de Bienville, to head the 
undersupplied French colonies.  By this time, survival had become so difficult that many of the 
Frenchmen defected to live amongst the natives, sparking outrage from the many conservative 
Jesuits that were left behind.   
After the war between England and France ended in Europe, the French crown had little 
use for its Gulf Coast colony and granted control to a private financier, Antoine Crozat, leading 
to its continued decline.  The first recorded catastrophic hurricane decimated the colony in 
August 1717.  The storm drastically altered the landscape of the coast and led to the 
establishment of New Orleans as a replacement for the fort at hurricane-ravaged Dauphin Island 
(near Mobile).  Around this time, the French seat was again moved to “New Biloxi” (west of the 
original location and the site of the modern city of Biloxi) from Mobile.  After Crozat’s financial 
failure, France ceded the colony to another opportunistic businessman, John Law, who initiated 
an ambitious marketing campaign, but was eventually ousted after financially ruining his 
stockholders. 
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Commercial interests ruled for the next several decades (from about 1713 to 1731), as 
France was embroiled in costly conflicts abroad and remained unable to manage the colony.   
The first African American slaves were brought to the region and forced into labor around 1707.  
Plantation slave labor produced rice, tobacco, and indigo. This agricultural diversity gradually 
waned, as cotton proved to be the most lucrative crop.  Although commerce was liberally 
managed, society was not.  A “Black Code” was enacted in 1724, which restricted the rights of 
even freed slaves and named Catholicism the only accepted religion.   
The capital of the French colony was moved again in 1723 to New Orleans, the year that 
another major hurricane struck the Gulf Coast.  Because of storm damage, Biloxi was virtually 
abandoned and records of all coastal settlements from around this time are almost nonexistent, 
except mentions of two more hurricanes in 1740 and in 1746.  Between 1727 and 1763, little is 
known about the conditions of the depleted settlements in and around Biloxi, although a few 
families are known to have survived past the French colonial period.   
It is almost remarkable that these colonial settlements survived given the early history of 
natural disasters and economic uncertainty.  Yet, despite the difficulty in maintaining a 
substantial population, Biloxi and other settlements persevered.   
Late Colonial Period 
England drove France from North America in 1763 following the French defeat in the 
Seven Years’ War, establishing English rule on the Mississippi Gulf Coast that lasted until the 
U.S. Revolutionary War.  As an English territory, the Mississippi Gulf Coast was part of West 
Florida, the capital of which was Pensacola.  Many French residents and native Biloxis and 
Pascagoulas fled west of the Mississippi River to what had become Spanish Louisiana (with an 
administrative capital in Havana, Cuba) rather than pledge allegiance to the English crown.  
Centuries later, this shift was still lamented: according to one historian, the “gay, adventurous 
French gave way to the thrifty, industrious English” (Riley, 1915). 
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The English occupied the fort at Biloxi and port at Ship Island in order to protect its 
holdings from the Spanish at New Orleans.  However, the Gulf Coast British forces were 
stretched thin, allowing the remaining French living in the area, who were isolated by language 
and religion from the English, to live relatively unmolested.  Numbering about 500, the French 
holdovers began illegally smuggling tar, lumber, and other products to New Orleans, a lucrative 
business.  Despite their isolation, the French began to germinate the industries that eventually 
would characterize the area’s economy – major tobacco and cotton operations, silviculture, and 
shipbuilding.  However, in 1772, another catastrophic hurricane destroyed crops and settlements 
up to 30 miles inland, including a successful plantation in Pascagoula run by the Krebs family.  
Only one structure from this plantation is still standing, and it is the oldest structure in the state 
of Mississippi.     
The onset of the U.S. Revolution resulted in a mass migration of English loyalists and 
Tories to Mississippi, which initially remained under English rule.  Tensions between English 
refugees and the multiethnic locals rose as the U.S., France, and eventually Spain allied against 
England in the conflict. The Revolutionary years of English rule were accordingly turbulent.  
 Successful raids by the U.S. and a European war between Spain and Britain allowed 
Spain to gain control of English West Florida in 1783.   In exchange for allegiance to Spain and 
the Catholic Church, Spain ruled over the citizens of Mississippi liberally, in an effort to appease 
the locals and to encourage immigration and revenue.  The Spanish courted trade with natives 
and kept taxes low to attract investment.   
The U.S. gained control of much of present-day Mississippi and Alabama north of the 
thirty-first parallel in 1798, years after it first laid claim to this land under the Georgia charter 
and after many assaults.  Spain retained Florida, including the Mississippi Gulf Coast, still part 
of West Florida.  The rest of the state was renamed “Mississippi Territory” and many American 
pioneers emigrated to the new territory as well as the adjacent coastal area.  This led to frictions 
with the established French, Spanish, and Native American populations over the most valuable 
land. 
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In 1810, rebels engaged in successful uprisings in strategic locations such as Baton 
Rouge and Pascagoula.  The coastal area was briefly (for a 74 day period) declared the 
independent Republic of West Florida; however, the U.S. government superseded the rebel 
government and claimed the Mississippi Gulf Coast (the parishes of Biloxi and Pascagoula) as 
part of the U.S.-controlled Orleans Territory. 
Following this period of conflict, the coast was terrorized by gangs of robbers and 
marauders.  The Orleans Territory governor authorized special agents, or justices of the peace, to 
eliminate the threat.  According to one such justice, in 1811, Biloxi numbered 420 residents and 
Pascagoula 350.  In order to provide postal services to the growing population, new roads were 
laid along the coast from New Orleans to Mobile and sailboat services between towns were 
initiated.  Wealthy New Orleanians discovered the coast as a welcome summer retreat to escape 
oppressive heat and epidemics of yellow fever.  
In 1812, Orleans Territory became part of the new State of Louisiana, and the coastal 
area entered by statute into the Mississippi Territory.  Coastal Mississippians were forced to 
defend themselves in the War of 1812, as the Spanish (still ensconced in Florida) were allied 
with the enemy English against the U.S.  The Spanish incited the native Creek tribe, resulting in 
a two-year campaign between Spain and the U.S.  General Andrew Jackson led an invasion of 
the Creek stronghold at Horseshoe Bend, whereupon he became the defender of the Gulf Coast 
border against the British, with successes at Mobile and New Orleans, and a major contributor to 
the U.S. victory in the war. 
The victory ushered in an era of nationalism and solidarity.  Moreover, the belief in 
manifest destiny led to increased migration to the southeast frontier.  With the resulting swell in 
population, Mississippi Territory finally achieved statehood in 1817.   
This period of Gulf Coast history was also characterized by conflict and mercenary 
economic activity, with few major hurricanes of significance.  Populations were still low but 
were poised to explode as new wealth entered the area.   
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Antebellum Period 
During the antebellum period of 1815 to 1861, cities along the Mississippi Gulf Coast 
grew and prospered as resort spas and getaways for the urban south.  This included the so-called 
“Six Sisters” of Shieldsboro (now Bay St Louis), Pass Christian, Mississippi City, Biloxi, Ocean 
Springs, and Pascagoula. Hotels, boardinghouses, wharfs, and bathing facilities were built for 
visitors.  Small permanent populations and summer residents built cottages, villas, and small 
plantations.  Local businesses and institutions were established as the needs of the population 
grew, including the second-oldest yacht club in the U.S. at Pass Christian.  By 1860, the 
Mississippi Gulf Coast boasted 12,000 year-round inhabitants, with populations doubling or 
tripling in the summer.  Summer festivities were grand and lively, attracting impressive wealth 
from New Orleans, Mobile, and Natchez. 
Commercial and industrial centers were formed on the back bay of Biloxi at Handsboro 
(now part of Gulfport); on the Pearl River at Pearlington, Gainesville, Napoleon, and Logtown; 
on the Pascagoula River at Elder’s Ferry (now Moss Point); and at the head of the Bay of St 
Louis at Wolftown (now Delisle).  These industrial towns supported the building boom occurring 
in adjacent resort villages.  Both the resorts and commercial-industrial centers were connected by 
steamboat service to larger cities such as New Orleans. 
In the midst of this building boom, the region was struck by another severe hurricane in 
1860, which leveled structures and destroyed infrastructure, including newly built telegraph 
lines.  Two strong hurricanes occurred shortly after, leaving residents and tourists stranded 
without aid.   
That same year, the election of President Abraham Lincoln caused further turmoil and 
uncertainty.  In January 1861, Mississippi became the second state to secede from the Union and 
the state prepared itself for war.  Many local men joined the Confederate Third Mississippi 
Regiment, which deployed early in the war, and returned to serve the final years on the coast.  
Less than five percent of that regiment survived the conflict.  Although fighting in coastal 
Mississippi was limited and local civilian casualties were very few, skirmishes occurred between 
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Federal warships operating off Ship Island and Confederate forces in Biloxi, Pass Christian, and 
Pascagoula.  Furthermore, Union blockades at Ship Island and along the coast restricted 
commerce in local ports.  Upon the Confederate defeat that resulted in the surrender of New 
Orleans in April 1862, the Third Mississippi Regiment retreated along with most inhabitants of 
the area.  Those that remained were neglected by the Confederates and continually raided by the 
Union army and “jayhawker” draft dodgers.  The Confederate states surrendered on April 9, 
1865, bringing an end to the war. 
Post-Civil War Era 
After the surrender, the once-prosperous State of Mississippi emerged as the poorest in 
the nation, an unfortunate title it has retained.  Pascagoula had been burned and pillaged.  Other 
Mississippi Gulf Coast cities were relatively unscathed by battle; however, in those areas that 
were not directly damaged by fighting, the neglect of the war years was still apparent.  
Restoration began immediately, including resumption of steamboat services and reopening of 
hotels, mills and foundries. 
In 1867, the U.S. Army instituted military Reconstruction.  Slavery had been abolished, 
African Americans were now granted the right to own land, and public education was made 
available for all.  Although most the Gulf Coast had largely been too poor to afford slaves prior 
to the war, a small contingent of free African Americans lived in the region.  Racial tensions 
began to escalate, notably in an 1869 race riot between white firefighters and African American 
railroad workers traveling by steamship, in which two men were killed.   
Reconstruction produced bitterness in the occupied South, but Gulf Coast residents were 
pleased by the government’s plans for the first railroad line in the region, completed between 
New Orleans, Mobile, and Chattanooga in 1870.  The new railroad brought employment and 
renewed tourism, including visitors from the Northern and Midwestern U.S., to the region.  It 
also increased the industrialization of Pascagoula, opened up agriculture production for export, 
and established new population centers at rail stations at Waveland and Long Beach.  The 
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railroads combined with the advent of ice plants also gave rise to the seafood industry.  These 
industries attracted immigrants from Italy, Greece, and the Balkan states (at the time, part of 
Austria-Hungary). 
 
Figure 3: Map of New Orleans to Mobile railroad and population centers, circa 1890 
Source: (Dyer, 1971) 
In 1893, another major hurricane struck the Gulf Coast.  The storm was the deadliest to 
hit the area, with more than 2,000 casualties.  In addition, the storm annihilated the infrastructure 
of the seafood industry and halted progress on new telephone and electric services.  The area 
rebounded quickly with resources and help from the citizens of New Orleans and the Red Cross, 
an early example of organizational and individual support in disaster recovery. 
An additional rail line was established in 1896 from Hattiesburg and the piney woods to 
the newly established city of Gulfport.  The Ship Island Channel was dredged to grant direct 
access to Gulfport by sea.  In the span of a few years, the fledgling city of Gulfport took off as a 
lumber and exporting hub, usurping Pascagoula and Biloxi as the commercial center for the 
Mississippi Coast. 
Reconstruction and the years leading up to the turn of the twentieth century were 
tumultuous.  Yet, in the midst of the unrest, several new population centers were formed.  
Although tourism was still an important economic activity, railroads and the seafood industry 
helped modernize and industrialize the region.  However, progress was once again tempered by 
forces of nature, as hurricanes remained a deadly and unpredictable threat.  A map of hurricane 
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strikes from 1850 to 2012 is shown in Figure 4, illustrating the concentration of damage over 
time in the region.  
 
 
Figure 4: Historic hurricane tracks and level of impact to Mississippi Coast 
 
Modern Era 
 Development intensified during the turn of the twentieth century.  The Mississippi Coast 
was established as a center for seafood, lumber, and tourism.  Technologies such as telephones, 
electricity, trolleys and automobiles became widespread.  There were new diversions such as 
cinemas and air shows for tourists and residents.  The first official Mardi Gras celebration in 
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Biloxi took place in 1908, including a parade and masked ball (informal Mardi Gras traditions 
date back to the French colonial period in Mississippi). 
In 1914, the outbreak of World War I led to a downturn in exports of seafood and upticks 
in the demand for lumber and shipbuilding, accompanied by a surge in population to support 
these industries.  Another major hurricane struck the area in 1915, with damage so severe that 
plans for a protective seawall were initiated.  Construction began in 1924; however, before it was 
fully completed, the seawall was tested by another hurricane in 1926.  The reinforced concrete 
wall, spanning 24 miles from Biloxi to Pass Christian, successfully withstood the storm.  Similar 
walls were built in Bay St Louis and between Ocean Springs and Pascagoula.  Waterfront 
construction exploded in response to what appeared to be a solution to erosion and flooding. 
By 1925, the first U.S. highway in the area was completed, linking Mobile and New 
Orleans (named the Old Spanish Trail, or U.S. Highway 90).  However, the 1929 crash and Great 
Depression brought a sudden end to the building boom along the coast.  As after previous 
economic catastrophes, the coast eventually regrouped, once again producing ships and other war 
materiel for World War II.  Perhaps more significantly, the coast’s suitability for supporting the 
war effort brought new military installations established at Pass Christian, Gulfport (Gulfport 
Army Airfield), and Biloxi (Keesler Air Force Base).  A surge in population and flood of 
government contracts ensued; the military influence permanently changed the character of the 
region. 
Another major hurricane struck in 1947, prompting construction of a sandy beach buffer 
and improvements to the damaged U.S. Highway 90.  In addition, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers cut a deep channel along the length of the Mississippi Sound, between the barrier 
islands and the mainland, in order to better defend the coast from foreign invasion.  These 
developments ushered in yet another industrial expansion, increased port activity for the existing 
shipbuilding and lumber sectors, and attracted chemical and energy companies.   
Road construction also facilitated early suburban sprawl.  In the 1960s, the first regional 
suburban mall was inaugurated in Biloxi, to the detriment of historic downtown commercial 
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centers.  Biloxi and Pascagoula responded by converting historic business districts into enclosed 
shopping centers and by annexing suburban areas.  Interstate 10 was completed in the late 1950s, 
running east to west through Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties. The new highway was 
built north of and parallel to U.S. Highway 90, which subsequently became a local connector. 
During the early years of the civil rights movement, although efforts such as the 
Mississippi Freedom Summer and the Freedom Rides concentrated in the Mississippi Delta and 
in Jackson, there were several instances of social upheaval in coastal cities.  For example, many 
African American residents demonstrated and petitioned against segregation of Gulf Coast 
beaches.  Despite harassment and violence during “wade-ins” at local beaches in 1960, 
segregation laws were challenged and African Americans were soon granted access to entire 
beach.  This movement has been credited as the beginning of the civil rights movement in 
Mississippi (Hearn, 2004). 
In 1969, the devastating Hurricane Camille struck the coast, the second-strongest 
hurricane in recorded history after the 1935 Labor Day Hurricane.  Ahead of the storm, 
evacuation warnings were issued.  Although this saved thousands of lives, the intense winds of 
more than 230 miles per hour and storm surges of 20 to 25 feet resulted in 144 deaths and $1.4 
billion in property damage.  Almost no structure was spared, and many historic buildings were 
destroyed, such as the iconic Biloxi lighthouse built in the 1870s.   
The storm had a profound impact on the psyches of residents and on the natural and 
human-made landscape.  According to the writer Elizabeth Spencer (Jackson, 2010): 
If I could have one part of the world back the way it used to be, I would not 
choose Dresden before the fire bombing, Rome before Nero, or London before the 
blitz. I would not resurrect Babylon, Carthage or San Francisco. Let the leaning 
tower lean and the hanging gardens hang. I want the Mississippi Gulf Coast back 
the way it was before Hurricane Camille. . . . 
 
Cleaning up after Camille was laborious, with the military providing much-needed labor 
for clearing the carnage.  Long term recovery was predominantly undertaken by the affected 
individuals and was facilitated by government aid.  For 36 years, Camille served as the 
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bellwether against which all other storms were judged.  Those properties that did not “get water” 
from the storm surge of Camille were considered (in many cases incorrectly) to be impenetrable 
in a hurricane of the greatest possible magnitude.   
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, in the later years of the Vietnam War, South 
Vietnamese refugees settled in the Gulf Coast, finding the climate and geography somewhat 
similar their homeland, and established communities and livelihoods in the seafood industry and 
in tourism, even in the difficult economic climate of the time. Clashes with the established 
fishing community occurred over standards of navigation and acceptable catches (Starr, 1977).   
During the 1970s, the term “Redneck Riviera” was popularized to describe the Gulf 
Coast from Mississippi to Florida’s Panhandle based on the festive but modest atmosphere.  As it 
was in the previous century, tourism continued to be a major industry for the coast.  In the 1980s, 
an arcane law allowing off-shore gambling in Mississippi was rediscovered, accelerating 
tourism, and economic growth in general, on the coast (Jackson, 2010).  The number of casinos 
tripled by 1994, resulting in enormous surges in housing construction and reduced 
unemployment (Applebome, 1994).  These developments consequently displaced many 
shrimping industry outfits and family-owned businesses.   
In 2005, just before Katrina struck, the coast was experiencing continued population and 
economic growth – tourism and gambling, heavy industry, and the military complex were solid 
industries.  Approximately $1 billion in development projects were underway, including 
expansions of the convention center and airport, and several new hotels and casinos.  The grand 
resorts of the coast, relics of a more provincial past, had mostly disappeared.  The seawalls held 
smaller hurricanes at bay, but Camille demonstrated that the coast was still vulnerable to great 
storms.   
Hurricane Katrina 
Regarded as the most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history, Hurricane Katrina 
struck the Mississippi Coast on August 29, 2005.  Initially forming as a tropical depression over 
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the Bahamas, the storm gained strength and first struck South Florida as a Category 1 hurricane 
on August 25.  The storm weakened as it moved across Florida, but intensified in the Gulf of 
Mexico.  At its peak strength in the Gulf of Mexico, Katrina was a Category 5 hurricane, with 
winds of 170 miles per hour and a 200 mile radius (Cutter et al., 2006).  Katrina made landfall a 
second time, its eye crossing at the border of Mississippi and Louisiana, at 9:45 a.m. on August 
29, 2005 (Figure 5).  At this point, the storm was a Category 3 hurricane with wind speeds of 120 
miles per hour and a radius of 140 miles and took nearly two hours to reel through the area.  The 
landfall location and strength of the storm made it among the deadliest and the most costly 
hurricanes in U.S. history, with more than 1,800 dead, one million people displaced, $80 billion 
in property damage, and 90,000 square miles of land impacted (Cutter et al., 2006).   
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Figure 5: NOAA Hurricane Katrina forecast on August 28, 2005 
Source: NOAA and National Weather Service 
 
Storm surges of up to 30 feet inundated the coast of Mississippi; in Mississippi alone, 
there were 230 deaths, more than 100,000 left homeless, and more than 200,000 homes that 
received some damage (Governor's Report on Recovery, 2010).  The landscape appeared as if an 
atomic bomb had been dropped, “houses reduced to debris, a rubble-land, buildings razed as if 
by one of the companies that do that for a living” (Barthelme, 2005).  Important economic 
drivers in Mississippi, such as tourism (particularly off-shore casino gambling) and the seafood 
industry were also decimated by the storm.  Casino revenues fell by 28 percent the following 
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season.  The under-construction, Frank Gehry-designed Ohr-O’Keefe art museum was damaged 
when an unmoored casino barge slammed into the structure. 
The immediate emergency response in Mississippi was undertaken by federal and state 
authorities and local first responders.  Ahead of the Katrina, Mississippi’s State Emergency 
Operations Center (SEOC) was activated near Jackson as a unified command center for FEMA, 
the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and other federal and state agencies.  
A staging area for the State Emergency Response Team, National Guard, and other response 
teams was established at Camp Shelby in Hattiesburg (Governor's Report on Recovery, 2010).  
MEMA and the National Guard deployed liaisons to the counties nearest the coast.   
The relief effort in Mississippi began almost immediately after the storm cleared, 
orchestrated by federal and state agencies, faith-based organizations, and other nonprofits.  An 
estimated 25,000 people from around the U.S. assisted with the effort (Governor's Report on 
Recovery, 2010).  Emergency shelters operated through October 2005, after which FEMA 
provided trailers and other temporary housing. 
In September 2005, Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour established the Governor’s 
Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal to guide long-term planning and rebuilding, 
which was reorganized into the Governor’s Office of Recovery and Renewal (GORR) in 2006.  
Mississippi residents were outraged when the commission allocated $570 million in federal 
housing funds from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program to refurbish the Port of Gulfport.  A 
contentious legal battle resulted in $132 million directed back to housing for low- and moderate-
income households. The controversy had a profound impact on the trust of survivors and 
constituents in state government and the use of recovery dollars. 
Post-Katrina research (Petterson, Stanley, Glazier, & Philipp, 2006) summarized the 
immediate social and economic impacts of the storm using empirical data from a wide variety of 
sources.  Social impacts observed included the dispersal of 1.5 million (registered) evacuees and 
problems associated with administering aid to these individuals, the lack of housing and 
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employment opportunities limiting return to the area (coinciding with labor shortages), ethnic 
shifts in the area and in communities with a large influx of Katrina refugees, and impacts on the 
very poor, including possible displacement and gentrification.   
Eight years after Katrina, the Mississippi Gulf Coast is still rebuilding and certain 
populations have not returned.  The area is in transition, with reminders of Katrina still evident in 
dilapidated structures and empty lots.  Even where reconstruction has occurred, the sense of loss 
is still apparent: 
In North Gulfport, as damaged houses are razed and gas stations and fast-food 
restaurants are erected in their place, we lose even more of our history. ''The old 
gas streetlamps on Main Street in Biloxi are gone,'' Joe [the author’s brother] 
tells me. ''They've replaced them with regular streetlights.'' ''It's nice,'' he says of 
all the new construction on the coast, ''but not the same.'' [his girlfriend] Aesha 
agrees: ''The historic neighborhoods of Biloxi have disappeared,'' she says. ''It 
was only a bunch of shotgun houses, but when I think of the coast, that's what I 
see.'' (Now, she tells me, the plans are to build a casino there.) (Trethewey, 2010) 
 
Like Hurricane Camille 36 year earlier, Katrina swept away even more of the area’s rich 
history and displaced its residents.   
As shown in Figure 6, in the past 160 years the area has witnessed multiple high-intensity 
hurricanes that made landfall in any of the three coastal Mississippi counties.  On average, the 
region has experience hurricane causing significant damage every 9.4 years since 1850.  Of 
those, the 1893 unnamed storm, Camille (1969) and Katrina (2005) were the most deadly and 
costly.  Historically, hurricanes have seemingly had little effect on population growth (see 1890 
to 1910 or 1940 to 1980), or have even preceded spurts in growth (see 1850 to 1860 and 1910 to 
1920).  However, the impact of four major hurricanes in ten years from 1998 to 2008 has likely 
been responsible in part for a flattening of population growth since 1998.  U.S. military action 
has also been a driver of population growth, with Civil War reconstruction and industrial activity 
associated with World War I, World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War accounting 




Figure 6: Hurricane strikes versus population, three coastal Mississippi counties 1850 to 2010 
Source: FEMA and U.S. Census data 
 
Compared with the rest of the country, the area is clearly more susceptible to hurricanes.  
The mean number of disasters per county from 1965 to 2008 is only 12.1 for the U.S., and the 
mean for coastal Mississippi is 19, demonstrating the increased risk and vulnerability of the area.  
As show in Table 1, the three coastal counties of Mississippi have experienced six times as many 
hurricanes than the rest of the country. 
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Table 1: Mean number of disasters per county during the period from 1965 to 2008 
 All U.S. 
counties 
Study area: 3 coastal 
MS counties 
Flood 2.4 1.0 
Hurricane 2.1 12.0 
Severe Storm(s) 4.2 5.0 
All disasters 12.1 19.0 
Source: FEMA, April 1965 to September 2008 
 
Recent 30-year forecasts predict more frequent and intense hurricanes (Webster, Holland, 
Curry, & Chang, 2005).  Therefore, the population and economy of the coast will face enormous 
challenges in the future without strategic planning for greater disaster resilience.  Worldwide, 
increasing urbanization and a growing reliance on interdependent technologies and infrastructure 
systems are increasing vulnerability along with disaster risk.  Given the increasing shocks of 
natural disasters, a more complete understanding of resilience is important for creating safer, 
more sustainable communities.  
Since Katrina, recovery has been uneven, and thus it begs the question what qualities 
make one community more resilient than another?  Why have populations returned or even 
increased in certain communities and others seem unable to regain original population levels?  
The Mississippi Gulf Coast has endured colonial-era struggles for power, the Civil War, and 
numerous major hurricanes.  A few communities have been abandoned, most have waxed and 
waned in population, and some have remained fairly constant.  As in the quote above, area 
residents often speak of the unique built environment as a symbol of their community.  
Interpersonal relationships are another important factor rooting individuals in their community.  
Accordingly, the following research aims to determine how these concepts interrelate and what 
aspects are most important for determining the resilience of a community, using the Mississippi 
Gulf Coast before and after Hurricane Katrina as a case study. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN 
Conceptual Model 
The research isolates a particular aspect of resilience that borrows and distills ideas from 
many disciplines in order to understand how physical planning impacts a community’s ability to 
withstand and recover from a natural disaster.  The conceptual model (Figure 7) summarizes the 
theory that communities are more or less resilient to disasters and that this is caused in part by 
the qualities of the built environment, which exert control on social networking activity.  
Essentially, the built environment supports and enhances social networks, which in turn 
determine resilience in the face of a disaster or other upheaval.  Social networks can be difficult 
to measure, particularly at the scale of entire communities.  Therefore, understanding the link 
between the built environment and social networks in this context may allow us to make 
assumptions about networks based on more measurable qualities of place.   
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Figure 7: Conceptual model 
 
This above model is based on the findings of the literature review.  The relationships in 
the model between social networks and resilience and between the built environment and social 
networks are well understood.  The link between more resilient communities and strong formal 
and informal social networks has been established through empirical data.  For example, it has 
been shown that social networks are a major contributor to the resilience of a community by 
providing and transferring social capital, resources, and information for recovery; enhancing 
economic and social opportunities; increasing levels of institutional trust; empowering residents 
and reducing vulnerability in preparing for and responding to a disaster; facilitating disaster 
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response and mitigation from the bottom-up; and for predicting household-level disaster 
preparedness by increasing the perception of the availability of resources.  Specifically, along the 
Gulf Coast, it has been previously shown that higher levels of civic engagement and social 
capital were significantly correlated with stronger levels of recovery  as defined by repopulation, 
and reduced blight and crime (Mitchell, 1969).  The effect of strong social networks on 
resilience, shown in the bottom of the conceptual model diagram, is the portion with the 
strongest causal ties, based on previous work in a variety of fields.   
In previous studies, the physical structure and other elements of the built environment 
have been shown to contribute to greater social capital and social networks, although not 
specifically as they relate to disaster resilience.  Features such as walkable, mixed-use 
neighborhoods encourage the development of social capital and place attachment and 
connectivity increases the probability of social interaction by increasing the potential for any 
origin-destination pair to traverse any point in space.  Features such as open space, historic 
properties, and institutions that encourage socializing add to the sense of place and further both 
social networking opportunities and place attachment.  Given the established relationship 
between the built environment and social networking, this research proposes that the built 
environment can be used to predict the resilience of a community, as it causes more or less social 
networking capacity, which causes greater or weaker resilience. 
Income and other economic, cultural and situational differences are known to be 
correlated with resilience as well.  In particular, income is an important factor as individual or 
even collective resources are generally needed to rebuild.  Along the Gulf Coast, higher-income 
areas were more likely to be properly insured and more likely to be civically engaged (Mitchell, 
1969).  Lower income areas tend to be associated with fewer features of the built environment 
that provide social networking opportunities, further justifying the need to take income into 
consideration during the analysis.  The amount of damage may vary by community, making 
overall recovery difficult to compare across geographic regions.  In addition, the level of support 
supplied by the government and external aid organizations and the impact of other trends, such 
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as the state of the housing market or additional disasters like the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill. Another confounding variable is cultural differences, for example traditional living 
arrangements, occupations, and manners of coping with hurricanes that are unique to landscapes 
along the coast.   There are many such examples, such as clusters of Vietnamese shrimp 
fisherman, which gained attention after the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  Therefore, these types 
of intervening variables are included in the model to control for these effects in the analysis.   
The research focused on Mississippi, although portions of Louisiana (most notably, New 
Orleans) and Alabama were also impacted. There are several reasons for this decision.  First, the 
scale and even type of disaster differed by state.  The eye of the hurricane hit landfall near the 
Louisiana-Mississippi border, therefore Alabama and western Louisiana received unequal forces 
of winds and rain compared with Mississippi.  Damage in New Orleans occurred primarily due 
to the breaching of levees, which resulted in prolonged flooding rather than wind and short-term 
storm surge damage.  Furthermore, the strategies and levels of state support and the prioritization 
of funds has differed by state.  Finally, the Mississippi Coast, which was brutalized by the storm, 
has received less attention in many circles than other areas, despite the decimation of its 
communities.  Because of these factors, and because of the substantial population and 
development of the Mississippi Coast, it was determined that coastal Mississippi should be 
examined in isolation from the rest of the Gulf Coast for this research. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The conceptual model relationships point to the strong possibility that physical design 
influences overall disaster resilience.  Given the increasing intensity and frequency of disasters, 
this has important implications for human safety and sustainability.  Furthermore, in a weak 
economy like the present and in the wake of a significant disaster like Katrina, understanding the 
impacts of development patterns on future resilience could prevent further devastation.  Many 
resources have been dedicated to rebuilding the Gulf Coast and to stabilizing neighborhoods 
experiencing decline and this research could inform and result in more strategic investments.  
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The research seeks to prove empirically that the proposed conceptual model is valid and that 
physical design indeed can be leveraged to create communities that are more resilient. 
The research asks several questions in order to explore these concepts.  It was initially 
expected that the built environment contributes to variation in resilience levels.  The first 
question tested this notion. 
1) Does a certain type of built environment result in a more resilient community?   
Next, the link between the built environment and social networking was explored. 
 2) Do those properties of the built environment make communities more conducive 
to social networking activity? 
The third question sought to understand how physical properties compare to other factors 
that influence social networks. 
3) How does the effect of the built environment measure against other factors that 
are significant in forming robust social networks?   
This was meant to further solidify the relationships in the conceptual model – that the 
built environment influences social networks, which influence resilience.  A final conclusion 
question was based on the results. 
4) What are the implications for planners?   
The core theoretical questions are therefore whether 1) there are statistically significant 
effects on resilience due to the built environment and 2) how much these effects are due to the 
effect of the built environment on social networks rather than other influences on social networks 
and resilience in general.   
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Figure 8: Research hypotheses 
 
The research hypothesis is that a built environment with features that support social 
networks will result in a more resilient community, accounting for all other significant factors 
such as socio-demographic variables.   
H0: a built environment with features that support social networks creates a more 
resilient community 
H1: a built environment with features that support social networks has no impact 
on community resilience 
As noted previously, the physical structure and other elements of the built environment 
have been shown to contribute to greater social capital and social networks, as the built 
environment is both the tangible and cognitive background in which social encounters take place.  
Despite the evidence, there may be other factors that are able to overcome deficiencies in the 
built environment to create more resilient communities. In order to establish the validity of these 
relationships with respect to disaster resilience, three research propositions, which provide more 
depth to the above hypothesis, were examined.   
a) Social networks are important factors for resilience 
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b) Social networks interact with and are influenced by the physical environment 
c) Communities with the strongest resilience include both strong social networks 
and varied and integrated physical environments 
The type of built environment believed to support resilient communities is believed to be 
dense, has a substantial mix of land uses, and is well-connected – characteristics which bring 
people together physically.  Proximity due to density and mixing increases the probability that 
any social encounter among individuals will occur in a given space.  This increases the number 
of possible encounters and therefore the number of both acquaintances and strangers that may 
meet at any time.  Furthermore, this mixing and density lead to an increased probability that 
formal and informal networks will form due to common interests and concerns and the 
aforementioned social mixing of geographic proximity.  
The type of built environment that supports resilient communities also includes features 
that promote gathering and community building, such as parks and open space, private and 
public establishments where people convene, and historic features imprinted with the past and 
present social fabric.  These features should be accessible, either centrally located or dispersed in 
such a manner that they are available to and useful for residents.  Such features allow individuals 
and groups to forge and maintain connections.  Examples include the formal headquarters of 
professional organizations, coffeehouses where neighbors regularly rub elbows and catch up, and 
playgrounds where children and their caregivers meet casually or intentionally.  Finally, a built 
environment that promotes place attachment is known to support social networks based on 
solidarity of common experiences.  This includes historically significant features, monuments, 
and other unique sites that are embedded in the cognitive maps of residents.  
The built environment with these features – a mix of uses, high density and connectivity, 
community-building features, and historic sites – supports events that strengthen both weak and 
strong social ties, as well as bridging and bonding social networks, all of which have intrinsic 
value in creating resilient communities.  Strong ties are generally with family members and close 
friends or coworkers.  Weak ties are those made with acquaintances and are often important for 
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establishing new enterprises (Granovetter, 1973).  Similarly, bonding networks are those made 
with people most similar to ourselves and bridging networks cross cultural divides.  Weak ties 
and bridging networks are more likely to be forged in a varied and integrated built environment 
than strong ties and bonding networks. 
A strong social network infrastructure includes some combination of the characteristics 
previously described.  This infrastructure provides opportunities for connections to occur and 
also supports and maintains those connections.   Social networks are integral to disaster 
resilience, and therefore this type of built environment will result in a resilient community.  If the 
first hypothesis is true, it is expected that resilience measures will be positively associated with 
the types of built environment described above.  If the second hypothesis is true, resilience 
measures will be positively associated with social networking activity, although a socially 
vibrant built environment is not necessary to achieve resilience through social supports.   
Methodology 
In order to substantiate the above relationships, hypotheses, and propositions, the 
research was conducted in several steps, with two main stages.  In Stage 1, an analysis of all 
geographies in Katrina’s storm inundation area was conducted in order to address the first 
research question, whether there are statistically significant effects on resilience due to the built 
environment.  A metric of resilience was the dependent variable and built environment metrics 
the independent variables in a multivariate linear regression model.  Control or test variables 
from the conceptual model, such as socio-demographic variables, were included.  In Stage 2, a 
case study analysis of community-level geographies was undertaken.  Four case study 
communities were selected for further investigation based on results the initial analysis, 
specifically on measures of resilience and built environment configurations.  Case study 
communities were classified by 1) their ability to withstand and recover from the hurricane, or 
their resilience and 2) the type of built environment found in the community.  The case study 
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stage of the research addressed the remaining research question, how the effect of the built 
environment measures against other factors that impact social networks. 
This mixed methods approach was practical for determining the validity of the 
hypothesis, as it provided a deeper understanding of the relationships between the built 
environment, social networks, and resilience within the context of the Gulf Coast through 
qualitative analysis while reducing personal bias through a quantitative analysis.  Mixed methods 
were also needed to test the hypothesis and examine the additional propositions.  A qualitative 
study would be insufficient to determine the soundness of the model, although quantitative data 
cannot possibly provide a detailed understanding of the unique places and circumstances, 
particularly the characteristics of social networks.   
The qualitative results build on the quantitative results in the manner of an explanatory 
two-phased mixed methods design, where the qualitative data explain initial quantitative results.  
The mixed methods approach used will conform to a follow-up explanations model (Creswell & 
Clark, 2007), where the qualitative data are used to expound upon the initial quantitative 
findings, particularly those extreme results that need additional explanation or do not conform to 
the hypothesized relationship.   Accordingly, the results of the qualitative analysis were informed 
by the specific quantitative results associated with the case study geographies.  Both sets of 
results inform the overall findings. 
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Figure 9: Research methodology 
 
 
The two stage method included a quantitative analysis of all Mississippi geographies 
impacted by Katrina and a qualitative analysis of select case studies to be chosen based on the 
results of the quantitative analysis. 
Stage 1: Testing the Model with Empirical Data 
The first stage answered the research question, does a certain type of built environment 
result in a more resilient community?  It tested the first hypothesis, whether a built environment 
with features that support social networks creates a more resilient community.  For the 
quantitative stage of the analysis, a cross-sectional multivariate linear regression model was 
employed in order to establish causality and to isolate the effects of individual variables.   
 58 
Resilience, measured by the relative stability of housing before and after Katrina, was the 
dependent variable in the model. The resilience of communities can be measured with a number 
of metrics.  For this research, a particular aspect of resilience was targeted– how households, 
rather than businesses, government, or ecosystems, rebound. The longer-term recovery was 
measured by the adaptive capacity of the population through the restoration of the local housing 
stock.  The surrogate measure used was the change in occupied housing units from 2000 to 2010, 
normalized by area.  Reliable data were not available on who exactly has returned or remained in 
the area, therefore net numbers were used, assuming the returning population is predominantly 
original residents or households that would have moved to the area regardless of the storm.  The 
specific dependent variable measure was 
 Adaptive capacity of population through restoration of housing stock: 
o change in occupied dwelling units in block from 2000 to 2010 (pre- and post-
Katrina), divided by area of Census block in acres 
The independent variables measured how the built environment is able to support social 
networks.  Many specific, measurable properties of the built environment contribute to greater 
social capital in a community.  Metrics of the built environment included a set of variables and 
indices of the relative social vibrancy or isolation a community.  Included were land use mix, 
housing density, and intersection density. Other variables include park and open space density 
and social gathering place density.  These measures capture access to spaces in which people are 
likely to gather.  Finally, historical site density was used as a proxy for place attachment, as 
monuments and heritage sites promote a sense of local continuity and splendor. 
The built environment variables included 
 Features that increase probability of social encounters: 
o land use mix 
o housing density 
o intersection density 
 Features that promote gathering: 
o social gathering place density 
o parks and open space density 
 Features that increase place attachment: 
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o historic sites density 
The independent variables can be organized into community versus individual effects, 
although all were aggregated to the block level, with many measures taken for a larger buffer 
around the block (buffers were created for a walkable distance of one kilometer, which 
constitutes the sphere of influence of the built environment).  Community effects are more 
intertwined with social capital and include poverty status and the year built of homes and other 
buildings in the area.  Individual effects are those made at the household level and are often 
based on microeconomic phenomenon.  These include the tenure status, damage to the property, 
insurance coverage, property values, and amount of aid received.   
Several intervening variables were introduced in the model as well.  These included 
socio-demographic variables that have been shown to be significant for resilience as well as 
external factors related to damage and ability or feasibility to rebuild.  Growth normalized by 
area from the previous Census period of 1990-2000 was used to control for endogenous growth 
or contraction in the population.  The number of occupied housing units per acre in 2000 was 
also included as an intervening variable to control for the large variance in block populations, as 
population density can vary greatly throughout the region. 
The intervening variables included 




o poverty status 
 Feasibility of rebuilding: 
o housing values 
o age of housing stock 
o level of storm damage 
o federal, state, and nonprofit aid received 
o stability of population measured by population living in area in 1995 
 Natural growth or attrition of the area 
o change in occupied housing units per acre, 1990-2000 
o initial occupied housing units per acre, 2000 
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The model in equation format is shown below (variable names are described in Table 2). 
 
Resilience = Built environment factors + intervening factors + control factors 
 
(occ10-occ00)/area = β + βlu_mix + βhsg_dens + βint_dens+ βsoc_orgs_dens + βpark_dens + βhist_dens + βrace + 
βincome + βtenure + βpoverty + βhsg_val + βhsg_age + βpc_damage + βaid_amount + βstability + β(occ00-occ90)/area + 
βocc00/area  + ε 
 
Table 2: Equation variables 
Variable Short Name Variable Full Name 
(occ10-occ00)/area 
Resilience (change in occupied dwelling units in block 
from 2000 to 2010 divided by area of Census block in 
acres) 
lu_mix Land use mix 
hsg_dens Housing density 
int_dens Intersection density 
soc_orgs_dens Social gathering place density 
park_dens Parks and open space density 




poverty Poverty status 
hsg_val Housing values 
hsg_age Age of housing stock 
pc_damage Level of storm damage 
aid_amount Federal, state, and nonprofit aid received 
stability Population living in same region in 1995 
(occ00-occ90)/area Change in occupied housing units per acre, 1990-2000 
occ00/area Initial occupied housing units per acre, 2000 
 
This quantitative model was designed to determine which of the variables listed above 
are most significant and whether the hypothesized relationship, that the built environment 
influences community resilience to disasters, is valid.   However, because the Stage 1 analysis is 
insufficient to identify a wider array of factors that may not be present in the literature or in the 
original conceptual model, a detailed qualitative analysis was conducted in Stage 2. 
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Stage 2: Case Study Analysis 
The Stage 2 analysis was designed to provide additional detail for the primary research 
question (does a certain type of built environment result in a more resilient community?) also 
explored in Stage 1 and answer an additional research question (how does the effect of the built 
environment measure against other factors that are significant to social networks?).  This stage 
also examined the three additional research propositions:  a) social networks are important 
factors for resilience; b) social networks interact with and are influenced by the physical 
environment; and c) communities with the strongest resilience include both strong social 
networks and varied and integrated physical environments.  The quantitative model of Stage 1 
was therefore enhanced with results from the qualitative case study analysis of the social 
networks and intricacies of the built environment of select case study communities.  The second 
stage of analysis also retested the questions in the first stage at a coarser-scale geography 
(neighborhood-scale clusters of blocks versus city blocks), with the results of each stage 
ultimately linked to improve overall understanding of the phenomena involved. 
Using the data compiled in Stage 1, four case study communities were selected to 
represent discrete types of built environment and levels of resilience (change in occupied 
households normalized by area).  The selected case study communities included two high-
resilience communities with integrated and varied built environments and two low-resilience 
communities with integrated and varied built environments.  As in Stage 1, mix of land uses, 
housing density, street network patterns, presence of historic buildings, and amount of open 
space were used to select examples of communities with more or less integrated and varied built 
environments and change in occupied housing units (2000-2010) per unit area was used to select 
examples of high and low resilience to Hurricane Katrina. 
Therefore, two communities were chosen from each of the two categories in the right-
hand column shown below in Figure 6; four cases total were analyzed.  The unit of analysis was 
a cohesive yet manageable geography, Census block groups, with anticipated case study 
community populations between 100 and 4,300 persons, based on 2010 block group populations.  
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Low-resilience communities with high integration and variation (“flawed” category shown in 
Figure 10) and high-resilience communities with high integration and variation (“ideal”) were 
singled out to determine how resilience was achieved and the relative impacts of the built 
environment.  Communities were chosen that have demographic profiles similar to the regional 
average, with highly unusual or overly homogenous communities excluded.  Areas with 
relatively similar levels of damage from the hurricane and storm surge were selected. 
Low-resilience communities with low integration and variation in the built environment 
(“undesirable”) and those high-resilience communities with low integration and variation 
(“redeeming”) were not examined in the qualitative analysis in order to focus on a larger sample 
of communities with more socially vibrant built environments, which are therefore more suited 
to addressing the research questions related to this type of built environment and its impact on 
resilience.   
 




The resilience metric of change in occupied housing units normalized by area is depicted 
in the map in Figure 11 at the level of Census block groups as an illustration of the variation in 
resilience levels found along the coast.  The area from which case study geographies were 
chosen was the portion of Mississippi most affected by Katrina, including three coastal counties 
– Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties.  Although the study area contains many distinctly 
different enclaves, it is a relatively small geographic area that also has many similarities, 
particularly with respect to exposure to disasters.   
 
Figure 11: Example data for selection of case study communities in Mississippi 
 
After selection of the four Mississippi case study geographies, interviews were conducted 
with residents and community leaders.  Interview subjects were chosen via purposive, 
respondent-driven sampling (Heckathorn, 1997).  Respondent-driven sampling is preferable to 
other methods in that it has been shown to produce relatively unbiased and representative results 
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while allowing access to hidden or disenfranchised populations.  Community leaders, the initial 
seeds of the respondent-driven sample, were identified through existing contacts at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s Community and Economic Development division.   
The sample of recruited subjects was interviewed individually in their communities or on 
the telephone.  Interview protocol were designed to determine how individuals engage in and 
perceive social networks in their communities in general, how they did so with respect to 
Katrina, whether there are physical elements of their communities that facilitate social networks 
in direct or symbolic manners, and what other factors contribute to resilience in their 
communities.   
The sampling and protocol were approved by Georgia Tech’s Institutional Review Board 
(IRB).  Once these interview data were collected, information was codified when possible.  The 
information was cleaned and compiled to create categories with frequencies that can be 
compared with quantitative data and presented as descriptive statistics.   
Overall, the importance of the built environment and social networks in building 
resilience was further explored by interpreting responses to the above questions and comparing 
with responses about other community characteristics that contribute to resilience.  Data and 
results from the quantitative study in Stage 1 provided an initial snapshot of the community.  The 
microscale data of Stage 2 were then combined with and supplemented the Stage 1 analysis.   
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CHAPTER 5: STAGE 1 RESULTS 
The Stage 1 portion of the research was a quantitative model encompassing a wide array 
of data, continually refined throughout the study.  The final results provide empirical support for 
interactions between aspects of the built environment that influence social networks and 
resilience.    
The units of analysis chosen for the model were Census blocks, which correspond to 
actual city blocks, bounded by city streets, railroads, or bodies of water.  Census blocks are the 
smallest geographic units for which Census data are available and are more suitable than other 
Census geometries, which tend to be larger than neighborhoods and are particularly large in 
sparsely populated areas.  In order to capture the community or neighborhood scale, a one 
kilometer buffer around each block was created.  There were approximately 14,000 blocks in the 
three-county study area of coastal Mississippi.  However, blocks that did not fall in the storm 
inundation limit, were less than a half-acre, or had fewer than five occupied housing units were 
excluded, reducing the sample size to 3,222 blocks.  Blocks outside the storm inundation limit 
were excluded to control for amount of damage (percent damage was also included as an 
independent variable).  Very small or nearly unpopulated blocks were excluded to ensure 
reliability, as population counts are less accurate at such small increments. 
Many independent variables were collected at the level of a one kilometer buffer around 
the block, as the block in which a household lives is influenced by a wider swath of the built 
environment, rather than the block itself in isolation.  Buffers were created for a walkable 
distance of one kilometer to capture the greater sphere of influence of the built environment on 
the block.  A distance of one kilometer is often cited as a distance easily walkable in 10 minutes.  
It is also the area in which residents are likely to encounter neighbors in their social networks.   
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Model Variables 
As per the research design and methodology, data were selected for use in the 
quantitative model to measure resilience, the built environment, intervening variables to account 
for vulnerability, and control variables to account for previous growth trends.   
Resilience indices have been advanced to determine how easily communities might 
rebound should a disaster strike, although these tend to be pre-disaster baseline assessments 
(Cutter et al., 2008).  Others have developed sophisticated economic equilibrium models based 
on pre-disaster conditions (Rose, 2004).  Social vulnerability indices and inventories include 
many of the same variables as the social aspects of resilience, such as race, income, and tenure 
status (Morrow, 1999).  Fewer studies have quantified resilience by examining pre- and post-
disaster conditions, which is curious given the concept of resilience is predicated on a cycle of 
change over time.  One example is the framework developed in order to assess the technical, 
organizational, social, and economic (TOSE) dimensions of community resilience with respect to 
the “four R” properties of resilience or of robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness, and rapidity 
(Bruneau et al., 2003).  This method can be applied both pre- and post-disaster.  Building on 
TOSE and the four R’s, the PEOPLES model specifies indicators that measure those dimensions 
and properties pre-and post-disaster in the categories of population and demographics, 
environmental/ecosystem, organized governmental services, physical infrastructure, lifestyle and 
community competence, economic development, and social-cultural capital (Renschler et al., 
2010).  The above methods capture the theorized contributors to and components of community 
resilience, but it does not appear that any have been sufficiently tested in actual disaster 
scenarios.   
Given the fact that housing comprises the greatest amount of damage in disasters 
(Comerio, 1997) and that commercial recovery is tied to housing recovery (Olshansky et al., 
2006), an aspect of resilience that underpins all other sectors and therefore serves as a proxy for 
overall resilience is the return of households.  For the purposes of the quantitative model stage of 
this research, many of the indicators used in previous research were included as independent 
 67 
variables that impact resilience and resilience was measured through a simplified metric, the 
return of occupied housing.    
Accordingly, resilience was the dependent variable in the model and was measured by the 
relative stability or recovery of housing post-Katrina.  The indicator used was the change in 
occupied housing units from 2000 to 2010, normalized by area.  This was taken for the 
individual unit of analysis, the Census block.  There have been some minor changes to the block 
geographies over time, thus 1990 and 2000 block data and 2000 block group data were spatially 
assigned to 2010 blocks by overlaying the data in GIS (using the Identity function) and 
allocating values by areal weights.   
This particular metric was selected in order to capture the return of all housing, including 
single-family, multifamily, mobile homes, and all other sheltering situations characterized as 
units of housing by the Census.  Based on field visits and interviews, in some cases, structures 
have been rebuilt but remain vacant.  In other cases, businesses would like to return but cannot 
find an appropriate address.  The number of occupied housing units is uniquely able to measure 
the actual rebound of the people.   
Although an area’s capacity to rebound is also captured in the return of businesses and 
generally of structures and infrastructures, the return of a resident population is even more 
fundamental and, as noted previously, essential for the recovery of other sectors.  Therefore, as 
housing is only one aspect of resilience, this is only a partial metric of resilience.  However, 
because this research focused on household social networks, it is also most appropriate to 
examine the return of households.  On a practical level, Census population counts are more 
accurate and available at a more refined scale than business or building permit data for this area.  
Unfortunately, reliable data are not available on who exactly has returned or remained in the area 
in 2010; therefore net numbers were used, assuming the returning population is predominantly 
original residents or households that would have moved to the area regardless of the storm.   
The independent variables were selected to measure how well the built environment 
supports social networks.  Many properties of the built environment contribute to greater social 
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capital in a community.  Metrics of the built environment chosen for this research included 
variables and indices of the relative social vibrancy or isolation a community.  All built 
environment variables were measured using pre-Katrina conditions, in order to capture the 
qualities of the built environment that impacted resilience rather than the resultant conditions 
from the storm.  Variables included land use mix, net residential density, intersection density, the 
density of social network-supporting businesses and organizations, park locations, and historic 
site locations. 
Land use mix was calculated using pre-Katrina parcel level land use data.  A housing 
analysis database for coastal Mississippi was created in November 2008 by FEMA for the 
Mississippi Governor's Office of Recovery and Renewal in order to assess land use change and 
property value change at the parcel level.  FEMA collected county land roll databases from 
Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson Counties with 2004 or 2005 data (the last available pre-Katrina 
data in each case) as well as 2007 post-Katrina data.   The databases were cleaned and 
standardized by FEMA and each includes a land use category pre- and post-Katrina.  Several 
other databases were also obtained, including data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) National Land Cover Database (NLCD), the Mississippi Automated Resource 
Information System (MARIS), and the Gulf Regional Planning Commission (GRPC), but 
ultimately the FEMA parcel data were the most appropriate in terms of classification of land 
uses, the coverage area available, and the date collected.   
Using the FEMA land use data, a land use mix index was calculated.  This was an 
entropy measure reflecting the evenness of distribution of several land use types in each block 
buffer that has been used in previous work (Frank, Bradley, Kavage, Chapman, & Lawton, 
2008).  The land use mix index was calculated as follows where n is the number of different land 
use type classes in the buffer and Pi is the proportion of land in type i in the buffer. 
Land use mix index = - ∑i=1n Pi * (ln Pi/ln n) 
Only three categories were used – residential, commercial, and other – due to the large 
number of categories present and in order to capture the mix between residential and commercial 
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uses, which was of greatest interest.  The resulting variable has a variance of 0 (homogeneous 
land use, for example, a low-density suburb) to 1 (a perfect mix of 33 percent of each land use).  
Net residential density was calculated using the total number of housing units in the 
buffer divided by the total residential area of the buffer, using Census data for housing counts 
and the aforementioned FEMA land use data for residential acreage.  This more accurately 
measures the type of housing density present over calculations using total area, as an area that is 
predominantly commercial may result in a very low-residential density despite the presence of 
dense multifamily development.  In order to be consistent with the dependent variable and other 
variables in the model, Census data were used for housing counts. 
Several measures of connectivity and street network accessibility were considered, 
including street length density and metric reach.  Given the types of street networks found in the 
region, these measures were highly correlated with one another.  Intersection density was used to 
be consistent with many planning studies, which have also shown intersection density to be 
strongly associated with pedestrian behavior compared with other common metrics (Ewing & 
Cervero, 2010).  In order to compute the intersection density measure, 2000 Census TIGER 
street network shapefiles were prepped using the clean and build functions in the GIS software 
ArcInfo.  A script was used to create a point at each intersection between line segments in the 
street network shapefile, which also calculated the number of streets converging on that point, or 
the valence value of the point.  Points with a valence of less than three were omitted from the 
measure, as these points constituted dead-end roads, cul-de-sacs, interstate on ramps, and similar 
features.  T-intersections, four-way intersections, and the like were included.  The number of 
intersections in the block buffer was divided by the square kilometers in the buffer.   
The number of organizations that support social networking per block buffer was 
calculated using business directory data from the commercial vendor InfoGroup.  Archived 
August 2004 business directory data from InfoGroup’s OneSource database were purchased.  
These were the last data collected before Katrina.  The resulting dataset included 3,228 total 
businesses in the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code categories shown in Table 3.  All 
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categories were chosen based on an oft-cited study examining social capital and associational 
activity (Rupasingha, Goetz, & Freshwater, 2000), which pointed to bowling alleys, public golf 
courses, membership sports and recreation clubs, civic and social associations, religious 
organizations, labor organizations, business associations, professional organizations, or political 
associations.  Added to this were gathering places such as eating and drinking places, book 
stores, beauty and barber shops, cultural centers, and recreational establishments not mentioned 
above.  Organizations and gathering places are of interest as a greater density of these locations 
provides opportunities for interactions and is associated with richer social networks and greater 
social capital (Isserman, Feser, & Warren, 2007).  The number of organizations in each block 
buffer was divided by the area in order to create a metric of the potential for social networking 
for each block. 
 
Table 3: SIC codes used in social organization density measure 
 









5942 Book stores 22 
7032 Sporting and Recreational Camps 6 
7033 





Beauty shops and barbers 489 
7832-7833 Motion picture theaters 5 
7841 Video tape rental 14 
7900-7999 




Museums, art galleries, and 
botanical and zoological gardens 
11 
 8200-8299 Educational services 268 





Membership organizations 133 
 8661 Religious organizations 517 
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The locations of parks were found using several geolocated parks databases: 
OpenStreetMap, MARIS, and the FEMA land use databases described above.  Some data were in 
point and other data were in polygon shapefile format.  All polygons were converted to 
centroids.  Park points were joined with block buffers.  The number of parks in each block buffer 
was divided by the land area of the buffer for a park density measure.  In addition, a dummy 
variable was computed based on whether park was present in the buffer. 
Historical site density was used as a proxy for place attachment, as monuments and 
historically significant sites promote a sense of local continuity.  The number of historic sites per 
area was similarly determined using a variety of data sources, compiling these databases to 
create the most complete coverage available.  For historic sites, data were taken from the 
National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) and from a state historic preservation database 
provided by the Mississippi Department of Archives and History (MDAH).  All properties extant 
at the time Katrina struck were included (many of these were destroyed by the storm), a total of 
505 sites after duplicates were removed.  However, there were several large clusters of historic 
houses that fell in designated districts or neighborhoods, generally in higher income areas.  These 
were removed to prevent large spikes in concentration, particularly as other districts may have 
had homes of a similar vintage but lacked the means or will to list them.  Listing with the 
national and state registries requires extensive research and can bias more wealthy areas.  After 
removing homes, there were 126 sites in the three-county area, many of which were concentrated 
in population centers.  Historic site points were joined with block buffers.  The number of 
historic sites in each block buffer was divided by the land area of the buffer to obtain historic site 
density measure. 
Several intervening variables were included in the model as well.  These included socio-
demographic variables that have been shown to be significant for resilience as well as external 
factors related to storm damage and ability or feasibility to rebuild.  Socio-demographic variables 
included percent African American, median income, percent of housing that is renter-occupied 
and multifamily, and percent of the population in poverty.  All variables were derived from the 
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Census.  The percent of the population that was African American in 2000 was aggregated to the 
block buffer from the block level using 2000 Census Summary File 1 full population counts.  
The median income in 1999, the percent of housing that is renter-occupied and multifamily, and 
the percent of the population living in poverty were disaggregated from 2000 Census Summary 
File 3 (SF3) sample data on the population, disaggregated from block groups by areal weights to 
the buffers around each block.   
Additional housing variables included median housing value and median age of structure.  
The median housing value was calculated from the housing values found in the FEMA database. 
Although values were missing for some parcels, the parcel-level scale of these data was 
preferable to the alternative of using a median value at the Census block group level data 
disaggregated to block buffers.  When compared, the two data sources were comparable in 
magnitude at the block buffer unit of analysis.  The median age of housing was taken from 2000 
Census Summary File 3 (SF3) sample data on the population, disaggregated from block groups 
by areal weights to the buffers around each block.  Median age of housing was subtracted from 
the data collection year, 2000, to yield the average age of structures in each block buffer.  
Median year built data are collected as part of the former long-form Census questionnaire, or 
SF3.  Respondents were asked what year the original structure was built, not including 
improvements.  The data are limited in that subjects might not know or recall when their housing 
was built.  The data only include housing, not commercial or other structures.  The measure 
approximates the vintage of neighborhood development in the area, however.  
Damage and aid were also included as intervening variables.  Several sources captured 
damage caused by Katrina.  These included remote sensing data taken by FEMA on August 30, 
2005 (polygon GIS data, shown in Figure 12) and the assessments found in the FEMA parcel 
database described above.  The categories of damage were slightly different among these 
sources, with the remote sensing data listing flooded, limited, moderate, extensive, and 
catastrophic.  The parcel database listed damaged, substantially damaged, and destroyed 
property.  There were discrepancies in the data, as the polygon data were processed at a larger 
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scale.  The parcel data provided a more accurate assessment of the damage, at a finer scale.  
Therefore, the percentage of land damaged was calculated from the sum of damaged parcels at 
the block level. 
 
 
Figure 12: Example of FEMA remote sensing data 
Source: FEMA 
 
Aid amount was taken from the Public Assistance Funded Projects Summary FEMA 
database and disaggregated from cities, service areas (such as fire districts), and counties to the 
block, using an area weighted mean.  The database includes money distributed under the 
Presidentially Declared Disasters Public Assistance Program (Catalogue of Federal Domestic 
Assistance [CFDA] Number 97.036), authorized by the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act.   The database spans from 1998 (the launch of the National 
Emergency Management Information System, or NEMIS) to the present, but includes a disaster 
code number, allowing aid to Mississippi due to Katrina to be easily identified by the number 
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1604.  This database lists all public assistance recipients (or sub-grantees) and a summary of the 
funded program support. According to FEMA, the grants are used for “debris removal, 
emergency protective measures, and the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, 
publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain Private Non-Profit (PNP) organizations” 
("Resource Record Details: FEMA Public Assistance Funded Projects Summary - Open 
Government Initiative," 2012).  The total amount of aid distributed to coastal Mississippi and 
detailed in this database was $1,974,633,280.  Although this database does not include the large 
outpouring of support from small nongovernmental sources, it would be difficult to obtain 
meaningful and consistent data for all aid distributed.  Therefore, only aid received through 
FEMA was considered. 
The percent of the population living in the area in 1995 was included as a measure of 
housing stability.  The percent living in the same three-county Gulfport-Biloxi Census Primary 
Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA) in 1995 was taken from 2000 Census Summary File 3 
(SF3) sample data on the population, disaggregated from block groups by areal weights to the 
buffers around each block.   
Growth from the previous Census period of 1990-2000, normalized by block area, was 
used to control for endogenous growth or contraction in the population.  This is the same 
measure used for resilience, but for the previous decade.  The number of occupied housing units 
in 2000, normalized by area, was also included as an intervening variable to control for the large 
variance in block populations, as population density can vary greatly throughout the region. 
Finally, local fixed effects were incorporated by creating a dummy variable for the local 
government area each block was located in, which included 27 municipal and unincorporated 
county areas.  Therefore, 26 dummy variables were included in the model, with one of the 27 
areas excluded.  This was meant to capture the effects of local government efficacy and the 
political will of local leadership.  For example, levels of infrastructure restoration and other 
public built environment improvements funded by local governments varied across localities.  
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Furthermore, some leaders were more aggressive about locating funding and ensuring residents’ 
needs were met after Katrina.    
A slightly modified version of the original model shown in Chapter 4 was used (variable 
names shown in Table 4, modified to reflect actual data used). 
 
Resilience = Built environment factors + intervening factors + control factors +  
local fixed effects 
 
(occ10-occ00)/area = β + βlu_mix + βnet_res_dens + βint_dens + βsoc_orgs_dens + βpark_dens + βnrhp_dens + 
βpc_af_amer + βmed_inc + βpc_mf_rent + βpc_pov + βhsg_val_med + βhsg_age_med + βpc_damage + βaid_amount + 
βpc_same_pmsa + β(occ00-occ90)/area + βocc00/area + local fixed effects + ε 
 
As noted in the descriptions above, data were gathered from a variety of sources.  With 
the exception of business directory data from InfoGroup, these are all free and publicly available.  
A summary of all variables, descriptions, and data sources are found below in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Variables, variable descriptions, and data sources 
Table 4 Continued 
Variable Short Name 
Variable 
Full Name 






Change in occupied 
housing units (2000-
2010) normalized by 





mix in 2004/ 
2005 





a = area of land for all 
land uses present in 
buffer 
bx= area in use X 
(residential, 
commercial, and other 
land uses) 
N = number of land 
uses with area > 0 
2004/2005 land use data, 
FEMA parcel level analysis 
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Table 4 Continued 
Variable Short Name 
Variable 
Full Name 






Occupied housing units 
in buffer in 2000 / 
residential acres in 
block buffer 







Number of intersections 
where three or more 
street segments meet 
divided by square 
kilometers of block 
buffer 







Number of social 
gathering 
places/networking sites 
in block buffer divided 
by acres of block buffer 
ReferenceUSA/InfoGroup, 
2004 archived business 
directory data 
park_dens Park density 
Number of parks in 
block buffer divided by 
acres of block buffer 
OpenStreetMap, MARIS, 






Number of sites on the 
NRHP and state historic 
registry in buffer, 
including those 
destroyed by Katrina,   
divided by acres of 
buffer 









Percent of population in 
block buffer that was 




















Percent of housing units 
that were in multifamily 
structures and were 
renter-occupied of 
block buffer area 
2000 Census 
pc_pov Percent of Weighted percent of 2000 Census 
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Table 4 Continued 
Variable Short Name 
Variable 
Full Name 





population living in 
poverty of block buffer 






Median housing value 
2004 and 2005, of block 
FEMA parcel data 
hsg_age_med 
Median age 
of housing of 
buffer in 
2000 
Weighted median age 
built (from 2000 
Census), owner 









Percent of land area 
damaged or flooded in 
block 







weighted to block area 
FEMA Public Assistance 





that lived in 
the 3-county 
coastal MS 
area in 1995 
Weighted percent of 
block buffer population 
in 2000 that also lived 
in Hancock, Harrison, 










Change in occupied 
housing units from 1990 
to 2000 of block by 
acres in block 




per acre in 
2000 
Occupied housing units 
in 2000 of block by 
acres in block 
2000 Census 






Binary (0 or 1) variable 
indicating block is 
within one of 24 
municipal and 2 county 
governments, with one 
2000 Census TIGER data 
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Table 4 Continued 
Variable Short Name 
Variable 
Full Name 
Description  Data Source 




Table 5 includes descriptive statistics for each variable.   
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics (N=3,222 blocks) 
 
Minimum Maximum Median Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
(occ10-occ00)/area -45.12 45.79 -0.14 -0.47 1.99 
lu_mix 0.07 1.00 0.70 0.68 0.14 
net_res_dens 0.04 28.97 2.29 2.72 1.89 
int_dens 0.00 0.42 0.13 0.14 0.08 
soc_orgs_dens 0.00 0.20 0.01 0.03 0.04 
park_dens 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
nrhp_dens 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 
pc_af_amer 0.00 0.96 0.17 0.21 0.19 
med_inc $17,209 $78,986 $35,503 $36,822 $9,175 
pc_mf_rent 0.00 0.51 0.08 0.10 0.09 
pc_pov 0.01 0.40 0.12 0.13 0.07 
hsg_val_med $19,576 $163,536 $50,319 $54,940 $19,018 
hsg_age_med 5.75 59.12 28.82 29.68 12.29 
pc_damage 0.00 0.98 0.17 0.25 0.24 
aid_amount $0 $15,277,504 $56,858 $258,803 $886,812 
pc_same_pmsa 0.07 0.99 0.74 0.71 0.16 
(occ00-occ90)/area -28.07 40.82 0.08 0.30 1.74 
occ00/area 0.00 45.12 1.39 1.88 2.07 
 
The park density variable was converted to a dummy variable, or presence or absence of 
a park in the buffer.  This was logical in that having one centralized park in a neighborhood 
would seem to be sufficient for social interaction.  The conversion improved the model. 
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Because of a skewed distribution, a logarithmic transformation was used for two 
variables: social organization density and historic site density.  The establishments that foster 
social networking tended to be highly concentrated in a relatively small number of blocks near 
the coast, skewing the results.  Similarly, historic patterns of development occurred in a similar 
pattern near the waterfront, resulting in most historic site density occurring in a relatively small 
area.  The transformation also improved the model.   
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of transformed variables 
Variable Minimum Maximum Median Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
ln_soc_orgs_dens -9.04 -1.59 -4.02 -4.20 1.47 
park_dummy 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.29 0.45 
ln_nrhp_dens -9.40 -2.94 -5.65 -5.59 1.03 
 
The amended model, with these variable transformations, is below: 
(occ10-occ00)/area= β + βlu_mix + βnet_res_dens + βint_dens + βln_soc_orgs_dens + βpark_dummy + βln_nrhp_dens + 
βpc_af_amer + βmed_inc + βpc_mf_rent + βpc_pov + βhsg_val_med + βhsg_age_med + βpc_damage + βaid_amount + 
βpc_same_pmsa + β(occ00-occ90)/area + βocc00/area + local fixed effects + ε 
 
 Discussion of Model Results 
The results of the OLS model are shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7: OLS model results with local spatial fixed effects 










  B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -2.655 0.420   -6.325 0.000***     
Built environment variables: 
lu_mix 0.221 0.254 0.015 0.868 0.386 0.528 1.892 
net_res_dens 0.055 0.030 0.052 1.860 0.063* 0.203 4.930 
int_dens 1.965 0.632 0.082 3.107 0.002*** 0.229 4.368 
ln_soc_orgs_dens 0.032 0.016 0.029 2.012 0.044** 0.751 1.331 
park_dummy -0.155 0.076 -0.035 -2.032 0.042** 0.533 1.877 
ln_nrhp_dens 0.023 0.013 0.030 1.799 0.072* 0.582 1.717 
Intervening variables: 
pc_af_amer 0.286 0.282 0.027 1.016 0.310 0.220 4.553 
med_inc 2.69E-05 6.30E-06 0.124 4.269 0.000*** 0.190 5.250 
pc_mf_rent 1.818 0.469 0.080 3.880 0.000*** 0.378 2.649 
pc_pov 0.030 0.792 0.001 0.038 0.969 0.189 5.287 
hsg_val_med 3.73E-06 2.50E-06 0.036 1.488 0.137 0.281 3.560 
hsg_age_med 4.88E-05 .005 3.01E-04 0.009 0.993 0.154 6.505 
pc_damage -0.380 0.136 -0.045 -2.791 0.005*** 0.618 1.618 
aid_amount -8.90E-08 3.22E-08 -0.040 -2.761 0.006*** 0.780 1.281 
pc_same_pmsa 1.929 0.259 0.154 7.444 0.000*** 0.378 2.643 
Control variables: 
d90_00_occ_area -0.221 0.018 -0.194 -12.090 0.000*** 0.627 1.595 
occ00_area -0.552 0.018 -0.575 -31.264 0.000*** 0.476 2.100 
Spatial fixed effect coefficients for 26 local dummies not shown here  
 




  =  0.489 
N   =  3,222 
 
 
The model displayed good explanatory power (R-squared of 0.489).  A few variables had 
collinearity statistics that were slightly elevated (such as age of housing, percent of population 
living in poverty, and median income).  Given that these were control variables, the levels of 
collinearity between variables known to be highly correlated, such as income and poverty, were 
considered acceptable.  Prior iterations of the model included variables with much higher 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics, and efforts were made to keep these figures as low as 
possible.  For example, in an early run of the model, high VIFs were found for the percent 
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owner-occupied housing and percent multifamily housing.  To reduce these values of 13.5 and 
9.2, respectively, a new term was created, percent of housing that is renter-occupied and 
multifamily, also obtained from the 2000 Census SF3.   
Of the built environment variables, intersection density had the most influential (and a 
positive) effect on resilience, as measured by standardized coefficients. A one standard deviation 
increase in intersection density (0.08 intersections per square kilometer) is associated with 8.2 
percent of a standard deviation increase in resilience. This, in turn, is equivalent to an increase of 
0.16 occupied housing units per acre from 2000 to 2010.  Given the mean resilience of -0.47 
units per acre, this is a consequential effect.  In reverse order of magnitude, net residential 
density, historic site density, the density of social networking organizations, and land use mix all 
had a positive effect (the effect of land use mix was not significant, however).  For net residential 
density, a one standard deviation increase in units per residential acre (1.89 units per acre) is 
associated with a 5.2 percent of a standard deviation increase in resilience, or 0.10 occupied 
housing units per acre.  For historic site density, a one standard deviation increase in the natural 
log of sites per acre (1.03 sites per acre) is associated with 3.0 percent of a standard deviation 
increase in resilience, or 0.06 occupied housing units per acre.  For the density of social 
networking organizations, a one standard deviation increase in the natural log of sites per acre 
(1.47 sites per acre) is associated with 2.9 percent of a standard deviation increase in resilience, 
0.06 occupied housing units per acre.  For land use mix, a one standard deviation increase in the 
land use mix index (a change of 0.14 on a scale of 0 to 1) results in 1.5 percent of a standard 
deviation in resilience, or 0.03 occupied housing units per acre.  The presence of parks actually 
had a negative impact on resilience, in which a one standard deviation increase in parks by buffer 
(0.45 parks) is associated with a 3.5 percent of a standard deviation decrease in resilience, or a 
decrease of 0.07 occupied housing units per acre from 2000 to 2010. 
Of the intervening variables, percent of the population living in the area in 1995 and 
median income had the most influential positive effects on resilience, which were greater than 
the effects of the built environment variables as measured by the standardized coefficients.  
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Percent multifamily rental housing had a significant positive impact similar to the magnitude of 
intersection density.  Percent damage and amount of aid each had a relatively strong negative 
impact on resilience.  The other intervening variables (percent African American, median 
housing value, housing age, and percent of population living in poverty) had a weaker positive 
influence than all built environment variables except land use mix.  
Control values of change in occupied housing units from 1990 to 2000 normalized by 
area and occupied housing units normalized by area each had a significant, relatively large 
negative impact on resilience.   
The built environment effects demonstrated the influence on resilience of many built 
environment features that are associated with greater social interaction and social networking 
activity.  Intersection density, which is associated with connectedness, accessibility, and 
walkability was the most significant example of these effects.  Although the bivariate correlation 
between intersection density and resilience was negative, when controlling for demographics, 
damage, and other significant variables, intersection density actually influenced the return of 
households.  Better connected areas are likely to be more visible and centrally located due to 
street patterns in the area, where higher intersection density tends to occur near the well-traveled 
waterfront and central business districts.  Therefore, residents are more likely to have chance 
social encounters and richer social networks, based on theories from the literature.  This could 
have also had a psychological effect on residents and former residents, as returning to a remote 
area where few homes had been rebuilt would seem to be undesirable.  Similarly, net residential 
density, which also had a positive effect on resilience, increases the probability of social 
encounters and local social networks through increasing the number of network connectors 
within the neighborhood.  In essence, intersection density and net residential density measured 
social integration in the area and positively influenced resilience. 
The density of historic sites, based on state and national historic designations, was used 
as a proxy for the age of the neighborhood and also to attempt to quantify place attachment 
through significant monuments and cultural icons in the area.  The natural log of historic site 
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density produced a somewhat weak positive effect on resilience in the model.  This variable was 
the third-most influential built environment variable with a positive impact on resilience, 
demonstrating historic features have some importance for resilience.  This is particularly 
noteworthy in that historic sites in Mississippi tended to be located in more vulnerable and 
damage-prone areas near the coast due to historic patterns of development near the shore and 
other waterways.  It is a testament to the draw of areas with greater historic character that these 
areas have seen a greater return in population.   
The density of social networking organizations and land use mix also had a relatively 
weak positive effect on resilience.  Social networking organizations included places of worship, 
schools, restaurants, and types of recreational facilities, among others.  These have been shown 
to improve social networks and, not surprisingly, also had a positive impact on resilience in the 
model.  Based on the literature suggesting that social networks are most effective in recovery 
when they have a physical address from which to operate (Sherraden & Fox, 1997), the impact of 
the density of social networking organizations is noteworthy.  Though not always considered in 
city planning research, community centers, be they commercial endeavors, nonprofits, or 
publicly funded institutions, are clearly important for recovery and should be embraced and 
nurtured by communities.   
Land use mix, which also had a weak positive, but statistically insignificant, effect on 
resilience, measures the evenness of three land uses – residential, commercial, and other.  Land 
use mix increases opportunities for commercial activity and employment in a neighborhood, 
reduces possible trip distances, increases how easily one can navigate between places, and 
promotes nonmotorized traffic such as biking and walking.  The measure was meant to capture 
whether blocks were located in a diverse and vibrant neighborhood.  An increase in walkability 
due to greater land use mix also increases encounters with other pedestrians and therefore social 
networking opportunities.  This measure was not significant in the model.  Although the 
expectation was that land use mix would have a positive influence on resilience, density and the 
presence of certain types of enterprises that promote social networking activity were more 
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important.  High-intensity commercial areas in low-density, disconnected development patterns 
are common in the region.  Therefore, the type of commercial development may be more 
important than the mix of land uses in predicting resilience, at least in the Mississippi coast 
region.  
The presence of parks actually had a negative impact on resilience, despite the fact that 
parks are also shown to increase chance encounters and provide a gathering point for neighbors.  
All area parks were included in calculating the dummy variable, which included 42 total parks 
that were within the one kilometer buffer of the 3,222 study area blocks.  Almost all parks were 
located in Harrison and Jackson Counties, with only three parks found in Hancock County.  The 
uneven spatial distribution of parks and the higher incidence of parks in undevelopable coastal 
areas that sustained great storm damage may have skewed the model; however, based on the 
evidence in Mississippi, parks had no influence on resilience. 
Certain intervening variables behaved as expected, such as the percent of the population 
living in the area in 1995 and median income, which had the greatest positive effects on 
resilience, greater than the effects of the built environment variables.  Percent of the population 
living in the area in 1995 captured the stability of the population prior to Katrina, but also the 
potential for richer social networks, developed through residents living in the area for at least a 
five-year period of time.  Because the resilience indicator was not able to pick up actual 
movement of households, only net change in occupied housing, this measure was included to 
take into account how established the base population was prior to Katrina.  It is not surprising 
that the indicator had a significant impact on resilience.  Higher median income also positively 
influenced resilience, which was expected as greater income provides households the means to 
rebuild and is associated with reduced social vulnerability to disaster.  
Percent multifamily rental housing had a surprising positive impact on resilience.  This 
variable was created, as mentioned above, to include the effects of both tenure and higher-
density housing.  Owner-occupied housing as a standalone measure was associated with greater 
resilience but was highly correlated with percent multifamily housing.  Interestingly, combining 
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the inverse statistic, percent renter-occupied housing, with percent multifamily housing did not 
have a cumulative negative effect.  Because this measure, like the other independent variables, 
was calculated for one kilometer buffers around the block, it may be that residential density was 
associated with the same areas that also had greater social networking organization density and 
net residential density.   These neighborhood characteristics had a positive influence on 
resilience in the model and are associated with social capital creation by planning scholars and 
theorists. 
The sign of the percent African American coefficient was, perhaps surprisingly, positive, 
although it was statistically insignificant.  Ethnic and racial minority populations have been 
shown to exhibit greater social vulnerability to disasters.  However, the weak and statistically 
insignificant positive effect may be a product of the demographics and spatial distribution of 
ethnic and racial groups in the area.  African American (and relatively poor) neighborhoods 
tended to be located further inland in coastal Mississippi where real estate was less expensive 
and therefore were likely to experience lower levels of damage from Katrina.  
Median housing value also had a positive influence on resilience, weaker than only the 
built environment variables of intersection and net residential density.  Similar to income, 
housing value is correlated with household resources and captures an economic incentive to 
rebuild.  Larger housing values may also be correlated with levels of insurance on a home, as 
owners may be more likely to protect a larger investment and have the means to do so.  Housing 
age had essentially no impact on resilience.  This may have been related to tension between 
historic or older neighborhoods that exhibited greater resilience, based on the above factors, and 
the period of growth that occurred between 1990 and 2000 (discussed below).  Further, storms 
such as Hurricane Camille in 1969 and Hurricane Georges in 1989 have destroyed many older 
properties, with uneven spatial effects, and therefore significantly older properties are not present 
in enough numbers to make a difference in the model. 
Percent of population living in poverty had a very weak and almost negligible positive 
influence on resilience.  This influence was weaker than most other variables, including all built 
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environment variables.  Although this influence was not statistically significant, as with percent 
African American, this variable was expected to have a negative influence on the dependent 
variable of resilience based on previous studies linking poverty and social vulnerability to 
disasters.  This measure was correlated with median income, median housing value, and percent 
African American, weakening the effects of poverty on the dependent variable.  As noted 
previously, vulnerable populations based on race and income actually tended to be protected 
from Katrina due to spatial demographic patterns in coastal Mississippi, with relatively poor 
neighborhoods located further inland.  Because of this, the effects of socio-demographic 
variables did not always behave as expected.  
Percent damage and amount of aid each had a relatively strong negative impact on 
resilience.  Clearly, damage was a factor in households returning.  Aside from the difficulty and 
cost in repairing damaged housing units, homes with greater than 50 percent structure damage 
were subject to new building codes after Katrina.  In many cases, this required elevating the 
home, which was cost prohibitive or logistically impossible for those with reduced mobility, 
such as elderly residents.  Badly damaged areas may have also been more likely to receive aid 
based on need.  It has been shown that local governments often find it difficult to make use of 
disaster aid resources due to a lack of organizational capacity (Berke et al., 1993), which may 
also contribute to the failure to convert aid resources to housing recovery. 
The negative effects of the control variables of change in occupied housing units from 
1990 to 2000 normalized by area and occupied housing units normalized by area can be 
explained by the high rate of growth in the time period of 1990 to 2000, when casinos were 
legalized and the local population was rapidly growing.  During this time, many blocks reached 
carrying capacity for housing units and therefore could only lose and not gain housing units from 
2000 to 2010.  Several high growth blocks between 1990 and 2000 were multifamily structures 
near the waterfront.  One waterfront high-rise in Biloxi was added in the time period of 1990 to 
2000 and was converted to a hotel post-Katrina.  A second high-rise was a senior housing tower 
built after Camille in 1969.  The complex experienced growth in the 1990 to 2000 time period 
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and survived Katrina. The senior units were replaced further inland and there have been stated 
plans to refurbish the currently vacant 13-story tower.  One inland example of high growth 1990 
to 2000 was a section of land near the former Bayou Auguste homes in East Biloxi, which was 
converted to single family homes under HOPE VI funding during that decade.  In short, 
previously built-out areas that could only lose housing units, as well as a few low-density areas 
that have been converted to condominium or higher-density housing, were responsible for the 
unexpected control variable effects. 
Local fixed effects on resilience were mixed as expected.  Only six localities exerted a 
statistically significant effect on resilience, and all of these six had a positive effect, 
demonstrating that these areas were more resilient, controlling for other variables, than the 
omitted place category of unincorporated Jackson County.  The high-resilience areas with the 
largest unstandardized coefficients included Ocean Springs, which had the greatest positive 
impact on resilience, Gulf Park Estates, St Martin, Diamondhead, D’Iberville, and 
unincorporated Hancock County.  Ocean Springs was noted as a standout in terms of resilience 
from many sources, including Stage 2 interviews.  Gulf Park Estates is adjacent to Ocean Springs 
to the east and is an older suburban area with a small population.  St Martin, like Ocean Springs 
and Gulf Park Estates, is in Jackson County.  It is larger in area and population than Gulf Park 
Estates, but is also predominantly residential.  Diamondhead is a low-density, mainly residential 
area incorporated as a city in 2012, although it was designated as a Census place prior to that.  
Diamondhead originated as a retirement community but has become more demographically 
diverse over time.  It is still relatively affluent among communities in the region.  D’Iberville is 
adjacent to and comprised of suburban residential development similar to St Martin, although the 
area also has significant strip commercial surrounding a mall and local access to two highways.  
Of these communities, unincorporated Hancock County is unique in that it is mostly rural and 












Ocean Springs 0.698 0.192 3.628 0.000*** 
Gulf Park Estates 0.606 0.218 2.781 0.005*** 
St Martin 0.523 0.255 2.046 0.041** 
Diamondhead 0.572 0.305 1.877 0.061* 
D’Iberville 0.394 0.213 1.847 0.065* 
Hancock County 0.363 0.206 1.765 0.078* 
 
 
Other local effects were not statistically significant in the model but exerted varying 
positive and negative effects.  Those with the largest negative coefficient values were Henderson 
Point and unincorporated Harrison County (B values of -0.482 and -0.344, respectively).  
Henderson Point is a very small coastal town that was badly damaged and likely subject to 
prohibitive building code revisions due to its elevation and location.   
The OLS model was also run without local spatial effects.  All other independent 
variables were included.  The model without fixed local effects had a slightly smaller R-squared 
than the OLS model that included fixed local effects (Table 9).   
 




OLS model with fixed local effects 0.489 
OLS model without fixed local effects 0.480 
 
Given the greater explanatory power of the model when local fixed effects were present, 
spatial autocorrelation was possible in the OLS model.  Therefore, a Global Moran’s I statistic 
was calculated for the residuals of the OLS model with local fixed effects to determine the 
amount of spatial autocorrelation in the data.  The statistic evaluates whether the expressed 
pattern of the residuals of the resilience measure in the OLS model with local fixed effects is 
clustered, dispersed, or random among all blocks in the sample.  The statistic was calculated 
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using a Euclidean inverse distance method with standardized rows and a distance threshold of 
10,000 meters or 6.2 miles.  This distance was chosen to ensure every feature has at least one 
neighbor and that distances effects reached beyond municipal boundaries.  As shown in Table 
10, the z-score was 5.76 for the standard residuals of the above OLS model with local fixed 
effects; therefore there is a less than one percent likelihood that the expressed clustered pattern 
could be the result of random chance.  Or, the spatial distribution of high values and low values 
in the dataset is more spatially clustered than would be expected if underlying spatial processes 
were random. 
  
Table 10: Global Moran's I Summary 
Moran's Index 0.011737 






Given this amount of spatial autocorrelation, a Spatial Lag (SL) model was produced for 
comparison and to determine the most appropriate method for accounting for local government 
and other spatial effects in the model. The SL model was run in the software GeoDa to assess the 
spatial heterogeneity in the estimated relationships between the independent and dependent 
variables.  Spatial lag was used because it is believed that areas of high or low resilience have 
spillover effects on nearby areas.  Spatial lag suggests that the dependent variable is influenced 
by contiguous geographies, which aligns with this theory.  A Euclidean distance of 10,000 
kilometers, row-standardized weight was used.  The model includes these interactions in its 
computations.  Results are shown in Table 11. 
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Coefficients t Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta 
(Constant) -3.329 0.368  -9.046 0.000*** 
Spatial lag 
(resilience) 
-1.819 0.158 -1.819 -11.538 0.000*** 
Built environment variables: 
lu_mix 0.532 0.234 0.037 2.274 0.023** 
net_res_dens 0.014 0.028 0.014 0.511 0.609 
int_dens 1.870 0.565 0.078 3.307 0.001*** 
ln_soc_orgs_dens 0.045 0.016 0.034 2.826 0.005*** 
park_dummy 0.062 0.068 0.014 0.901 0.367 
ln_nrhp_dens 0.032 0.012 0.017 2.596 0.009*** 
Intervening variables: 
pc_af_amer -0.570 0.198 -0.055 -2.876 0.004*** 
med_inc 3.69E-05 4.97E-06 0.170 7.425 0.000*** 
pc_mf_rent 0.525 0.440 0.023 1.194 0.232 
pc_pov 2.642 0.691 0.097 3.825 0.000*** 
hsg_val_med 1.06E-07 1.70E-06 0.001 0.062 0.950 
hsg_age_med -0.014 0.004 -0.085 -3.415 0.001*** 
pc_damage -0.620 0.129 -0.074 -4.820 0.000*** 
aid_amount -1.44E-07 3.05E-08 -0.064 -4.709 0.000*** 
pc_same_pmsa 2.218 0.236 0.177 9.394 0.000*** 
Control variables: 
d90_00_occ_area -0.215 0.019 -0.188 -11.556 0.000*** 
occ00_area -0.555 0.018 -0.578 -31.005 0.000*** 




  =  0.454 
N   =  3,222 
 
The SL model resulted in a comparable pseudo R-squared to the R-squared of the OLS 
model with local fixed effects (0.454 and 0.489, respectively).  Of the built environment 
variables, the presence of parks switched signs from a negative to a positive effect but the 
significance decreased substantially, making this variable insignificant in the model.  Net 
residential density also became insignificant and the magnitude of the positive influence 
decreased.  Land use mix became significant in the SL model, with a positive influence on 
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resilience.  The influence of the intersection density, the density of social networking 
organizations, and the density of historic sites remained positive and significant in the SL model. 
In terms of intervening variables, percent African American had a negative rather than a 
positive effect and became significant in the SL model.  This is more in line with expectations.  
Percent renter-occupied, multifamily housing became insignificant in the model.  Average age of 
housing and percent poverty each became significant, with housing age exerting a small negative 
influence on resilience and percent poverty a significantly large positive influence.  Other 
variables remained significant (or, in the case of median housing value, remained insignificant) 
and changed in magnitude, but not in direction of influence. 
The built environment variables had a stronger influence on resilience in the SL model, 
although they were also significant in the OLS models with and without local fixed effects.  
Across all three models, a built environment that is varied in terms of organizations that promote 
social networks and historic properties and is integrated as measured by intersection density and 
net residential density was shown to positively influence resilience.  Land use mix also had a 
positive influence on resilience, but was not a significant factor in each of the models.  Finally, 
the presence of parks had a negative influence on resilience that was rendered insignificant in the 
SL model. 
The findings of the Stage 1 model validate many strategies that have been employed in 
rebuilding the Gulf Coast, such as the incorporation of walkability in building codes and master 
plans (McKee, 2005).  Creation of additional community centers and neighborhood commercial 
districts is outlined in several post-Katrina plans, such as the master plans for Biloxi and 
Gulfport.  Based on the results of the model, these types of planning efforts are likely to improve 
overall resilience to future disasters.   
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CHAPTER 6: STAGE 2 
As noted previously, the Stage 2 analysis was designed to provide additional detail for 
the primary research question (does a certain type of built environment result in a more resilient 
community?) also explored in Stage 1 and answer the second research question (do those 
properties of the built environment make communities more conducive to social networking 
activity?) and the third research question (how does the effect of the built environment measure 
against other factors that are significant in forming robust social networks?).   
This stage also examined the three additional research propositions:  a) social networks 
are important factors for resilience; b) social networks interact with and are influenced by the 
physical environment; and c) communities with the strongest resilience include both strong 
social networks and varied and integrated physical environments.  The quantitative model of 
Stage 1 was therefore enhanced with qualitative case study analysis of the social networks and 
intricacies of the built environment of select case study communities.  The second stage of 
analysis also retested the questions in the first stage at a larger geography, with the results of 
each stage ultimately linked to improve overall understanding of the phenomena involved. 
As per the research design, communities were chosen from right two quadrants of the 
matrix shown in Figure 13 (a modified version of Figure 10), the high-resilience and integrated 
and varied built environment “ideal” quadrant and the low-resilience and integrated and varied 
built environment “flawed” quadrant.  As noted in the figure, the case study communities chosen 
were block groups of Waveland, Ocean Springs, East Biloxi, and downtown Pascagoula.  A map 









Figure 14: Map depicting locations of four case study communities. 
 
The variables from the model in Stage 1 were used to determine high or low resilience 
and levels of integration and variation in the built environment and to select case study 
communities from which the Stage 2 interviews were recruited.  These variables included the 
Stage 1 dependent variable of resilience, measured by change in occupied housing units 
normalized by area, as well as Stage 1 independent variables pertaining to the built environment.  
The built environment variables were land use mix, residential density, street connectivity, 
density of social networking sites, park density, and density of historic sites.  Intervening 
demographic variables from Stage 1 were compared to obtain comparable communities across 
race, income, and tenure.  All variables were aggregated or recalculated at the block group level 
instead of the block or block buffer level used in Stage 1.  There were 270 block groups in the 
three-county study area, each corresponding roughly to a city neighborhood, increasing in size as 
population density decreases.  Of these, 226 were at least partially in the surge inundation area.  
 95 
The four communities were selected by overlaying the built environment variables with a 
moderate transparency in GIS, so that relative tint could be used to identify built environments 
that were more or less integrated and varied, based on the block group-level measures.  Block 
group resilience values were also overlaid in the GIS map.  Using this visual scan as a first pass, 
potential case study communities were determined.  Demographic variables and levels of 
damage were then calculated in order to compare the 11 contenders from the visual scan (which 
included Bay St Louis, D’Iberville, East Biloxi, Ocean Springs, Pascagoula beachfront, 
downtown Pascagoula, Pass Christian and Henderson Point, St Martin, Waveland, and West 
Gulfport).  After removing high-resilience communities with relatively low levels of damage as 
well as mismatched demographics, block groups in Ocean Springs and Waveland were selected 
as high-resilience communities.  Similarly, block groups in East Biloxi and Pascagoula were 
selected as low-resilience communities.  The Ocean Springs and Pascagoula are comprised on 
one block group each and the Waveland and East Biloxi study areas are comprised of two block 
groups each to capture a larger area with similar built environment and resilience characteristics.  
Communities were selected from each of the three counties on the coast and alternated between 
high- and low-resilience communities from west to east for geographic variety. 
As shown in Table 12, the four communities were roughly similar when compared across 
the same built environment and demographic factors that were used in Stage 1, with some 
differences (all variables and data sources are described in depth in Chapter 5).  In terms of the 
built environment, all four case study communities had a relatively high mix of land uses (0.75 to 
0.80), although other measures tended to vary more significantly.  Waveland and Pascagoula had 
lower housing densities, social networking location densities, and parks.  Ocean Springs and East 
Biloxi had the highest densities and mixes of amenities.  Therefore, there is some variation 
among the two high-resilience and two low-resilience communities, but these differences 
average out among all four case study communities.  Overall, Waveland is the least integrated 
and varied of the four, although among all block groups on the coast, it is still in the top quantile.  
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The case study communities that were selected had the greatest similarities in built environment 
metrics along the coast. 
In terms of demographics, some key differences also exist.  Waveland and Ocean Springs 
had higher median incomes, a lower percentage of African Americans, and higher home 
ownership rates.  Being the two high-resilience communities, this was not ideal; however, built 
environment measures were privileged in the selection of communities.   
 





Pascagoula East Biloxi 






Resilience high high low low 
Land use mix 0.77 0.80 0.75 0.80 
Net residential density (HU/res. acre) 1.01 1.84 0.83 2.62 
Intersection density per square kilometer 26.82 79.95 54.05 52.83 
Social networking organizations per acre (2004) 0.02 0.23 0.18 0.13 
Number of parks 1 3 1 2 
Number of historic sites 1 14 5 23 
% African American (2000) 22% 25% 56% 83% 
Median income (1999) $34,257 $48,393 $25,682 $19,012 
% Multifamily rental housing (2000) 12% 0% 30% 15% 
Median housing value (2004) $55,278 $53,866 $44,053 $35,242 
Median age of homes (2000) 26 48 61 47 
% Living in poverty (2000) 13% 6% 19% 29% 
% Living in region in 1995 (2000) 86% 78% 91% 91% 
Percent land damaged by Katrina (FEMA) 100% 79% 41% 15% 
Percent houses damaged by Katrina (FEMA) 77% 20% 43% 78% 
Parcel-level percent land damage (FEMA) 26% 13% 19% 48% 
Acres 1,345 164 585 192 
Population (2000) 2,977 532 870 991 
 
Waveland was a popular summer location prior to Katrina and is in the process of 
rebuilding its tourism industry.  Once considered a suburb of New Orleans, it has been 
influenced by New Orleans culture and many year-round residents have ties to the New Orleans 
area.  Based on OneSource data, the major employers in Waveland are the Home Depot and 
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Lowe’s building supply stores.  Waveland is often described as “Ground Zero,” as it was in the 
direct path of Katrina.  The historic central business district was only several hundred feet from 
the Gulf, on low-lying land, and was particularly devastated.  A commercial strip on U.S. 
Highway 90 sustained damage as well, but has been mostly restored.  Waveland is low-density 
and many homes near the coast have not been rebuilt, giving it an almost rural feel.  Railroad 
tracks running east to west bifurcate the city. 
Ocean Springs is an artistic, tourist-friendly city.  Notable former full-time and summer 
residents include the artist Walter Inglis Anderson and the architect Louis Sullivan.  Building 
styles and businesses are eclectic and the entire city is of low- to moderate-density, with pockets 
of expensive real estate.  The major employers are the Ocean Springs Hospital, Wal-Mart, and 
Gulf Coast Research Laboratories (a biotech firm).  Ocean Springs and the three other case study 
communities also have large employment bases in government – including law enforcement, 
public schools, and public works.  
Pascagoula is a more industrialized city than Waveland, Ocean Springs, or East Biloxi.  
Trains pass through the heart of the city several times per day.  Residents describe the area as 
one with a strong religious tradition (particularly within the Catholic faith).  Despite being the 
furthest case study community east of the eye of the hurricane, damage was severe, with the 
United Way estimating that 95 percent of all homes flooded.  Renters, including commercial 
tenants, have had a difficult time returning due to their dependence on landlords.  The major 
employers are Ingalls/Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding and U.S. Navy Engineering.  Even 
through major downturns in the economy, Pascagoula’s specialized industrial base has been 
preserved, more or less, recently aided by the announcement of the new Airbus plant in nearby 
Mobile, Alabama.  
East Biloxi is separated from the western peninsula and northern mainland portions of 
Biloxi by Keesler Air Force Base.  Bridges connect East Biloxi to Ocean Springs to the northeast 
and D’Iberville to the north.  East Biloxi is dominated by gambling – the five top employers in 
its ZIP code are all casinos.  A diminished number of seafood canneries and docks still exist in 
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the area.  The coastline is dotted with modern, large casinos like the Beau Rivage as well as 
modest motels and souvenir shops.  The historic downtown core and residential district is located 
a few blocks inland.   Before Katrina, East Biloxi had a high percentage of home ownership and 
had a low rate of insurance due to the high costs of premiums in the area.   
Seven subjects were interviewed in each of the four communities.  Subjects were 
identified using a purposive, respondent-driven sampling technique.  After first making contact 
with community leaders in each study area, each leader was asked to identify other residents.  In 
this way, subjects were from a diverse cross-section of each community in terms of age, race, 
and occupation.  This method was used due to its ability to reach hard-to-reach populations.   
The first group of subjects was identified through two sources.  First, subjects were 
identified through contacts of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s list of community and 
economic development contacts developed by the New Orleans branch, which serves nonprofits, 
financial institutions, and other stakeholders on the Mississippi Coast.  Second, interview 
subjects were located through the ReferenceUSA and OneSource databases that were also used 
to locate social networking organizations.  These databases are managed by InfoGroup, a private 
company that culls business directory data from a large number of sources, including the Yellow 
Pages and Reuters.  Data are rigorously monitored for quality assurance; however, such 
databases are known to undercount very small and marginalized businesses and organizations, 
particularly those that are owned by ethnic or racial minorities.   
The ReferenceUSA and OneSource databases include a physical address and Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code; therefore, all formal community organizations operating in 
each study area were easily identified.  After removing 15 nonverifiable or otherwise 
inappropriate locations, 59 organizations from industry sectors of educational services, social 
services, museums and cultural institutions, and membership organizations were identified 
among the four communities.  Of these 59, 10 were in East Biloxi, 13 in Ocean Springs, 26 in 
Pascagoula, 10 in Waveland.  About half were faith-based organizations.  The database also 
yielded phone numbers, most senior executive name, email, and websites.  Contacts were then 
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cold-called.  Of those that could be directly reached, 100 percent consented to an interview.  A 
small number had moved after Katrina but current staff recommended other names within their 
organizations.  This method in conjunction with the Federal Reserve contact list yielded a 
diverse cross-section of residents but was limited in that only directors and other primary 
contacts involved with organizations in the area were identified.   
These initial Federal Reserve and business directory contacts provided 19 interview 
subjects.  Those subjects were asked to identify fellow community members.  An additional nine 
were identified through the first wave of cold calls.  The recruited interviews were selected to 
represent at least one resident from the business, faith-based, education, housing, municipal 
government, and local nonprofit sectors, although not all interviewees fit in these categories.  
There were two exceptions where a representative could not be contacted for a certain category.  
In East Biloxi, the historic African American school that had been in the study area closed after 
Katrina; therefore, no representatives from education were located.  In Waveland, only one of 
four faith-based organizations identified in the area had a valid telephone number, and that 
church was not responsive.  In these cases, other interviews touched on the education and faith-
based community response, respectively, and after several attempts over several months, efforts 
to locate these interviewees were abandoned.  Finally, at least one interviewee in each 
community was selected due to their work with or knowledge of special needs or functional 
needs populations such as ethnic or racial minority, immigrant, elderly, or homeless populations.   
Although many interview subjects were leaders from the sectors mentioned above 
(business, faith-based, education, housing, municipal government, and local nonprofit), a few 
could be described as laypeople who were not directly involved in organized relief or rebuilding 
efforts.  These included maintenance workers, retirees, and teachers, for example.  Despite 
efforts to capture the most vulnerable populations in each community, in some communities this 
was not accomplished.  Although elderly, ethnic and racial minority, and (self-described) lower-
income subjects were found in the greater sample across all four communities, this was not the 
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case within each individual community.  However, as noted above, individuals with intimate 
knowledge of these populations were available with very few exceptions. 
Many interviews were conducted in person at four locations and dates: July 9, 2012, at 
the Pascagoula Library; July 10, 2012, at the East Biloxi Library; July 11, 2012, at the Ocean 
Springs Library; and July 12, 2012, at the Waveland Library.  A few were conducted at the 
personal offices of the subjects.  All other interviews were conducted via telephone.  Most 
interviews were between 30 and 45 minutes.  All subjects were asked the same core questions 
(Table 13 and Appendix A), with follow-up questions, if necessary.  All subjects signed the 
approved Georgia Tech Institutional Review Board (IRB) consent form (Appendix B).  All 
interview subjects consented to the interview and to an audio recording to be transcribed for 
analysis.   
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Table 13: Interview questions for Stage 2 analysis 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
How long have you lived in this community?  How long have you been with your 
organization [for community leaders]?  Did you evacuate or stay during Katrina?  If so, 
when did you return? 
SOCIAL NETWORK QUESTIONS: 
Think of organizations, networks, associations that you or any member of your household 
belong to.  These could be formally organized groups or just groups of people who get 
together regularly to do an activity or talk about things. Of how many such groups are you 
or any one in your household a member?  Please describe them. 
Which of these groups or networks were you engaged in most actively before Katrina?  
During?  After? 
Which of these groups or networks disbanded or have been formed after Katrina? 
RESILIENCE QUESTIONS: 
Think about how your community has coped after Katrina.  Resilience is the ability of a 
community to rebound, or to bend but not break, after a disaster.  In your opinion, how 
resilient is your community to disasters? (1-10, 1 being not at all resilient, 10 being very 
resilient) 
On what factors do you base your score?   
By your estimation, what percent or proportion of your neighborhood has returned after 
Katrina?  Of your city? 
Have vulnerable populations returned, such as the elderly or very poor?  Why or why not? 
BUILT ENVIRONMENT QUESTIONS: 
Think about the physical characteristics of your community – homes, buildings, open and 
green space, streets and sidewalks, landmarks and monuments, historic sites, businesses, 
institutions, natural features.  Which of these places or features are most important, 
memorable, or symbolic to your community in your opinion before Katrina?  After? 
What locations are used by your formal and informal social networks for gathering before 
Katrina?  After?  
With respect to the community pre- and post-Katrina, does your community offer 
amenities in walking distance to your home? What is the availability of parks and open 
space? 
RECRUITMENT: 
Who else should I talk to in your neighborhood? 
 
The sample included individuals that lived on the Gulf Coast prior to Katrina.  Eight 
subjects, or 29 percent, had lived in their respective communities their entire life.  The others 
resided in the area between seven and 59 years, with an average of 30 years.  Many subjects 
remarked specifically on the tendency for generations of families to remain on the coast, often in 
the same neighborhood.  This phenomenon was also acknowledged by newer residents to the 
area.  Several subjects (29 percent) mentioned ties to New Orleans, more common in Waveland 
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and Hancock County, or to Mobile (18 percent).  A small number (7 percent) mentioned that the 
Keesler Air Force Base brought them to the area.  These subjects ended up remaining in or 
retiring in the area.   
In several instances, subjects described the three counties of the Mississippi Gulf Coast as 
a cohesive region, with residents frequently moving between communities for work, recreation, 
and shopping.  With the exception of political boundaries formed by bodies of water, the 
boundaries between the communities tend to be blurred by residents.  However, most highlighted 
central nodes in each community, such as downtown districts, shopping malls, and the casinos.  
The blurring of boundaries occurred in part due to utilitarian necessity, as most communities lack 
certain amenities that residents require.  Of the case study communities, Ocean Springs was 
commonly described as the best place to eat a meal, Pascagoula as an employment center, East 
Biloxi as a place for nightlife (casino gambling and a faded bar scene), and Waveland as a 
recreation center with points of interest such as Buccaneer State Park and a former water park.  
Pascagoula and Waveland are 54 miles apart, but connected by Highway 90 on the beach or 
Interstate 10 further inland.  Although there is very little public transportation, particularly 
between rather than within communities, many residents move between various parts of the 
region daily.  This tended to make identification of community-specific phenomena difficult, 
therefore subjects were asked and reminded to remark primarily on the community in which they 
resided and were shown a map of the area during in-person interviews as a reference point. 
When subjects were asked whether or not they evacuated for Katrina, 12 (46 percent) 
said they remained in their homes, two (8 percent) evacuated to a home on higher ground but 
remained in their community, and two were not in the area at the time, either on vacation, or 
temporarily living elsewhere.  Of the 14 that evacuated, most returned within one week and half 
were able to resume living in their homes (often despite major damage) within one week.  Two 
subjects reported that it took more than one year to rebuild their homes and two additional 
subjects were still working on repairs, seven years after the hurricane.  It was suggested by an 
interviewee and first responder that the people who did not evacuate, or who came back most 
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quickly, were more likely to stay and rebuild.  Those that evacuated, particularly those that 
evacuated and did not come back until more than a few weeks later, came back to a desolate 
landscape and ultimately were more likely to choose not to stay.  However, there were some 
complications to returning immediately, including reports that the Mississippi State Police were 
blocking access to the area.   
Results: Social Networks 
The first set of interview questions pertained to subjects’ social networks.  Subjects were 
asked to think of organizations, networks, associations that they or members of their household 
belonged to before and after Katrina.  Most began with a description of their formal 
organizations – churches or other faith-based organizations, school groups, and professional 
organizations – followed by their core informal groups such as family, friends, and neighbors.   
Overall, 294 formal and informal social networks were identified by 28 interview 
subjects across the four case study communities.  As interviews were conducted in two high-
resilience and two low-resilience communities, each with similar built environment factors, these 
networks of support were first aggregated by level of resilience to determine trends in high- 
versus low-resilience communities.    
As shown in Table 14, the number of organizations described by interviews from high-
resilience communities was not significantly different and only slightly higher than the number 
of networks described by those in low-resilience communities.  High-resilience communities 
identified 149 networks, or 10.64 networks per person on average and low-resilience 
communities identified 145 networks, or 10.36 networks per person on average.   
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Sum, number of networks 
mentioned 
149 145 294 
Average number of networks 
mentioned 
10.64 10.36 10.5 
 
Interestingly, high-resilience communities were more likely to mention organizations that 
had a negative impact on recovery (these organizations are not included in the above totals).  
Low-resilience interviewees tallied seven mentions and high-resilience interviews tallied 18 
mentions of organizations that were either limited in their ability to help or actually complicated 
response.  Those 25 negative statements were comprised of only a few unique organizations 
discussed in a negative light.  This includes city leadership in Biloxi and Waveland, which was 
seen as ineffective or working at cross-purposes with those trying to rebuild; FEMA, which was 
thought to be similarly ineffective and out of touch with the needs of locals; and the American 
Red Cross, due to long lines and extensive administrative requirements.  It should be noted that 
there were more positive mentions than negative of FEMA and the Red Cross and that the local 
governments of Ocean Springs and Pascagoula were seen as quite effective post-Katrina.   
Although the numbers of networks that community members belonged to and sought help 
from was not significantly different, the types of networks were (Figure 15).  In both cases, faith-
based organizations were the most frequently mentioned (23 percent of networks in low-
resilience communities and 21 percent of networks in high-resilience communities).  However, 
high-resilience communities were networked with local nonprofits, schools, friends, businesses, 
and municipal organizations in higher numbers.  Conversely, low-resilience communities were 
networked with state, national or international groups, military, and federal organizations, as well 
as family.  The different types of organizations identified by the two groups point to the 
effectiveness of local networks of support, including friends and the public and nonprofit sector.  
Although high-resilience communities seemed to fall back on local networks, low-resilience 




Figure 15: Types of networks by resilience category 
 
Many interview subjects spoke of their own strong faith and that of their neighbors.  For 
a majority of the subjects, a faith-based organization was their most important social network.  
Further, faith-based organizations were the most consistent source of support in recovery, as 
distribution points for supplies and in clean up and rebuilding.  In fact, the percent and number of 
faith-based organizations is low, as many subjects were unable to name the entire roster of 
churches and other organizations from around the world that came to help.  Therefore, in some 
interviews, the catchall of “churches” was noted yet it was not clear if two or 20 churches were 





















































area (generally from nonaffected U.S. states); however, these groups almost always had a local 
tie, pointing to a greater national network of faith-based support.  For example, after seminary, a 
Catholic priest may retain ties with a number of classmates that are called to various points 
around the nation or the world.  For those faith-based groups that came to the area without a 
local tie, in some cases a bond was formed that has continued.  Interview subjects pointed to 
several such networks that have outlasted the recovery.  Subjects also spoke of outreach 
conducted by Gulf Coast churches in other disaster-affected areas, such as the communities 
destroyed by the 2012 Alabama tornados.   
The importance of faith-based organizations has been frequently examined in the field of 
community development.  According to one source, faith-based organizations that are more 
active in traditional economic development activities, including housing and social services that 
are important for disaster recovery and resilience, tend to have more staff and pledge income and 
a theological world view stressing building community and economic justice (Reese & Shields, 
2000).  Faith-based organizations are uniquely able to provide various types of support several 
reasons.  Such institutions tend to remain in place no matter what kinds of disinvestment occur in 
a neighborhood, the mission of most (if not all) faiths includes community building, they have 
unique types of local and external networks, and because of their ability to provide valuable 
spiritual support even when resources are not available (Cisneros, 1996). 
When the numbers and types of social networks were aggregated by individual case study 
communities rather than by level of resilience, there were additional differences in the numbers 
and types of networks described.  First, subjects from high-resilience Waveland and low-
resilience East Biloxi reported higher numbers of total and average networks (Table 14).  These 
two communities were closer to the eye of the hurricane when it made landfall, resulting in 
greater damage, which may have resulted in an increased amount of attention and greater activity 
during the recovery period. 
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Springs Pascagoula East Biloxi 
Total, all 
interviews 
Sum, number of networks 
mentioned 
82 67 67 78 294 
Average number of networks 
mentioned 
11.71 9.57 9.57 11.14 10.5 
 
The types of social networks engaged in also differed somewhat by case study 
community.  Again, faith-based organizations dominated in all locations (22 percent of total 
responses in all four communities), although other local nonprofits were most widely cited in 
Waveland and East Biloxi (17 percent of responses in both communities).  Federal support was 
most cited in Pascagoula (15 percent of responses).  Interestingly, East Biloxi, which neighbors 
Keesler Air Force Base, was the only community that did not cite the military as a network, 
either socially or as a resource in recovery.  Before Hurricane Camille struck in 1969, this may 
have been more overt.  To many in the area, the young men on the base were seen as a nuisance.  
However, their assistance in cleaning up and rebuilding after Camille repaired their image in the 
community.  Although East Biloxi is adjacent to the base, there is still a disconnect between the 




Figure 16: Types of networks by case study community 
 
In addition to the accounts of personal social networks, many interviewees spoke of the 
generally high rates of volunteerism and philanthropy in the Gulf Coast region of Mississippi.  
Despite having one of the lowest per capita income levels in the country, the state of Mississippi 
was ranked first or second on the Catalogue for Philanthropy’s Generosity Index from 1995 to 
2005 ("Generosity Index," 2006).  According to the Chronicle of Philanthropy, in 2012, the 
average Mississippi household donated 7.2 percent of its discretionary income to charity ("How 
America Gives: How States Stack Up in Generosity," 2012), making it the second most generous 
state in the country by this metric.   
This local generosity was very beneficial, as Mississippi received a significantly smaller 
amount of post-Katrina funding than New Orleans and Louisiana ("Philanthropy Today: 
Charities Work to Foster Mississippi Philanthropy," 2007).  In interviews, residents were aware 
of the discrepancy and often pointed out the attitude among residents of taking care of oneself 
and one’s neighbors, rather than waiting for intervention from the government or nonprofits.  
Those entities providing aid were important for recovery, particularly faith-based and relief 
organizations; however, for most they were a last resort.  Those who had the resources to help 
themselves or their neighbors did so willingly and immediately. 




















national or international group
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Although the number and type of formal and informal networks of support yielded 
interesting results, the question of capacity remained.  In order to gauge the amount of resources 
available by location and by organization, U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990 and 
Form 990EZ data were obtained from the Foundation Center’s online database ("990 Finder," 
2012).   Form 990 is meant to monitor tax-exempt organizations and includes financial 
information for nonprofits.  Total assets are collected in this annual disclosure and the 
Foundation Center database includes assets over multiple years for each organization.  Due to 
multiple data gaps, the annual assets by organization were averaged for all years available (2001 
to 2011) in order to ensure a greater number of data points.  The average values by organization 
over these years were aggregated for a sum of assets by case study community and an average of 
assets for all organizations in each case study community (Table 16).   Organizations were 
queried by ZIP code field.  ZIP codes are larger than the study area geometries used in this 
analysis; however, no other geographic identifiers were available (Figure 17).  
Based on these data, Pascagoula clearly had the largest total assets and the highest 
average assets per organization and Waveland had the fewest total assets and lowest average 
assets per organization.  This is largely because of the presence of three credit unions with large 
assets in Pascagoula.  There were no other credit unions listed in the database for the other three 
communities. When the Pascagoula credit unions were removed, as these assets represent a very 
different type of individual capacity, the sum and average assets drop well below the other case 
study communities (Table 17).  The ZIP codes that house East Biloxi and Ocean Springs also 
have the highest populations.  Total assets normalized by the 2000 population of each ZIP code 
are also shown in Table 16 and Table 17.  Waveland and Pascagoula had the lowest levels of 
nonprofit capacity per capita and per organization, demonstrating limited nongovernmental 
resources.  Ocean Springs and East Biloxi exhibited higher levels of capacity per capita and per 
organization, with East Biloxi having the greatest resources by each metric.  Based on this, 
financial resources of local nonprofits appeared to be unrelated to resilience, as East Biloxi has 
been the least resilient of the four communities.   
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Table 16: 990 data by case study community, 2001 to 2011 
 
Total assets of all 
organizations in 
database 
Average assets per 







per capita based 
on 2000 
population 
Waveland $3,104,389 $310,439 6,959 $446 
Ocean Springs $36,693,275 $601,529 31,819 $1,153 
Pascagoula $246,804,065 $7,478,911 13,756 $17,942 
East Biloxi $44,213,457 $1,105,336 17,214 $2,568 
Total  $330,815,186   $2,297,327  69,748 $4,743 
 
Table 17: 990 data for Pascagoula without credit unions, 2001to 2011 
 
Total assets of all 
organizations in 
database 
Average assets per 







per capita based 
on 2000 
population 
Pascagoula $7,690,657 $256,355 13,756 $559 
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Figure 17: Comparison of ZIP code and study area geometries 
 
Within the Foundation Center’s online 990 database, 18 organizations specifically cited 
by subjects during interviews were available (Table 18).  These ranged from only $24,410 (St 
Vincent de Paul Society) to over $18 million (Ohr O’Keefe Museum) in assets.  Once again, the 
assets were averaged over all available years in the database to control for gaps and noise in the 
data.  Of these, certain organizations widely praised for their contributions had relatively modest 
resources, such as the Mississippi Coast Interfaith Disaster Task Force (MCIDTF) and the Steps 
Coalition.  Financial resources of local nonprofits appeared to be unrelated to their ability to 
contribute and support local recovery. 
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Table 18: 990 data by organizations named in interviews 
 Average assets, 
2001-2011 
Location 
Hancock Housing Resource Center  $326,529 Waveland 
Nereids Inc.  $232,942 Waveland 
Mary C. O’Keefe Cultural Center $243,277 Ocean Springs 
Mississippi Gulf Coast YMCA Inc.  $2,760,961 Ocean Springs 
Ocean Springs Chamber of Commerce  $373,114 Ocean Springs 
The O'Keefe Foundation  $105,598 Ocean Springs 
Walter Anderson Museum of Art Inc.  $9,686,299 Ocean Springs 
St Vincent De Paul Society East Jackson Co  $24,410 Pascagoula 
United Way for Jackson and George Counties 
Mississippi, Inc.  
$2,757,802 Pascagoula 
Habitat for Humanity of Jackson County Inc.  $1,405,301 East Biloxi 
Harrison County Habitat for Humanity  $1,621,990 East Biloxi 
Hope Community Development Agency  $1,614,573 East Biloxi 
Junior Auxiliary of Biloxi-Ocean Springs  $75,468 East Biloxi 
Mississippi Coast Interfaith Disaster Task Force  $136,271 East Biloxi 
Ohr-O’Keefe Museum of Art Inc.  $18,313,711 East Biloxi 
Steps Coalition  $140,005 East Biloxi 
 
Results: Resilience 
After being asked about formal and informal social networks, interview subjects were 
next asked about how resilient they perceived their community to be after Katrina and why.  
Resilience was defined for each subject in the same manner it was quantified for Stage 1 of this 
research, or how well the community has rebounded to its prior state, specifically in the return of 
occupied housing.  Interview subjects spoke of and were asked about other aspects of resilience, 
such as the return of businesses and institutions, but the focus of the interview was on 
households.  
Surprisingly, when asked to rate the resilience of their communities on a scale of one to 
ten, with ten being totally resilient (or all households restored), the interviewees from high-
resilience communities rated their communities lower than those from low-resilience 
communities (Table 19).  Several interview subjects gave a mixed rating and were excluded from 
the average in Table 19; therefore, the averages are based only on the 21 valid numerical 
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responses collected.  For example, many rated the people versus the city government or the core 
versus the periphery differently.  Others did not feel they could give a numerical value at all or 
gave a generic high or low rating, which were also excluded. 
 









Average rating of resilience 
on a scale of  1 (least) to 10 
(most resilient) 
7.91 8.45 8.17 
 
The discrepancy in calculations of the resilience variable (return of occupied households 
from 2000 to 2010, normalized by area) and the ratings above was also quite clear throughout the 
interview process.  In fact, the case study area of Pascagoula was seen as quite resilient by 
interviewees and Waveland was generally given a low resilience score.  As shown in Table 20, 
this was manifested in the ratings estimates given in each case study communities.   
 
Table 20: Average resilience rating by case study community 
 Average rating of 
resilience on a scale of  1 
(least) to 10 (most 
resilient) 
Waveland 6.70 
Ocean Springs 8.92 
Pascagoula 8.86 
East Biloxi 7.50 
Total 8.17 
 
There were a number of reasons for the unusual results above.  First, although case study 
communities were drawn around smaller neighborhood-scale areas using Census block groups, 
as mentioned previously, residents tended to blur formal boundaries and in some cases thought 
of their communities as being larger than city, let alone neighborhood, boundaries.  For example, 
Bay St Louis and Waveland and Pascagoula, Moss Point, and Gautier have historical and 
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practical ties.  Further, residents’ perceptions of resilience tended to be rooted in their areas of 
expertise.  Therefore, a faith-based leader whose entire congregation returned might feel their 
community is very resilient while a social justice advocate in the same area might feel the same 
community is not resilient based on the impact on a vulnerable ethnic or racial minority 
population.  The term resilience has also been long applied at the individual rather than the 
community scale, thus many subjects in low-resilience areas looked to the population that did 
stay as being very resilient, given the hardships faced in rebuilding among the ruins.   
Overall, the resilience rating demonstrated the wide range of emotions and meanings 
assigned to the term and the individual perspectives of subjects.  Because it was not particularly 
meaningful aggregated to the community level, the resilience ratings by subject were compared 
with other data from the interviews. 
When resilience ratings were compared with the number of social networks mentioned in 
interviews, the relationship was weak but negative. Figure 18 shows data points for all interview 
subjects that gave a valid numerical resilience rating for their community, plotted against the 
number of social networks mentioned in the subject’s interview.  As in the relationship described 
in a previous section, where low-resilience and high-resilience communities did not differ in the 
number of social networks engaged in per person, self-reported resilience ratings had little 




Figure 18: Relationship between number of networks and resilience rating 
 
When compared with the number of years a subject lived in the community, there was a 
similarly weak and positive relationship.  Although the results are weak, again, these 
comparisons point to the individual attitudes about resilience encountered during the interviews 
and demonstrate the difficulty in quantifying the concept of resilience in this manner.   
 
 

















































































Number of years living in community 
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Results: Built Environment 
In addition to questions about social networks and resilience, interview subjects were also 
asked a series of questions about the built environment in their community.  They were first 
asked to think about the physical characteristics of their communities, which were defined for 
them as homes, buildings, open and green space, streets and sidewalks, landmarks and 
monuments, historic sites, businesses, institutions, and natural features.  They were asked which 
places or features are most important, memorable, or symbolic to their communities before and 
after Katrina.  They were also asked which places are or were used by social networks for 
gathering before and after Katrina.  Finally they were asked, in general, if their communities 
offer amenities such as restaurants, shopping, schools, and parks within walking distance to their 
homes. 
First, when asked to identify physical characteristics of their communities that are most 
symbolic and important, residents of high-resilience communities listed an average of 12.36 sites 
per person and residents of low-resilience communities listed only 9.64.  This difference was not 
significantly different based on a T test, with a p value of 0.17.  However, numbers and types of 
places described as symbolic and important did differ among high and low-resilience 
communities and between the four communities. 
 









Sum, number of places 
mentioned 
173 135 308 
Average number of places 
mentioned 
12.36 9.64 11.00 
 
 
The sites listed by subjects were categorized as institutions, commercial establishments, 
parks, districts, infrastructure, recreational facilities, beaches, housing, historic sites, churches 
and other places of worship, and other natural features.  Institutions included municipal and 
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public safety facilities, nonprofit organization headquarters, community centers, libraries, 
schools, and clubs such as fraternal halls.  Commercial establishments were primarily retail and 
restaurants and bars, although casinos, barber shops, and movie theaters were also mentioned.  
Parks included neighborhood-scale parks and playgrounds, state parks, and national parks.  
Districts included downtown or central business districts, other neighborhoods, and streets.  
Infrastructure included bridges, highways, streets and sidewalks in general, lighting, docks, and 
airstrips.  Recreational facilities included ball parks, pedestrian and cycling trails, venues such as 
fairgrounds and coliseums, marinas, bowling alleys, and skating rinks.  Beaches were commonly 
mentioned in interviews due to the prominence of the waterfront in the area.  Housing included 
multifamily, single-family, and special needs housing.  Historic sites included landmarks such as 
the remaining grand hotels, lighthouses, forts, monuments, and specific homes such as the 
cottage of architect Louis Sullivan.  Churches and other places of worship were primarily 
Christian denominations, with one Buddhist temple given as a response.  Other natural features 
included bodies of water, islands, and vegetation in general, not specific to parks or recreational 
areas. 
Of the 173 total places recognized by residents from high-resilience communities, there 
was a greater percentage of institutions, parks, infrastructure elements, recreational sites, 
beaches, and housing (Figure 20).  Of the 135 places recognized by residents from low-resilience 
communities, there was a higher percentage of commercial sites, districts, historic sites, and 
churches.  The higher number of sites identified by high-resilience communities and the more 
even distribution of types of sites could indicate a larger and more varied number of landmarks 
or simply a greater pride in and place attachment to community in more resilient communities.  
Most striking was the higher number of churches singled out by low-resilience communities.  
Both East Biloxi and Pascagoula have some of the larger congregations and places of worship, 
notably St Michael Parish, also known as the Fisherman’s Church, in East Biloxi and First 
Baptist Church in Pascagoula.  East Biloxi and Pascagoula, as noted in Chapter 3, were 
established earlier than Waveland and Ocean Springs, therefore more places of worship have 
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likely been founded and have remained in these communities.  Historic structures were also more 
prominently mentioned in the low-resilience communities of East Biloxi and Pascagoula, quite 
likely for the same reason. 
 
 
Figure 20: Types of sites and places mentioned by resilience category 
 
The number of sites and places mentioned differed by case study community as well 
(Table 22).  Waveland reported the most significant places and Pascagoula reported the fewest.   
 




Springs Pascagoula East Biloxi 
Total, all 
interviews 
Sum, number of  places 
mentioned 
95 78 50 85 308 
Average number of places 
mentioned 







































When the types of sites and places were compared by case study community, other 
differences emerged (Figure 18).  Churches were most prominent in East Biloxi (14 percent of 
responses) and least prominent in Waveland (2 percent of responses).  Other institutions such as 
schools, conversely, were most prominent in Waveland (27 percent of responses) and least 
prominent in East Biloxi (16 percent of responses).  Various types of green space, including 
beaches, other natural features, parks, and recreational facilities, were most prominent in Ocean 
Springs (35 percent of responses) and least prominent in East Biloxi (14 percent of responses).  
This is understandable, as Ocean Springs has made a great effort to enhance its beachfront and 
community parks and East Biloxi’s coast is still dominated by casinos and the seafood industry.  
As noted previously, the prominent churches of Pascagoula and East Biloxi were often cited in 
those communities.  Responses of housing and infrastructure were by far more common in 
Ocean Springs than any other community (19 percent of responses in Ocean Springs, versus only 
3 percent of the responses of the other three communities combined).   
 
 
Figure 21: Types of sites and places mentioned by case study community 
 
The spatial location of site and places mentioned for which geographic information could 
be determined were plotted.  This included 237 (77 percent) of the total 308 sites mentioned by 

















subjects in interviews.  Those that could not be plotted included generic categories of sites (for 
example “historic homes”) or nonspecific types of places that were too broad or common to 
pinpoint on a map.  For each case study community, a convex hull geometry was created for the 
points that came out of interviews in that community.  A convex hull is a polygon formed by the 
union of all possible geometries made from points in a given set.  For this analysis, this included 
the plotted sites mentioned by case study community.   As shown in Figure 22, these geometries 
tended to extend well beyond the boundaries of each case study community.  Further, Pascagoula 
and Ocean Springs shared roughly the same territory from west to east, although not from north 
to south.  In addition, a heat map was created, calculated using the point density function in the 
ArcInfo software extension Spatial Analyst.  The point density function creates a raster grid with 
a magnitude per unit area from point features that fall within a given neighborhood distance 
around each cell of 100 meters by 100 meters.  A radius, or neighborhood distance, of one 
kilometer was used for consistency with other spatial measures calculated at a buffer or walking 
distance of one kilometer.  The heat map clusterings are also shown in Figure 22 and illustrate a 
finer-scale view of the locations of significant places around the four case study communities, as 




Figure 22: Heat map and convex hull geometries of sites and places by case study community 
 
Detailed views of these heat maps are shown in Figure 23.  From these detailed views 
taken from the map above, it is clear that the subjects did indeed focus on the sites and places 
central to their community.  Other “hot spots” arose, however.  In Waveland (top left), the area 
around Highway 90, a shopping hub dominated by strip commercial, appeared as a smaller hub 
northwest of the gold and yellow district of central Waveland (another dark blue cluster of sites 
can be seen in neighboring Bay St Louis at the upper right corner of this figure).  Similarly, in 
Pascagoula (bottom left), additional blue nodes appeared near the beach and along Highway 90, 
northeast of downtown.  Sites and places mentioned by subjects in Ocean Springs and East 
Biloxi tended to form a radial pattern around these case study areas.  The densest areas of the hot 
spot analysis, shown in gold and red, conform nicely to the study areas of Ocean Springs, East 
Biloxi, and Pascagoula. The densest areas of the hot spot analysis in Waveland were actually 
outside of the study area.  In general, the places mentioned in interviews that could be plotted on 
the map indicated the importance of city centers, commercial areas, and beachfront amenities.  
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The Biloxi-Ocean Springs area contained the greatest density of sites, demonstrating the 
importance of these two communities as places for gathering. 
  
   
Figure 23: Detail of heat maps of site and place density by case study community 
 
As reported previously, the number of social networks mentioned in interviews was 
nearly equal between low-resilience and high-resilience communities; however, the number of 
places mentioned was larger in high-resilience communities than in low-resilience communities 
(Table 23).   
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Table 23: Types of networks and places mentioned by resilience category 








Number of networks mentioned 149 145 294 
Number of places mentioned 173 135 308 
 
However, as in the ratings of resilience, individual responses were examined in addition 
to the aggregated results.  When the number of networks per interview subject was plotted 
against the number of places per interview subject, the relationship was weak but positive 
(Figure 24).  This points to both the tendency for certain subjects to be more thorough than 
others and the tendency toward highly socially connected people having a greater connection to 
the built environment.   
 
 
Figure 24: Relationship between number of social networks and number significant places identified in 
interviews 
 
Although very few subjects had a professional background in city planning or 
architecture, most were quite astute about the built environment, including planning and 































Number of networks subject belongs to 
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to identify a large array of sites and also spoke in a nuanced way about complications in 
restoring the built environment. 
As mentioned elsewhere, the most significant built environment complications post-
Katrina have been the need to elevate infrastructure and structures and the loss of landmarks.  A 
major issue for rebuilding has been the high cost of insurance and restrictions and regulations 
that prohibit many from rebuilding, particularly the new flood insurance rate maps.  Traditional 
ways of building are impossible in affected areas and costs are prohibitive, therefore many lost 
landmarks were unable to be replaced.  According to the Mississippi Department of Archives 
and History (MDAH) and the Mississippi Heritage Trust, 354 listed historic structures were 
destroyed by Katrina.  Of those, 254 were destroyed during the storm and 100 were demolished 
within four years due to extensive and irreparable damage (Malvaney, 2009).   
Many interview subjects pointed to homes as the type of buildings most missed.  As a 
result of uneven rebuilding, particularly of homes, wayfinding is now more difficult.  For 
example, one cannot use a once-familiar direction such as “turn left at the big blue house” in 
what is now a sea of empty lots.  At times, post-Katrina reconstruction restricted prior customs 
and ways of life.  For example, new parking regulations made the practice of soft shelling 
difficult in East Biloxi.  Residents of the area would harvest crabs in their rubbery molting state 
by tapping the crabs with a spear known as a flounder gig and catching those that attempt to bury 
themselves.  Along with shrimping and fishing, soft shelling was once a local ritual and an 
inexpensive food source.  After Katrina, parking was made illegal in the area between 10 pm and 
6 am; therefore residents cannot transport their gear during peak soft shelling hours.  
Despite these complications, in Ocean Springs and Pascagoula, several subjects noted 
that the built environment is better than before, with refreshed buildings and new amenities.  
There were still many vacant properties to serve as reminders of Katrina, but in the four case 
study communities selected, trailers were not noticeably in use as primary residences.  A few 
Katrina cottages could be found, serving their intended purpose of providing permanent modular 
housing.  There were some derelict buildings, such as the White House Hotel in Biloxi.  
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Improvements continued seven years after Katrina; for example, a major wing of the badly 
damaged Ohr-O’Keefe Museum remained battle-scarred (Figure 25).  Although parts of the 
Frank Gehry-designed museum reopened in 2010, these “pods” designed to house the museum’s 
permanent collection of George Ohr pottery were not scheduled to open until 2013. 
 
 
Figure 25: Unrestored portion of the Ohr-O’Keefe Museum of Art in East Biloxi 
Source: Photograph taken by author, July 2012 
Results: Other Reasons for Resilience 
During the interviews, residents identified many additional factors that impacted 
resilience in their communities other than their own formal and informal social networks.  Sixty-
six different factors were given by the subjects (2.4 per person on average).  In order to analyze 
the results, the factors were coded by categories derived from Susan Cutter’s work on a Disaster 
 126 
Resilience of Place (DROP) model (Cutter et al., 2008). These categories include ecological, 
social, economic, institutional, infrastructure, and community competence indicators (Table 24).  
The DROP model was developed to as a theoretically grounded and quantifiable method to 
assess resilience at the community level in a given place facing a given disaster.  
Table 24: Community resilience indicators 
Dimension Candidate variables 
Ecological  Wetlands acreage and loss 
Erosion rates 
% impervious surface 
Biodiversity 
# coastal defense structures 
Social  Demographics(age, race, class, gender, occupation) 
Social networks and social embeddedness 
Community values-cohesion 
Faith-based organizations 
Economic  Employment 
Value of property 
Wealth generation 
Municipal finance/revenues 
Institutional  Participation in hazard reduction programs (NFIP, StormReady) 
Hazard mitigation plans 
Emergency services 
Zoning and building standards 
Emergency response plans 
Interoperable communications 
Continuity of operations plans 
Infrastructure Lifelines and critical infrastructure 
Transportation network 
Residential housing stock and age 
Commercial and manufacturing establishments 
Community 
competence 
Local understanding of risk 
Counseling services 
Absence of psychopathologies (alcohol, drug, spousal abuse) 
Health and wellness (low rates mental illness stress-related outcomes) 
Quality of life (high satisfaction) 
Source: (Cutter et al., 2008) 
As shown in Table 25, Cutter and others have applied the DROP model method to the 
Gulfport-Biloxi area in an analysis of the resilience of southeastern counties (Cutter, Burton, & 
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Emrich, 2010).  This research found that Hancock County had low- to moderate- and Harrison 
County moderate- to high-resilience scores compared with other counties in the southeastern 
U.S.  Scores were based on a minimum-maximum rescaling index of zero to one.  Scores of 0.5 
indicate average levels of resilience in each category.  A total score of 2.5 indicates average 
resilience. Scores higher than the average indicate greater resilience and lower than the average 
indicate weaker resilience.  Harrison County was above average in all categories, particularly in 
community capital, and stronger than Hancock County in all categories, particularly in 
infrastructure.  Hancock County was below average in all categories. 
 
Table 25: Community resilience scores using DROP model data for Gulfport-Biloxi Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA) 




Social Economic Institutional Infrastructure 
Community 
Capital 
Hancock County 0.498 0.409 0.499 0.203 0.499 2.108 
Low to 
moderate 





not included in 
this research) 
0.44 0.324 0.324 0.258 0.537 1.883 
Low to 
moderate 
Gulfport-Biloxi MSA  2.271 Moderate 
Source: (Cutter et al., 2010) 
 
Of the categories used in the DROP model, ecological and economic factors were not 
included in the interview responses as explicit reasons for resilience (although these types of 
issues did come up tangentially in a number of interviews).  Two categories for this analysis 
were sub-categories of the above social resilience indicators – values and cohesion and faith and 
the faith-based community.  Social networks and demographics are also included in the DROP 
model but are discussed elsewhere in this chapter.  Other categories derived from Cutter’s model 
include physical infrastructure, institutional and local response, and community competence.  
Two items not included in the DROP model were added for this analysis – external support and 
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the legacy of hurricanes.  External support is clearly not an endogenous factor related to 
resilience of place, as it is dependent on the decision of other agencies and organizations to 
intervene.  However, it was extremely important after Katrina and differences in levels of 
support were perceptible to interview subjects and seen as a factor in recovery.  A legacy of 
dealing with hurricanes or any other disaster is related to the community competence factor in 
the DROP model, the local understanding of risk.  Hurricane experience was considered to be a 
distinct characteristic worthy of analysis based on interview responses. Aggregated responses by 
community, resilience level, and total subjects are shown in Table 26 and Figure 26. 
 











Values/cohesion 5 7 8 3 12 11 23 
Community competence 5 4 3 1 9 4 13 
Institutional/local response 2 4 2 2 6 4 10 
Physical infrastructure 1 7 1 0 8 1 9 
External support 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 
Faith 0 0 3 1 0 4 4 
Legacy of hurricanes 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 




Figure 26: Interview subjects’ alternative reasons for resilience 
 
Values and social cohesion were the most oft-cited of the alternative reasons for 
resilience (35 percent of total responses for all communities).  Although this notion is related to 
social networks, as social cohesion is achieved through social connections, the social resilience 
measures described by interview subjects tended to focus on the overall community, rather than 
their own networks, and the cultures and traditions of the area.  Examples included families, 
friends, neighbors, and even strangers pitching in and helping one another, the commitment to 
family, the small size of the community, generosity, and multigenerational or well-established 
roots and family businesses in the area. In addition, greater cohesion was brought about by the 
hurricane, the kind of ad hoc synthetic communities noted in the literature (Tobin, 1999).  
Subjects also mentioned values such as the creativity, the culture, and the ambiance of their 
communities, intangible characteristics that also contribute to sense of place. 
Community competence was the second-most cited alternative reason for resilience, 




















frequently cited in high-resilience communities than low-resilience communities (24 percent 
versus 14 percent of all responses by respective resilience category).  Examples of community 
competence included residents taking care of their own needs, helping to take care of others’ 
needs, capacity issues such as the existence of partnerships and resources associated with local 
wealth, rebuilding instead of waiting for help, the mindset of moving forward and not quitting, 
and the availability of emotional support including formal mental health training and outreach.   
The institutional and local response comprised 15 percent of total responses for all 
communities.  This category included the responsiveness of local government, city leadership 
and political will, the efforts of major employers such as Ingalls and the Port of Pascagoula, and 
contingency planning by households, businesses, and nonprofits.  In addition to the benefits of 
local government capacity in hazard mitigation (Burby & May, 1998), responsive governance 
has also been associated with stronger social networks (Aldrich, 2010).  Specific examples of 
local government responses included well-attended charettes during the rebuilding phase and the 
Community Rating System adopted by Waveland.  In another example, the Port of Pascagoula’s 
primary responsibility was quickly restoring port activity, but it also provided the infrastructure 
to moor a cruise ship used as temporary housing for about 1,200 refugees.   
Physical infrastructure accounted for 14 percent of total responses for all communities, 
although the percent differed greatly between low-resilience and high-resilience communities (4 
percent versus 21 percent of all responses by respective resilience category).  Of the responses 
categorized as physical infrastructure factors, robustness of the “core” or central business district 
was the most frequently cited.  Lack of damage was seen as a very important reason for the 
strong recovery in Ocean Springs, where the downtown area is set back from the beach, versus 
Waveland, where the downtown area took a direct hit and was almost completely destroyed.  
Aside from the presence of a functioning commercial district, places to congregate were also 
seen as important for resilience.  The rebuilding of casinos and related amenities occurred very 
quickly after the storm, to the amazement of residents.  Several subjects noted that their 
respective communities are better off after Katrina, as city planning and an influx of capital have 
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led to a revitalized community.  Features such as bridges, parks, and other recreational facilities 
have been created and streets, landscaping, and lighting improved.   
External support comprised 6 percent of total responses for all communities.  Examples 
of external aid included the support of outside volunteers (particularly in cleanup and rebuilding) 
and positive media attention, such as the efforts of former resident Robin Roberts of Good 
Morning America and Whoopi Goldberg on behalf of the October 2005 Mississippi Rising 
telethon.  It should be noted that external support has been shown to be most effective when 
integrated with well-organized local networks and can be rendered ineffectual when lacking such 
local integration (Berke et al., 1993). 
Responses referencing faith were found only in Pascagoula and East Biloxi, the two low-
resilience case study communities, where they comprised 14 percent of all responses given for 
alternative reasons for resilience. With respect to the faith and presence of a strong faith-based 
community, residents in these communities noted the powerful presence of churches in the 
community, the strong Christian faith of residents, and the specific ability of the local faith-based 
community to avoid bureaucratic red tape in delivering aid.  As discussed previously, faith-based 
organizations were the most common types of networks that residents belonged to in all four 
communities; however, with respect to describing community resilience more generally, faith 
was only specifically cited in Pascagoula and East Biloxi.  Also, as previously discussed, 
subjects from Pascagoula and East Biloxi were more likely to view churches and other places of 
worship as symbolic and important features in the built environment.   
The legacy of hurricanes was mentioned in several interviews (5 percent of total 
responses for all communities), as all residents had been through previous (albeit less intense) 
hurricanes and expected that storms would occur.  Because of this, residents were familiar with 
protocols for securing their property, evacuating, and even with rebuilding complications such as 
dealings with insurance companies after a hurricane.   
Interview subjects had moving personal stories of resilience such as civilians rescuing 
their neighbors from the deadly storm surge flooding and teachers going back to work in outdoor 
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classrooms with no supplies.  Although these experiences were quite extraordinary, the reasons 
for community resilience given above were typical of those established in the literature.   
Results: Reasons for Lack of Resilience 
During the interviews, residents also identified many factors contributing to the lack of 
resilience in their communities.  When asked about factors that influenced the resilience of their 
communities, interview subjects gave a longer list of factors that inhibited resilience versus those 
that enhanced resilience (71 versus 66).  The factors that were most significant included 
construction codes, various social and economic problems, insurance, and the overall loss of 
population and employment (Table 27, Figure 27). Other factors included emotional and 
psychological damage, institutional problems and bureaucracy, location, amount of damage, and 
fraud. 











Construction requirements 3 4 2 5 7 7 14 
Social and economic problems 3 1 2 5 4 7 11 
Insurance 3 3 3 1 6 4 10 
Loss of population and 
employment 5 0 1 4 5 5 10 
Emotional and psychological 
damage 4 2 1 1 6 2 8 
Institutional 
problems/bureaucracy 3 0 1 2 3 3 6 
Location 2 0 2 0 2 2 4 
Amount of damage 2 0 0 1 2 1 3 
Fraud 0 0 1 1 0 2 2 




Figure 27: Interview subjects’ responses for lack of resilience 
 
Construction requirements were a very common reason for a lack of resilience (21 
percent of total responses for all communities), particularly in the return of single-family 
housing.  Since Katrina, building codes have been redrawn, as have FEMA floodplain maps.  
Building elevations were revised, raising 3 to 8 feet above the levels recommended in pre-
Katrina Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) in some locations.  Local governments adopted the 
International Building Code for wind and flood requirements and many employed municipal 
Smart Code ordinances, based on urban design rather than traditional zoning.  Although these 
standards were meant to protect residents, they have made rebuilding cost-prohibitive, 
particularly for those properties that front the Gulf of Mexico, which suffered the most damage 
and face the greatest restrictions.  Because of this, many residents lack the resources or are 
overwhelmed by the technical aspects of the new standards and have not rebuilt.  Homes that 
experienced less than 50 percent damage were exempt, and could rebuild their homes as before, 


























Hurricanes have driven the repeated overhaul of building codes and insurance standards 
on the Gulf Coast.  Hurricanes Audrey (1957) and Betsy (1965) led to modifications in coastal 
planning, including preservation of an open beachfront with a seawall and artificial sand beach 
for the public.  At this time, the Southern Standard Building Code and Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) standards were in use and the informal building elevation standard was 10 
feet above sea level (Hearn, 2004).  Hurricane-specific standards had not been formalized prior 
to Camille in 1969, but massive property losses prompted codification.  After Camille, a 13.2 
foot building elevation standard was adopted.  Certain practices meant to protect residents were 
later ignored, such as in the risky development of casinos and recreational land uses on once-
protected beachfront.  Reports made after Camille called for future planning to limit exposure 
and take into account vulnerability of the community, particularly by adopting county- or region-
wide hazard mitigation plans (Hearn, 2004).  Often, seeking economic development, local 
governments succumb to pressure from private developers and relax building standards or 
enforcement in the future.  Unfortunately, this type of hubris is often detrimental to disaster 
mitigation.   
Social and economic problems were the second-most cited reason for lack of resilience 
(16 percent of total responses from all communities).  Major problems included property value 
declines and foreclosures.  Other problems included the lack of a social safety net, resulting in 
the very poor falling through the cracks.  Although there were some strong nonprofits 
specializing in social services, including shelters and food banks, there was a lack of area 
capacity to meet the needs of the poor.  In particular, affordable housing was seen as a weak 
area.  Social and economic problems were more commonly noted in low-resilience communities 
than high-resilience communities (21 percent versus 11 percent of all responses by respective 
resilience category) and were highest in East Biloxi (25 percent of responses). 
The increased cost of insurance after Katrina was also detrimental to resilience.  
Therefore, this was one of the top reasons cited for lack of resilience (15 percent of total 
responses in all communities).  Many residents did not have coverage for flood damage, given 
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that these properties were beyond the pre-Katrina 100-year floodplain.  According to research, 
regardless of risk, many households fail to insure their properties based on short-sighted 
economic decisions (Kunreuther, 2006).  In Mississippi, poor households were improperly 
insured and had to rely on limited household resources, aid, grants, and loans to rebuild.  
Furthermore, many homes had not been flooded by Hurricane Camille, and residents were 
confident that Camille’s high-water mark would not be breached in their lifetime.   Therefore, 
many affected households were not insured against the significant flood damage that occurred.  
Aid was distributed to these properties, including funds from the state development authority.  
However, since flood maps were redrawn by FEMA post-Katrina, these same properties have 
seen dramatic increases in insurance premiums and in some cases have been refused insurance.  
Some residents reported paying four or eight times the pre-Katrina rates in recent interviews.  
Wind insurance, covered by the state, is an additional cost.  The public sector can reduce the 
burden on residents and businesses by employing a strategy like that of Waveland, Mississippi.  
Under the FEMA Community Rating System (CRS), Waveland has been classified a Class 5 
community, which allows a 25 percent discount on flood insurance for properties.   Through the 
program, communities can earn credits through flood mapping, regulations, preparedness, 
damage reduction, and public information campaigns in order to receive up to a 45 percent 
discount on residents’ premiums in the highest-risk flood zones.  Although recent studies have 
found the effectiveness of CRS to be uneven (Brody et al., 2009), Waveland appears to be 
exceptionally committed to the approach, which bodes well for the community. 
The loss of population and employment was another often cited reason for a lack of 
resilience (15 percent of total responses in all communities), particularly in Waveland and East 
Biloxi (20 percent of responses in both communities).  The losses of population acted as a 
feedback loop wherein households and businesses in the hardest hit areas were less likely to 
return given the lack of amenities and the high number of vacant properties.  There was also 
increased competition from D’Iberville and other inland communities that fared better and 
offered more housing options for renters.  The lack of grocery stores in the area was particularly 
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burdensome.  In Hancock County, a grocery store did not reopen until 2012.  In East Biloxi, 
some residents remained underserved by a subpar dollar food store and an international market 
specializing in Vietnamese goods that did not meet the broader needs of the population.  Many of 
the properties left vacant after these losses of population have remained under ownership of 
former residents unable to sell and unwilling to rebuild.  There are few options other than 
waiting and hoping for growth and a dearth of future hurricanes. 
Emotional and psychological trauma was also mentioned as a detriment to resilience in 
12 percent of total responses in all communities.  Interestingly, these responses were more 
common in high-resilience communities than low-resilience communities (17 percent versus 6 
percent of all responses by respective resilience category).  These responses were related to grief 
from losing friends and family, the fear of hurricanes and related dangers, the confusion of 
having so much activity going on at once, the feelings of abandonment by the outside world, the 
loss of property to which residents had a sentimental attachment, the loss of ways of life, and 
diagnosed and undiagnosed mental health issues in general.  Many subjects spoke of the extreme 
losses experienced by their neighbors.  There was a general feeling that, although the entire area 
experienced loss, one could always find an example of someone much less fortunate.   
Institutional problems, particularly systemic bureaucracy, also slowed the recovery and 
reduced resilience, as cited by 9 percent of total responses in all communities.  Aside from 
paperwork and perceived red tape, a lack of political consensus in certain communities was also 
cited.  Similar issues were shown to be even more pervasive in New Orleans after Katrina, which 
hampered the collaboration and adaptability that is important in resilience (Olshansky & 
Johnson, 2010).  In Mississippi, one interview subject responded that very few representatives 
from governmental agencies were on-scene after the disaster.  Longer term, some residents felt 
that planning and recovery efforts did not involve residents.  Institutional problems were notably 
absent in Ocean Springs, which was praised for its leadership and inclusive decision making 
processes. 
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Geographic location was cited as an issue preventing resilience in Waveland and 
Pascagoula, where it arose in two interviews in each community, or in 6 percent of total 
responses in all communities.  For Waveland, the isolation and distance from major highways, 
which also adds to its sleepy charm, was not convenient in rebuilding and attracting households 
and businesses.  In Pascagoula, like in other communities on the Gulf Coast, homes closest in 
proximity to the water were not rebuilt and thus the location near the water was a limiting factor 
for resilience. 
Amount of damage was cited in Waveland and East Biloxi and in only 4 percent of total 
responses in all communities.  That this response was confined to these two communities is not 
surprising given the relatively large amount of damage received in these areas.  Specific issues 
raised that related to amount of damage included the damage to the city core (a counterpart to the 
response in the previous section, that lack of damage to downtown promoted resilience) and 
damage to infrastructure.  This varied by community, as Ocean Springs experienced minor 
damage to its central business district and Waveland and East Biloxi were gravely damaged.  
Infrastructure issues also tended to differ among communities.  For example, Waveland has 
restored basic infrastructure such as roads, sewer, and water, while local advocates have 
criticized Biloxi for failing to follow through on a water and sewage drainage project in East 
Biloxi (D. Walker, 2012). 
Although fraud only came up in two interviews, in the low-resilience communities of 
Pascagoula and East Biloxi, it was an unfortunate consequence that warrants mention.  
Following Katrina, a contingent of criminals posing as contractors offered their services to 
residents who needed roofing, drywall, or other assistance.  According to one interview subject, 
these individuals tended to prey on the distrust of outside assistance exhibited by poor, ethnic or 
racial minority, and elderly households.  Perpetrators collected payment in advance for services 
that were never delivered and left town without a trace. 
Finally, there were two answers given on the lack of resilience that did not fit in the 
above categories.  First, the lack of media attention, or the bias toward coverage of New Orleans 
 138 
instead of Mississippi was a source of frustration and noted by one subject as a limiting factor for 
resilience.  Although exceptions exist, including the celebrity-filled Mississippi Rising telethon, 
residents were aware of the narrative in the media and were discouraged by what they felt was 
biased or negligent reporting.  Stories and images of Mississippi that did emerge were every bit 
as distressing as those in New Orleans, but received a fraction of the attention.  Another issue 
raised was that, although hurricanes are frequent in the region, there had not been a major storm 
in many years prior to and after Katrina.  One interview subject remarked that this may have 
made people too comfortable or complacent, leading to a lower rate of evacuation, for example.   
Subjects were also asked specifically about vulnerable populations, whether certain 
demographic or economic groups were less likely to recover.  The literature asserts that certain 
populations are particularly vulnerable to disaster due to living conditions as well as a lack of 
resources to prepare for and recovery from a devastating event (Cutter et al., 2003; VanZandt et 
al., 2012).  According to interview subjects in Mississippi, Hurricane Katrina was an egalitarian 
disaster.  If anything, the storm disproportionately impacted the wealthy.  The most devastated 
areas were closest to the waterfront, and tended to be expensive real estate.  Exceptions existed, 
including several modest high-rise apartment buildings in East Biloxi that were destroyed.  
However, many poor and ethnic or racial minority households were situated on higher ground, 
resulting in less wind and storm surge damage.  During the interviews, demographics such as 
income and race were not seen as major barriers to recovery. 
Although other vulnerable populations fared better in Mississippi, residents did note that 
the disaster was difficult for the elderly.  Many were isolated and unable to physically and 
emotionally cope with the damage to their properties.  For some elderly homeowners, taking out 
a loan for repairs, coordinating contractors, and other necessary steps in the recovery process 
were unrealistic prospects.  Some left to stay with family members, often in other parts of the 
country, and could not or chose not to return.  Many subjects also spoke about elderly neighbors 
who were totally disconcerted by the loss of life and destruction of landmarks.  These subjects 
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speculated that Katrina escalated existing illnesses or otherwise shortened the lives of many 
elderly residents.   
 
Discussion of Stage 2 Results 
The tenor of these interviews was consistent.  Those living in low-resilience communities 
according to the resilience measure (return of households) actually tended to rate their 
communities high on a ten-point scale.  Some qualified this by rating the residents’ resilience 
very high and the city or city leadership much lower.  Examples were given of individual 
struggles and difficult times, but there was an unwavering belief that the population of the 
Mississippi Coast had been and would continue to be resilient. 
In general, residents indicated strong bonds with people and places in coastal Mississippi.  
However, the number and type of social networks and types of urban environments tended to 
differ between high and low-resilience communities.  Residents indicated many are better off, 
having higher quality housing than before and a refreshed community due to city planning and 
beautification efforts.  It must be noted that these improvements were not consolation for the 
losses incurred, and that others continue to struggle to return to their homes. 
The role of the faith-based community and of individual faith in community resilience 
was more complex than expected.  Faith-based groups were the most common social networks 
that interview subjects engaged with.  Churches and other places of worship were also prominent 
features of the built environment, though more so in the two low-resilience communities. Faith in 
particular was singled out in these two low-resilience communities as an alternative reason for 
resilience.  Although it is impossible to analyze the residents’ levels of faith based on these 
responses, it would seem that the results indicate that the faith-based community is more 
prominent in the two low-resilience communities, which may have resulted in a greater reliance 
on these resources after Katrina.  More than anything, this demonstrates the importance of the 
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faith-based community after disasters, particularly in those populations that are more vulnerable, 
a point which has often been made (Moore, Linnan, & Benedict, 2004; Patterson et al., 2010).  
The issue of internal versus external networks of support was also recurrent in interviews.  
Residents of high-resilience communities tended to have greater ties to friends, schools, 
businesses and local nonprofits, or networks with very concentrated local ties.  In contrast, 
residents of low-resilience communities tended to have greater ties to federal, state, university, 
military, and national or international nonprofits, or networks that are external by nature.  This is 
problematic in part because of the dwindling resources of these organizations.  One interview 
subject directing a nonprofit based in the area stated that there is greater competition for fewer 
dollars, which resulted in a significant decrease in the local community's ability to take care of 
those in need.  There has also been a dramatic increase in the numbers of people in need and who 
cannot take care of themselves.   
This research suggests that establishing and maintaining strong, redundant, 
interconnected local networks that interface with external and national groups will improve 
future resilience.  The Mississippi Coast Interfaith Disaster Task Force (MCIDTF), referenced in 
several interviews, is an excellent example of this strategy in action.  Prior to Hurricane Katrina, 
the MCIDTF had only been activated immediately after a storm.  Since Katrina, the organization, 
which fosters collaboration between public, private, and nonprofit organizations, has remained 
active, focusing on preparedness and mental health in addition to ongoing recovery.  Based on 
the findings, attention to the needs of elderly residents and other vulnerable populations is 
necessary, including outreach before and after a disaster.  Finally, the results support the notion 
that a built environment encouraging social gathering, with many amenities and landmark areas, 
results in personal pride and attachment as well as greater fellowship among residents.  Such 
spaces are already valued by city planners and should be further encouraged as effective 
resilience planning. 
With respect to the built environment, interview subjects were most connected to 
institutions, commercial establishments and the unique natural features and park spaces available 
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in the area.  Low-resilience communities tended to have greater affinity to churches and other 
places of worship and high-resilience communities tended to have greater affinity for a wider 
range of built environment components.  Places of worship in Pascagoula and East Biloxi, both 
low-resilience communities, had a stronger presence.  The location of built environment 
elements that were listed in interviews was concentrated near the districts described as the 
“heart” or “core” of each community. Although many structures were lost in Katrina, there have 
been efforts to rebuild in a locally and historically sensitive manner.  An example is the new 
library in East Biloxi (Figure 28).  The library was designed to recall late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century resort hotels from the area, which have almost completely vanished over time 
due to hurricane damage and economic changes.  The library also houses a climate-controlled, 




Figure 28: East Biloxi Library 
Source: Photograph taken by author, July 2012 
 
Interview subjects also identified alternative factors, or factors other than social networks 
of support, that contributed to resilience.  These included 
 Factors related to community values and cohesion 
o Culture and spirit of residents (including generosity, volunteerism, a strong family 
tradition, established roots, pride in their community, and a proactive population 
that helps one another) 
 Factors related to community competence 
o Role of major industries and employers (shipbuilding, casinos) 
o Public participation in recovery 
 Factors related to the institutional and local response 
o Political will and leadership 
 Factors related to physical infrastructure 
o Relatively small damage to the central business district 
 The strong faith of population and strong faith-based organizations 
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 The tradition of coping with hurricanes 
Interview subjects also identified alternative factors that limited resilience.  Factors 
thought to decrease resilience included 
 Factors related to construction requirements 
o New building codes 
 Factors related to social and economic problems 
o Depleted property values, foreclosures 
 Factors related to insurance 
 Factors related to loss of population and employment 
 Factors related to emotional and psychological damage 
o mass confusion and fear 
 Factors related to institutional problems/bureaucracy 
 Factors related to location  
o Geographic isolation, proximity to coast 
 Large level of damage to entire community 
 Fraud 
The Stage 2 analysis gave credence to many findings from the Stage 1 analysis and 
further identified disaster resilience factors.  Many of these responses on resilience dovetail with 
the theories presented in Chapter 2 about disasters, social networks, place attachment, and 
resilience.  Many others, such as tradition of coping with disasters have also been well 
documented in other fields (Adger et al., 2005).  These dichotomous lists suggest a tension 
between the desire to reestablish a traditional way of life and the need to protect human life and 
property in advance of future hurricanes.  Although Katrina was not a typical disaster and the 
Mississippi Coast is a small sample, the information provided by interview subjects in the area 
was detailed and thoughtful and can be applied to other situations.   
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CHAPTER 7: SYNTHESIS OF STAGE 1 AND STAGE 2 RESULTS 
The Stage 1 and Stage 2 results were combined to respond to each research question: 1) 
does a certain type of built environment result in a more resilient community; 2) how does the 
effect of the built environment measure against other factors that are significant to social 
networks; and 3) do built environment properties make communities more conducive to social 
networking activity that promotes resilience?  The three additional research propositions were 
also reexamined: a) social networks are important factors for resilience; b) social networks 
interact with and are influenced by the physical environment; and c) communities with the 
strongest resilience include both strong social networks and varied and integrated physical 
environments.  Below are the relevant findings from both stages of the study that respond to the 
research questions as well as the additional research propositions. 
1) Does a certain type of built environment result in a more resilient community?   
With respect to the first question, communities with varied and integrated physical 
environments were indeed resilient.  In the quantitative model, intersection density, net 
residential density, the density of establishments that support social networking, and the density 
of historic sites positively impacted resilience.   
Intersection density was an important factor in the quantitative model.  In interviews, 
subjects were asked about walkability and proximity of amenities but not specifically about the 
street configurations of their communities.  Streets as significant places came up in ten 
interviews from Waveland and Pascagoula and pedestrian infrastructure came up in two 
interviews in Ocean Springs.  The overall perception in Ocean Springs was that this area, which 
was by far the most resilient, is the most pedestrian friendly.  According to the data, it is also the 
most compact in terms of intersection density, with a density of almost 80 intersections per 
square kilometer versus about 50 intersections per square kilometer in Pascagoula and East 
Biloxi and only 7 intersections per square kilometer in Waveland.  Intersection density and 
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walkability were less important than other factors, but were significant for resilience in both the 
quantitative and qualitative portions of the analysis.   
Net residential density was also a significant factor in the model and housing was 
mentioned in many interviews.  In the model, net residential density positively influenced 
resilience along with percent renter-occupied multifamily housing.  Median housing value also 
had a positive impact on resilience.  Despite this, multifamily housing was an issue for many 
interviewees.  In East Biloxi and Waveland in particular, the lack of affordable multifamily 
housing was considered an issue before and after Katrina.  When calculating resilience based on 
occupied housing units, it was clear that the loss of a few very high-density structures skewed the 
results.  Although some of these units have been replaced, these particular structures were not 
rebuilt or restored.  It is typical in the area to build multifamily housing very near the shore, 
which would seem to create a more vulnerable situation for residents.  These types of 
developments are more likely to be severely damaged and not rebuilt; therefore a large 
population is potentially displaced by each major storm.  Post-Katrina comprehensive plans have 
begun to reconcile the need for affordable and workforce housing with the need to mitigate 
vulnerability.  For example, Biloxi’s Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance is specifically 
referenced in the high-density residential guidelines of its comprehensive plan (Beckman, Rouse, 
O’Neill, & Kim, 2009). 
Historic site density positively impacted resilience in the quantitative model and historic 
sites were considered important for some residents in interviews.  The loss of old family homes 
and former landmarks (such as Pascagoula’s Round Island lighthouse) was upsetting to these 
subjects.  However, the predominant attitude about historic sites was that hurricanes and other 
historic events (including the Civil War) have produced enormous changes to the landscape and 
change is part of the way of life in the area.  One of the most high profile sites damaged by 
Katrina was Beauvoir in Biloxi, a home that the Confederate president Jefferson Davis lived in 
after the war until the end of his life.  Using federal, state, and private funds, Beauvoir was 
restored and reopened as a museum and library. In Ocean Springs, the 1890 Charnley-Norwood 
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cottage designed by Louis Sullivan and Frank Lloyd Wright, which sat next door to Sullivan’s 
summer cottage before Sullivan’s own cottage was destroyed by Katrina, was still undergoing 
laborious reconstruction in 2012.  The modest, late nineteenth-century home of French Creole 
former slave Pleasant Reed was also rebuilt and relocated to the Ohr-O’Keefe museum campus 
after being badly damaged by Katrina.  To the population of the Mississippi Coast, there were 
certain landmarks worth saving, including these three historic homes and the Round Island 
lighthouse, which has been relocated to the mainland in Pascagoula where it will be pieced back 
together brick by brick.  The presence of historic sites was an important factor for resilience in 
the Stage 1 analysis, and preserving sites that are most significant to the culture and history of 
the area seemed to be a priority.  This is not surprising given the level of attachment to place 
seen in the interview process.  Although each of these restored structures will be vulnerable to 
the next storm, residents deemed it important to dedicate funds for the preservation of high 
priority historic sites.  Given that residents returned at a greater level in communities with a 
greater density of historic sites, this has the potential to increase future resilience.    
Density of social networking organizations also positively influenced resilience.  The 
establishments that support social networking included eating and drinking places, book stores, 
sporting and recreational camps, recreational vehicle parks and campsites, beauty shops and 
barbers, motion picture theaters, video tape rental, amusement and recreation services, museums, 
art galleries, botanical and zoological gardens, educational services, social services, membership 
organizations, and religious organizations.  Among these categories, eating and drinking places 
and religious organizations were cited most often in interviews.  All other categories – sporting 
and recreational camps, recreational vehicle parks and campsites, beauty shops and barbers, 
motion picture theaters, amusement and recreation services, museums, art galleries, botanical 
and zoological gardens, educational services, social services, and membership organizations – 
were also mentioned in at least one interview. 
Land use mix was not a significant factor in the quantitative model but was explored in 
greater depth in the qualitative stage of the research.  In interviews, subjects were asked about 
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the proximity of amenities within a short distance in their communities.  The overall perception 
in Ocean Springs was that this area, which was by far the most resilient of the Stage 2 case study 
communities, had the greatest diversity of land uses within a short or walkable distance.  In 
contrast, interview subjects stated that East Biloxi, which has been much less resilient post-
Katrina, suffered from a lack of amenities such as retail and restaurants.   
Although parks had a negative influence on resilience in the quantitative model, the 
presence of parks was clearly important to interview subjects.  Parks in general were the most 
often cited built environment feature that was important and symbolic to residents among all 
total interview responses.  Furthermore, parks of all kinds were used as a gathering place for 
social networks.  Ball fields, playgrounds, and neighborhood parks were the most common types 
of park spaces used for gathering; however, the area has a wide variety of parks, such as 
neighborhood parks, state parks with camping facilities, and an historic national seashore park.  
The parks and open spaces in the area highlight the natural features and contribute to the 
livability of the area.  Immediately after the storm, parks were one type of area used as a 
distribution point (for example, the Jackson County Fairgrounds in Pascagoula was a drop point 
for the National Guard).   
Of course, many parks and natural features were affected by the storm.  Countless trees 
were felled, barrier islands were inundated, and inland waterways were impacted by the storm 
surge.  After Katrina, city government along with nonprofit groups such as KaBOOM!, the 
Salvation Army, and the Kroc Center made park and recreation space a priority in rebuilding.  
However, in 2010, the BP oil spill catastrophe further degraded the area’s natural resources.  
Contrary to the results of the quantitative analysis, the qualitative analysis bore out the 
importance of parks in community resilience. 
Retail services, municipal government facilities, housing, and districts such as downtown 
core areas were not included in the quantitative model but proved to be important for residents in 
interviews.  Comments on retail centered on the importance of grocery stores and other staples 
for returning to normalcy.  Municipal government facilities such as city hall and fire stations 
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were commonly pointed to as examples of major post-Katrina improvements.  Using federal aid, 
many communities received new state-of-the-art facilities that greatly improved on past 
conditions.  For example, Pascagoula gained a well-appointed county services center that unified 
all services in a “one-stop shop.”   Significantly, in interviews, subjects spoke of downtown core 
areas as the “heart” of their community and as features crucial to resilience.  The core districts 
were Coleman Avenue in Waveland, Washington and Government Streets in Ocean Springs, 
Pascagoula Street and Jackson Avenue in Pascagoula, and the Vieux Marche in East Biloxi.  
Comments were also made about the relative amount of damage to the core.  Communities that 
sustained major damage to the core were considered less resilient by subjects.  Ocean Springs 
was seen as more resilient and Waveland was seen as less resilient by interview subjects due to 
the amount of damage sustained downtown.   
Residents of each low-resilience community, Pascagoula and East Biloxi, commented on 
changes that were made to the downtown areas of these cities in the 1970s to compete with area 
malls.  In both cities, the core downtown shopping district was redesigned with narrowed streets 
and an awning or enclosure in order to emulate the mall experience.  Although some of these 
trappings were eventually removed, the narrowed streets have remained.  Both Delmas Avenue 
in Pascagoula and parts of Howard Avenue in East Biloxi still resemble alleys more than streets, 
with one lane flanked by angled parking spaces and sidewalks that are sufficiently wide but 
unpleasant for pedestrians due to the bulky parking areas, the vacant storefronts, and the lack of 
street life.  Interview subjects found these urban renewal projects ill-conceived and damaging to 
the original character of downtown.  Given the number and nature of statements made about each 
community’s downtown core, central business districts were certainly seen as important for 
resilience by interview subjects.  There were no specific metrics of this in the quantitative 
analysis, although higher density and greater land use mix are associated with the core of an 
urban area.    
East Biloxi has a unique built environment among the case study communities, as there 
are several casinos only a short distance from the study area boundaries (Figure 29).  In some 
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ways the casinos are very separate from the community.  Casino guests are encouraged to stay on 
the grounds, spending their money in casino shops rather than other local shops.  Although 
casinos employ locals from the region, the relatively disadvantaged East Biloxi population is not 
the typical employment base.  Therefore these imposing casinos flank the peninsula on which 
East Biloxi is situated but do not factor in the daily life of residents.  Of the 12 percent in taxes 
casinos pay, 3.2 percent stays in the community for the city general fund and city and county 
public safety and school systems.  In fiscal year 2012, this amounted to $7.7 million to Harrison 
County and $18.8 million to the city of Biloxi out of $827 million in total casino revenue 
("Gaming revenue," 2012).  
 
 
Figure 29: Contrast between local facilities (Fleur de Lis French club, left) and casinos (Palace Casino, right) 
Source: Photograph taken by author, July 2012 
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Some built environment factors were more significant than other variables that impact 
resilience, including the intervening and control variables (socio-demographic data, amount of 
damage).  These included the same variables mentioned above – intersection density, net 
residential density, the presence of establishments that support social networking, and historic 
site density. 
The intervening and control variables had varying levels of explanatory power.  These 
results were largely validated by the interview process.  For example, some lower income 
households, which are generally considered less resilient in studies conducted of resilience, fared 
better than wealthier households in many parts of the Gulf Coast because of the patterns of 
development in the area, thus income had almost no effect on resilience.  Lower income 
households generally cannot afford expensive waterfront real estate, either on the Gulf of Mexico 
or inland waterways such as the Bay of Biloxi or Bay St Louis.  These households tend to live 
inland and on higher ground and therefore were less vulnerable to storm surge flooding.  Of 
course, some low-income housing was badly damaged, but interview subjects did not view the 
damage as more detrimental to populations that are viewed as socially vulnerable, with the 
exception of elderly populations.  The percentage of households that are multifamily and renter-
occupied had a positive impact on resilience in the Stage 1 model, although interview subjects 
mentioned that areas with higher proportions of renters have not rebuilt as readily.   
Amount of damage and amount of aid were also included as intervening variables in the 
Stage 1 model and both significantly affected resilience.  Both damage and aid received had a 
pronounced negative effect on resilience.  Although amount of damage was seen as an important 
factor in resilience in interviews, amount of aid received by local area was not a factor.  Certain 
interview subjects compared the amount of aid received in New Orleans to that received in 
Mississippi, but not among communities or households in Mississippi.  The aid that was 
available to individual households was either dispensed door-to-door (for example, Salvation 
Army meal trucks), by waiting in a queue (for example, the Red Cross distribution points), or 
was prioritized using a door-to-door assessment process favored by many churches.  Comments 
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were occasionally made about individuals that “hoarded” supplies, but in general residents 
believed that most were able to get what they needed from a variety of sources and that no subset 
of the population was privileged more than others in terms of external aid in the wake of the 
storm.  
The control variables in the Stage 1 model – change in occupied housing units per acre in 
the previous decade of 1990 to 2000 and occupied housing units per acre in 2000 – each had a 
negative impact on resilience.  Or, areas that were high-growth tended to reverse trajectory after 
Katrina and strong clusters existed in a nonrandom pattern.   
In summary, four built environment variables had a significant positive impact on 
resilience in the model greater than the impact of many intervening variables.   Aside from the 
two control variables, percent of damage, amount of aid, and the presence of parks had the 
greatest negative impact on resilience overall and percent of the population living in the area in 
1995 had the greatest positive impact on resilience.  The four built environment variables of 
intersection density, net residential density, social networking establishment density, and historic 
site density had a positive impact on resilience and were seen as important characteristics with 
respect to resilience in the interviews. 
2) Do those properties of the built environment make communities more conducive to 
social networking activity? 
With respect to the second question, the above qualities of the built environment that 
were associated with greater resilience (intersection density, net residential density, social 
networking establishment density, and historic site density) were noted by interview subjects to 
particularly impact social networks or to support social networks.   
Subjects were asked about amenities in a short walking or driving distance in order to 
gauge certain properties of the built environment that are conducive to social networking, such as 
intersection density, land use mix, and the presence of parks.  Interview subjects in Waveland, 
Pascagoula, and East Biloxi did feel that there were some amenities within a short distance, in 
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particular parks, beaches, schools.  Subjects in these communities felt certain other types of 
amenities were lacking, in particular grocery stores in Waveland and Biloxi and restaurants in 
Pascagoula.  Residents of Ocean Springs felt unanimously that the area has almost all the 
amenities within a short distance that they desire. Only a few exceptions, including the lack of a 
community college or other center of higher learning, were mentioned in interviews in Ocean 
Springs.  Ocean Springs was the most resilient community in Mississippi to emerge after 
Katrina.  This may have been in part due to the diversity and number of amenities such as parks, 
schools, and commercial establishments.  Perhaps because of these positive aspects of the 
community, more households chose to return despite damage in the residential areas and 
particularly in beachfront properties.  Whereas many of these properties remained vacant in 
Waveland and Pascagoula, beachfront properties in Ocean Springs were occupied at a higher 
rate. 
The importance of those types of establishments that are conducive to social networking 
was a phenomenon often described in interviews.  Sites mentioned by interview subjects that 
were used for social networking activity included restaurants, community centers, and specific 
kinds of commercial establishments, which were all included in the list of social networking 
establishments.  For example, in East Biloxi, among the first businesses restored were a beauty 
salon and a barber shop, as these had been important spaces for gathering prior to Katrina.  A 
local aid group set out specifically to rebuild these establishments in order to allow a sense of 
community and normalcy to be restored. 
Various types of parks, beaches, and historic sites were also singled out as spaces for 
convening with social networks.  The ample public amenities on the coast provided recreational 
opportunities for all residents, regardless of socioeconomic status.  Before and after Katrina, 
interview subjects noted that parks and beaches were commonly used for family reunions and 
other social events, recreational fishing, and for both organized sports and pickup games.  
Furthermore, the piers, docks, and open waters were used for subsistence and commercial 
fishing, an important source of food or income for many households.  In East Biloxi, the shrimp 
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boat docks on the Back Bay were noted as an important location for Vietnamese shrimp boat 
fisherman to socialize between hauls. 
3) How does the effect of the built environment measure against other factors that are 
significant in forming robust social networks?   
With respect to the third question, social networks noted in interviews were not tied to the 
built environment, but were supported by it.   Over one fifth of all social networks that interview 
subjects relied on were faith-based organizations, which organize around a built environment 
element, a church or other place of worship.  Many other organizations similarly exist because of 
an institution, such as schools, local nonprofits, municipal government, and businesses.   
However, friend and family relationships are impacted less directly by the built 
environment.  Friends and family made up 11 percent of all social networks that interview 
subjects relied on.  Although this was a relatively small percentage, these relationships were 
tremendously important in providing emotional and financial support after Katrina. 
In addition to the built environment, many social networks in the area are impacted by 
demographics.  Particularly in East Biloxi, the communities of immigrants or ethnic groups such 
as Vietnamese, Croatian and Slavonian, and Acadian French have formed strong networks that 
persist even as younger generations are increasingly removed from the original culture.  An 
established African American population is yet another demographically configured network in 
East Biloxi and other communities.   
The Gulf Coast’s diverse culture is supported by local clubs such as the Krewe of Nereids 
in Waveland, which is responsible for a Mardi Gras parade.  This social network is tied to 
tradition rather than the built environment.  Despite a very small Cajun population (about 650 
persons in all three coastal Mississippi counties in 2000 according to the U.S. Census), Mardi 
Gras, Fais Do-Do, and other Cajun and Creole traditions reinforce a strong local culture, which 
in turn undergirds the unique sense of place and social networks in the area.  The stability of the 
population over generations, more pronounced in residential areas like East Biloxi than in upstart 
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and tourist-oriented communities, also supports the Gulf Coast culture and contributes to strong 
local social networks as well.  Population stability was also found to have a positive impact on 
resilience in the Stage 1 model. 
Many networks in which residents belonged or that responded after Katrina originated 
outside the region but had local ties in the area.  These national and even international social 
networks tended to consist of weaker ties (i.e., ties between individuals that spoke or met 
infrequently).  However, it has been well documented that such ties are quite powerful in 
mobilizing resources by reaching a greater number of people (Granovetter, 1973).  Weak ties are 
commonly formed through formal organizations and work settings, which is consistent with the 
types of ties mentioned in interviews.  Examples from interview subjects include former 
classmates, military cohorts, and associates from professional organizations. 
Social networks and cohesion can also be impacted by trust in leadership.  In Waveland 
and East Biloxi, lack of trust in leadership was an issue for certain interview subjects.  In 
contrast, interview subjects from Ocean Springs trusted and admired their local leadership.  
Interview subjects from Pascagoula did not discuss leadership.  In Waveland in particular, the 
lack of reliable leadership impacted the ability of formal networks of support to mobilize and 
collaborate.  For example, agencies and organizations that focused on affordable housing tended 
to work in isolation due to competition for limited resources.  Few organizations met or 
communicated regularly, which could be changed through increased opportunities for meeting 
and forming coalitions, a role that city and county leadership could fill.    
Additional Research Propositions 
Three additional research propositions were also examined in Stage 2.  First, it was 
determined through the Stage 2 analysis that social networks are important factors for resilience.  
Although questions focused on social networks in general, interview subjects invariably spoke of 
the social networks that were most important for surviving and recovering from Katrina without 
prompting.  More than any other factor, social networks were found to be important for 
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resilience.  Common and simple ways of expressing this included “neighbors helping neighbors” 
or “people coming together” after Katrina.  Other factors given by interview subjects for 
resilience were strongly related to social networks, such as the qualities of community spirit and 
commitment to family noted in the area. 
Second, social networks were found to interact with and were influenced by the physical 
environment. Formal social networks tended to be influenced by the physical environment 
through virtue of having offices or other bases of operations.  These included churches, schools, 
and local nonprofits.  Informal social networks were also influenced by the physical 
environment, supported by parks, schools, restaurants, and gathering places such as restaurants 
and community centers.  Cultural institutions, such as the Ohr-O’Keefe Museum in East Biloxi 
and the Mary C. O’Keefe Cultural Center in Ocean Springs were important to many interview 
subjects, although more so with higher-income residents.  Historically, the Gulf Coast has 
inspired many local artists, such as the potter George Ohr and the painter Walter Inglis 
Anderson.  Galleries in Bay St Louis, Ocean Springs, and Biloxi continue to foster local artists.  
Institutions, galleries, and public art are features of the built environment that support a unique 
sense of community. 
Third, communities with the strongest resilience include both strong social networks and 
varied and integrated physical environments.  The community that was the most resilient was 
Ocean Springs, which indeed had both strong social networks and the most varied and integrated 
built environment.  Of the four communities, Ocean Springs was the only one in which all 
interview subjects stated that a wide array of amenities such as parks, schools, shopping, and 
community facilities existed within a short walk or drive.  The community was praised for its 
walkability, its sense of community, its diverse shopping and restaurant options, and the 
redeveloped waterfront parks.  Residents in the area were very engaged in the rebuilding process, 
through well-attended charettes.  As in the other case study communities, faith-based 
organizations were the most common social networks in which residents were engaged, although 
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various other types of formal and informal networks were also mentioned.  These tended to be 
more locally rooted than in less resilient communities.  
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CHAPTER 8: EXAMINATION OF POST-KATRINA COMPREHENSIVE 
PLANS 
During the interviews, local planning activities and processes were a common topic.  
Some found the process in their community inclusive and felt great pride in plans and 
implemented projects.  These comments came primarily from residents of Ocean Springs.  
Others, particularly residents of East Biloxi, thought their community had excluded entire 
segments of the population and had focused on the wrong types of projects (such as 
beautification instead of social services).  In order to analyze and compare the decisions 
communities made in rebuilding after Katrina in a more objective manner and to determine to 
what extent they promote resilience based on the above findings, the comprehensive plans of 
each case study were examined. 
For some study area communities, multiple planning documents were produced after 
Katrina.  For example, rebuilding plans were created by the governor’s Mississippi Renewal 
Forum, the Congress for New Urbanism (CNU), the American Planning Association-American 
Institute of Certified Planners Planning Assistance Team, the Gulf Coast Community Design 
Studio (GCCDS) of Mississippi State University’s College of Architecture, and other nonprofit 
organizations (such as community development corporations). Because these plans differed in 
scope and in intent, only the adopted comprehensive plans for each of the four case study 
communities were examined for consistency.  Mississippi state statute section 17-1-1 requires 
that each municipality have a long range comprehensive plan adopted by the local governing 
body.  Plans include goals over a 20 to 25 year period of development and are required to 
address (at a minimum) residential, commercial and industrial development; parks, open space 
and recreation; street and road improvements; and public schools and community facilities. In 
order to capture the most significant interests and values, the overarching goals of each plan were 
compared and analyzed. All plans included a vision statement, which were also compared.  
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Excerpts from each plan, including goals and vision statements in in their entirety, can be found 
in Appendix D.   
Comprehensive plans were acquired for Biloxi (Beckman et al., 2009), Pascagoula 
(Pascagoula Comprehensive Plan, 2010), Ocean Springs (Peshoff & Humphrey, 2010), and 
Hancock County (Hancock County Plan, 2010).  East Biloxi fell under the Biloxi comprehensive 
plan, although a separate 19-page section was devoted to East Biloxi, which is one of four 
designated neighborhood planning areas in Biloxi along with West Biloxi, North Biloxi, and 
Woolmarket.  Waveland also fell under the plan of the larger geographic area of Hancock 
County.  The Pascagoula, Ocean Springs, and Hancock County plans were adopted in 2010 and 
the Biloxi plan was adopted in 2009.  The plans were drafted by city staff and consulting firms.  
In Biloxi, four city departments and boards, a citizen council, and three consulting firms are 
listed on the credits page.  Ocean Springs listed one consulting firm and five city departments 
and boards.  Hancock County listed one consulting firm.  Pascagoula’s 2009 plan does not have a 
credits page, although a similar 2006 Pascagoula plan credits six city departments and boards, a 
citizen committee, and one consulting firm. 
The comprehensive plans created after Katrina in the four case study communities 
encompass many of the resilience factors included in this analysis.  These include such projects 
as increasing street network connections in Ocean Springs and creating a “town center” around 
the casinos in East Biloxi.  Plans varied in robustness in certain areas, but overall each displayed 
a commitment to creating a varied and integrated built environment as well as a socially 
equitable community. 
When the stated goals of each plan were compared, there were several elements that were 
common to more than one community (Table 28).  The number of goals in each community 
varied, with ten in Biloxi, 52 in Pascagoula, six in Ocean Springs, and 22 in Hancock County.  
Those plans with fewer stated goals tended to include high-level and comprehensive goals (e.g. 
“Promote a Healthy, diversified, and sustainable economy that provides a strong tax base, needed 
goods and services, and employment opportunities for Biloxi’s residents”) and those plans with a 
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greater number of goals tended to list more specific types of activities (e.g.  “A local airport with 
minimal off-site impacts” in Pascagoula).  The full text of these goals and the vision statements 
can be found in Appendix D. 
 










Natural resources x x x x 
Diverse housing x x x x 
Business development/employment x x x x 
City services x x x x 
Diverse transportation options x x x x 
Historic and cultural resources x x x x 
Protecting residents/reducing vulnerability x x x x 
Design and character x x x x 
Coastal and riparian resources x x x 
 
Parks x x x 
 
Growth management x x  x 
Downtown  x x 
 
Regionalism x  x 
 
Community building   x 
 
Public participation   x 
 
Tourism x   
 
 
Table 29 includes items found in vision statements for each case study community, 
including most of the categories from Table 28.   
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Natural resources x x x x 
Diverse housing x  x 
 
Business development/employment x x x x 
City services   x 
 
Diverse transportation options  x x 
 
Historic and cultural resources x x  x 
Protecting residents/reducing vulnerability x  x x 
Design and character  x  x 
Coastal and riparian resources x x  
 
Parks   x 
 
Regionalism   x 
 
Community building x  x x 
Public participation   x 
 
Tourism    x 
Future generations   x 
 
Resilience    x 
Low-income populations   x x 
 
In terms of the elements found in plan goals, natural resources, business development, 
diverse housing, diverse transportation options, and city services were included in all four plans.  
Protection of natural resources and business development and employment opportunities were 
the only elements found in all four vision statements.  Diverse housing and diverse transportation 
options were found in two vision statements and city services in one vision statement.  Given the 
state mandate to include open space, housing, economic development, municipal facilities, and 
transportation, in local comprehensive plans, the inclusion in all four communities’ goals is to be 
expected and is a direct example of plan conformity to state-level planning (Deyle et al., 2008).   
Protecting and supporting historic and cultural resources was found in the goals of all 
four plans and the vision statements of three communities.  Historic site density had a positive 
impact on resilience in the Stage 1 analysis and the importance of high-priority historic and 
cultural sites was noteworthy in the Stage 2 interviews.  The importance of historic resources to 
the community is adequately reflected in the comprehensive plans. 
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Protecting citizens and reducing vulnerability of households was found in all four 
communities as well as the vision statements of three communities.  In Waveland, the focus was 
on public safety and emergency response, and in Ocean Springs, the focus was on mitigation by 
understanding risks.  In general, the plans did not focus on disaster protection.  The concept of 
resilience was not included in the plans of Ocean Springs and Pascagoula and only infrastructure 
resilience was mentioned in Waveland (as it pertained to water and wastewater systems).  In 
contrast, the plan for Biloxi uses the term “resilient” or “resilience” in 35 places, in describing 
the population, the vision, and the natural and built environment of the area.  Although not part 
of the goals section of the plan, fostering resilience was present throughout the Biloxi plan in 
sub-sections of the document.  Given the problems associated with vulnerable populations 
uncovered during interviews, citizen protection is necessary; however, the plans lack rigor in 
identifying and supporting the most vulnerable populations, such as functional needs and elderly 
households. 
Design and character were also included in the goals of all four communities and the 
vision statements of two plans.  This included statements such as retaining the character, 
specifically the “small town character,”  “historic character,” or the “distinct character” of 
existing spaces and promoting high-quality design.  Although such elements were not quantified 
in the Stage 1 model, the unique character of the region was an important aspect of resilience 
noted in interviews, particularly in Ocean Springs.  Fostering and maintaining these qualities are 
therefore likely to improve resilience. 
Coastal and riparian protection was included in the goals of Pascagoula, Ocean Springs, 
and Hancock County and the vision statements of Ocean Springs and Hancock County.  
Although protection of natural resources was included in the goals of all communities, water 
resources in particular were also mentioned in these communities.  Many area industries and 
coastal residents are reliant on these resources.  The coast and inland waters are also commonly 
used for recreation and are an asset for the tourism industry, according to interview subjects.  
The area’s hydrologic features are incredibly important to the vitality of the area.  Katrina and 
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the 2010 BP oil spill demonstrated the dramatic impact that interruptions in the seafood and 
tourism industries have on economic and social conditions in the area.    
Parks were included in the goals of Pascagoula, Ocean Springs, and Hancock County and 
in the vision statement of Pascagoula. The presence of parks actually negatively impacted 
resilience in the Stage 1 analysis but was found to be an important factor for resilience and social 
networking in Stage 2.  Ocean Springs and Hancock County stated in their plans the more 
specific goal to provide parks that meet the needs of all residents.  Parks that are not functional 
or inclusive were found to be almost detrimental to vitality and resilience during the interview 
process.  The goal of providing parks that specifically meet the needs of residents is beneficial 
for resilience. 
Growth management was included in the goals of Biloxi, Ocean Springs, and Hancock 
County but was not included in any of the vision statements.  Intersection and residential density 
each had a positive impact on resilience in the Stage 1 model.  However, previous growth (from 
1990 to 2000) had a negative impact on resilience.  Based on this, it would seem that 
development should be of an appropriate density and sited properly.  Therefore, strong growth 
management is likely to improve resilience.  Growth management in tandem with hazard 
mitigation is also critical in protecting the region from the next hurricane, particularly in 
preventing over-development of flood-prone areas.  In addition to growth management 
strategies, Hancock County and Ocean Springs also adopted form-based codes to develop 
standards for intensity and character in disparate zones.  
Creating a vibrant downtown or business center was included in the goals of Pascagoula 
and Ocean Springs but was not included in any of the vision statements.  A strong core or central 
business district was seen as an advantage to resilience in the interviews.  The downtown area of 
Waveland was the most devastated of the four case study communities after Katrina.  However, 
Hancock County’s plan only briefly outlined provisions to preserve the downtown.  Biloxi’s 
downtown area has been in decline since at least the 1970s.  Although not in the goals and 
visions, Biloxi’s comprehensive plan devotes a full chapter to reestablishing downtown.  Given 
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the importance of downtown districts for social networking and for resilience, retaining a strong 
business district is important to each community and, if implemented effectively, will have 
positive effects on resilience.   
Regionalism was included in the plans of Waveland and Ocean Springs, the two 
communities with the smallest population, as well as Pascagoula. Regionalism was also found in 
the vision statement of Pascagoula.  Waveland and neighboring Bay St Louis are the largest 
cities in Hancock County, a fairly isolated region, and after Katrina have merged some services, 
such as the school district.  Ocean Springs recognized the need to consider a similar strategy of 
regional infrastructure provision and development decisions with other providers to increase 
efficiency and maximize investments.  Ocean Springs is located near communities with more 
suburban patterns of growth, including Gulf Hills to the north.  In its plan, Ocean Springs 
demonstrates the need to coordinate with Harrison County and surrounding communities to 
preserve the character of the community and the natural resources of the area.  Regionalism was 
surprisingly absent from the plan of Biloxi, perhaps because it is a more established and self-
sufficient population and employment center. Despite this, regional coordination should be a part 
of any resilience strategy in order to ensure that any one city or neighborhood is not overly 
vulnerable or lacking resources to recover from a disaster.  Stronger formal ties between 
communities in the region can only improve social networks by adding redundancies.  As stated 
by one interview subject, a community is only as resilient as its weakest link, which was 
apparent in communities like East Biloxi following Katrina.   
Community building was found in the goals of the plan of Pascagoula.  Biloxi, Ocean 
Springs, and Hancock County did not specifically mention community building as a goal, 
although other goals were related such as community viability.  Community building was 
included in the vision statements of Biloxi, Pascagoula, and Hancock County.  Community 
building is most evocative of creating formal and informal social networks.  Comprehensive 
plans tend to focus on physical development; however, the plans of Pascagoula and Ocean 
Springs acknowledged the importance of fostering livable neighborhoods that illicit pride and 
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neighborliness.  Sense of community was an extremely important factor for resilience based on 
Stage 2 interviews.  The inclusion of community building in several plans is beneficial to 
creating future resilience through stronger social networks. 
Public participation was included in the goals and vision statement of Pascagoula but not 
in the plans of the three other case study communities.  This is unfortunate, as public 
participation could produce creative ideas for the community, increase trust and transparency in 
the planning process, improve community buy-in, and build formal and informal social 
networks.  Participation by local interest groups increases the impact of plans and levels of 
commitment in elected officials (Burby & May, 1998).  The most effective projects post-Katrina 
were the result of inclusive planning, such as the parks designed through public charettes in 
Ocean Springs.  Less effective projects post-Katrina were often perceived to come about through 
a closed planning process that neglected community needs, such as elaborate boat ramps that 
were not useful for the many residents without boats.  Given the influence of the built 
environment on social networks, an exclusive planning process could lead to decisions that 
disrupt important neighborhood ties.  Improving public participation was lacking in plans (which 
address the built environment) and is a serious concern for future resilience. 
Tourism was included in the goals of Waveland as part of its economic development 
strategy.  The stated goals included natural resources and cultural tourism as well as gaming and 
“high-tech” attractions.  Waveland’s tourism was particularly hard-hit, perhaps because it lacked 
the large-scale hotels and casinos that had the resources to quickly rebuild.  The city also seemed 
to have a higher percentage of summer homes than other case study communities.  Historically, 
Waveland’s summer population came via train from New Orleans.  With many beachfront homes 
razed and properties still vacant seven years after Katrina, much of the summer population 
appears to have abandoned the area.  Creating new tourism opportunities is important for the area 
economy.  In Biloxi, with its numerous casinos and attractions, tourism was included in the 
vision statement.  Ocean Springs and Pascagoula are notably short of hotel space and, although 
they welcome the tourists that visit, these areas have not relied as heavily on revenue from 
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tourists beyond day-trippers.  Although the communities should move away from reliance on 
tourism dollars alone, many projects would also benefit local resilience, such as creation of 
additional recreational features, restaurants, and other built environment features that foster 
social networks. 
Three additional categories were found in vision statements that were not featured in plan 
goals, but are noteworthy for resilience.  First, the needs of low-income communities were 
included in the vision statements Pascagoula and Biloxi.  Providing for future generations was 
found in one vision statement (Pascagoula) and future resilience was also found in one vision 
statement (Biloxi).  These items are evincive of the need to increase resilience in the two low-
resilience communities through providing future resources, particularly for socially vulnerable 
populations.   
Based on the comprehensive planning documents produced after Katrina in the four case 
study communities, the region understands many of its present strengths and weaknesses with 
respect to disaster resilience and has outlined a strategy to mitigate damage, reduce vulnerability, 
and create support networks to speed up recovery for a future disaster of the scale of Katrina.  
Like any plan, how and to what extent these ideals are implemented is a concern.   Several 
projects have been completed, such as the new libraries in Waveland and East Biloxi and 
beachfront improvements in all four communities.  Other projects are in progress, such as 
planned mixed-use riverfront development to augment downtown Pascagoula.  During the Stage 
2 interviews, recurring concerns were public participation and, at the least, attention to the needs 
of residents in the planning process.   
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY AND PLANNING IMPLICATIONS 
The results of this research provided generalizable recommendations for planning 
interventions in the physical and social domains that would improve disaster resilience.  Based 
on the information gathered from the Stage 1 quantitative model and from Stage 2 interviews, 
specific variables measuring physical attributes of communities explained some of the difference 
in ability to recover among communities on the Mississippi Coast.   
Intersection density, net residential density, the density of establishments that support 
social networking, and the density of historic sites positively impacted resilience in the Stage 1 
model and were seen as important characteristics with respect to resilience by Stage 2 interview 
subjects.  These four built environment variables had a significant positive impact on resilience 
in the Stage 1 model, greater than the impact of many intervening variables.   The presence of 
parks was insignificant in the Stage 1 model but was important for social networking and 
resilience in the Stage 2 interviews.  Control variables measuring previous growth in housing 
density and initial housing density, percent of damage, amount of aid, and the presence of parks 
had the greatest negative impact on resilience overall and percent of the population living in the 
area in 1995 had the greatest positive impact on resilience of the intervening variables in the 
Stage 1 model.   
The findings of this study have important implications for disaster vulnerable 
communities.  Communities can develop design and planning strategies to create a built 
environment that enhances social networks.  In fact, since Katrina, the four Stage 2 case study 
communities have drafted comprehensive plans and implemented projects that this research 
suggests will strengthen social networks and improve resilience. 
Conceptual Model Revisited 
The results also largely validate the conceptual model used to inform the research design.  
Overall, the relationships between the phenomena depicted in the conceptual model were shown 
to align with the findings from the Stage 1 and Stage 2 analyses.  Returning to the conceptual 
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model found in Figure 7 (a simplified version is found in Figure 30), many findings were 
consistent with the established and hypothesized causal relationships in the model.  The link 
between social networks and resilience was strongly supported by the interviews, although the 
link between the built environment and resilience yielded slightly different results in the 
quantitative model (intersection density had a strong positive impact on resilience; however, the 
presence of parks had a weak negative impact on resilience).  Taken together, Stage 1 and Stage 
2 results clarified the relationships in the conceptual model.  All relationships shown in the 
model held true, although the quantitative findings related to individual built environment and 
intervening socio-demographic variables were less consistent.  Those specific findings in the 
Stage 1 quantitative analysis that were inconsistent with the model are discussed individually 
below.   
 
Figure 30: Simplified conceptual model 
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The notion that social networks support resilience was substantiated by the research.  As 
noted previously in the literature in Chapter 2, social networks improve physical, psychological, 
social, and financial well-being (Aday, 1994; Ben-Porath, 1980; Berkman et al., 2000), all of 
which improve household or individual resilience and support after a disaster.  During 
interviews, residents noted the same types of advantages from their own formal and informal 
social networks prior to and after Katrina.  In addition to these benefits indirectly related to 
disaster resilience, social networks transfer knowledge and resources and can be directly 
leveraged during disaster recovery.  For example, because of prior relationships, one resident 
welcomed her neighbors to use her functioning washer and dryer and was given other items such 
as paper products in gratitude rather than repayment.  This type of reciprocity based on mutual 
needs has been well documented in the males living in a poor, inner-city African American 
community in Washington, D.C. (Liebow, 2003); in poor African American females in the 
Midwest (Stack, 1979); and in Italian-American slums in Boston (Gans, 1962).  The use of social 
networks as an informal marketplace is a well-documented manifestation of human self-
preservation, including after disasters, when supply and demand interruptions wreak havoc on 
the economy. 
The effect of the built environment on social networks shown in the conceptual model 
was also demonstrated by the research.  Indeed, more varied and integrated neighborhoods were 
shown to increase social activity in the Stage 2 interviews.  These neighborhoods possessed 
characteristics shown to support social networks in the literature, such as varied land uses and 
pedestrian-oriented design (Leyden, 2003).  Built environment features such as places of 
worship, commercial centers, historic sites, and recreational facilities were among the most 
common types of spaces in which social networking occurred.  Many of these places were also 
important centers for short- and long-term disaster recovery activities.   Place attachment to 
similar types of locations and to the natural landscape was also prevalent, constituting a direct 
mechanism by which the built environment influenced residents to return and rebuild after 
Katrina.   
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In the conceptual model, social networks were also hypothesized to impact the built 
environment, albeit to a lesser degree.  This is because development patterns are influenced by 
politics, codes, and ideologies, although many elements of the built environment remain fixed 
over time and therefore the direct influence may decrease as generations pass (Rapoport, 1994).  
Moreover, the built environment, even after catastrophic damage, exists in a community’s 
collective memory and is assigned a set of values by the community.  To some extent, the effect 
of social systems on the built environment is more evident after a disaster.  In Mississippi, 
residents attended public meetings and charettes that influenced rebuilding and prioritized certain 
features and land uses.  Notably, waterfront park improvements have been implemented in 
response to resident demand, as beaches are an important social gathering point in the region.  
Although the effect of social networks on the built environment is weaker than the inverse effect 
of the built environment on social networks, it is nonetheless important, particularly during a 
major rebuilding effort.  Shifts in urban planning values, such as use of form-based codes rather 
than Euclidean zoning, also affect rebuilding.  
The Stage 1 and Stage 2 analysis results support the link between the built environment 
and social networks as well as the link between social networks and resilience.  Furthermore, the 
quantitative model results showed a positive relationship between a more varied and integrated 
built environment and resilience to Hurricane Katrina.  Given these combined findings and their 
conformance to findings from the literature, the conceptual model depiction of the impact of the 
built environment on resilience was validated, with only a few discrepencies within the Stage 1 
dependent-independent variable relationships.   
Although many social networks that intervened after Katrina were not rooted in the local 
built environment (for example, national professional or religious organizations), the built 
environment was shown to support many types of important social networks such as neighbors 
and local faith-based groups.  Many of these local networks of support were particularly helpful 
in the early survival phase of the recovery.  Local places of worship and other physical 
establishments serving social networks also served as distribution points for tangible goods as 
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well as volunteer labor.  Without this type of infrastructure that supports social networks, 
communities are at a practical as well as spiritual disadvantage.  In addition to the measurable 
impacts of the built environment on social networks, sense of place and sense of community, two 
related and rather ethereal qualities, are among the most important and least well understood 
factors in resilience.  It is difficult to disentangle the two, but at the root of each is a shared set of 
experiences and a determination to preserve a beloved way of life.    
Discussion of Built Environment Variables and Resilience 
In the Stage 1 quantitative model, certain aspects of the built environment were 
associated with greater resilience – namely, intersection density, net residential density, 
community amenities where social networks gather, and historic sites.  These types of features 
were also shown to be connected to formal and informal social networks in the interview 
process, as was hypothesized based on a review of the literature.   
Although it would be difficult to alter the street layout of the mostly built-out Mississippi 
Coast region, street connectivity as measured by intersection density was shown to be important 
for resilience in the Stage 1 model.  All four study area communities selected for the Stage 2 
analysis are laid out, more or less, on an orthogonal grid.  However, many areas in the most 
severely impacted area that are laid out along dendritic suburban street patterns have not 
recovered, such as the St Andrews neighborhood in Ocean Springs.  This finding was consistent 
with the literature, as intersection density has been shown to increase pedestrian activity (Ewing 
& Cervero, 2010) and therefore increase the probability of chance encounters with other 
pedestrians .  Given the difficulty of retrofitting city streets, the creation of trails and paths could 
improve the connectivity without altering the underlying street pattern.  Planners should also be 
aware of the limitations of disconnected subdivisions for resilience. 
The research also demonstrated the importance of housing, in particular of pre-existing 
multifamily housing.  Net residential density had a significant influence on resilience in the 
Stage 1 model and related housing concerns were voiced in Stage 2 interviews.  This is 
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consistent with the literature, in that residential density has been shown to increase the possibility 
for creating strategic transitory and intimate ties with neighbors, insomuch as overcrowding is 
prevented (Baldassare, 1977).  However, renter-occupied households are most vulnerable after a 
disaster, as they have little control over their housing options and may be forced to move if 
replacement housing is unavailable (Comerio, 1997).  The model and interviews indicated that 
an established mix of housing, diversified by age of structure, housing units per structure, and 
ownership will result in a more resilient community for all income groups.  These housing types 
mush be reestablished in a timely manner post-disaster. 
The density of social networking establishments, or locations where groups can meet 
formally or informally, was also important for resilience.  In the Stage 1 model, these were 
defined as bowling alleys, public golf courses, membership sports and recreation clubs, civic and 
social associations, religious organizations, labor organizations, business associations, 
professional organizations, political associations, eating and drinking establishments, book 
stores, beauty and barber shops, cultural centers, and recreational establishments.  This is 
supported by literature linking such establishments with greater economic and social outcomes 
(Isserman et al., 2007; Rupasingha et al., 2000).  Many such locations have been vital to the 
resurgence of community in Ocean Springs, and in East Biloxi, the closing of an historic African 
American school after Katrina was a hindrance to recovery.  Overall, these types of locations are 
important for stimulating social activity, increasing formal and informal interactions, and 
facilitating organizational activity.  Planning can influence the siting of these locations through 
zoning and ordinances and planners should be aware of the impacts of displacing long-standing 
establishments that support existing social networks. 
The density of historic structures had a positive impact on resilience in the Stage 1 model 
and the protection or restoration of high priority historic sites was shown to be important to 
residents.  With respect to historic structures, planners should identify which are most culturally 
significant during periods of calm and document prioritized structures thoroughly in case they 
are destroyed.  If reconstruction is not feasible, honoring the former site may also be appropriate.  
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Prior to Katrina, Ocean Springs, which is the original site of Iberville’s settlement of Biloxi, 
featured a replica of the historic Fort Maurepas.  Although this structure was not replaced after 
Katrina, in 2009 a public park and playground situated on the site of the former fort was 
dedicated.  The popular public space is named after the fort and features a bronze statue of 
Iberville and amenities such as an outdoor stage, pavilion, restrooms, a playground, and a splash 
pad.   
In the Stage 1 quantitative model, the presence of parks had a negative impact on 
resilience, which was inconsistent with literature that suggests parks promote sense of place, 
community, and civic pride (Talen, 1999).  However, interview subjects noted the importance of 
parks for their networks.  The mixed results are likely due to the uneven distribution of 
neighborhood parks in the area.  The beach is open along much of the Gulf Coast, particularly in 
Hancock County.  These areas were not counted as parks in the model (as all study area 
geographies are within a short distance from the beach), which may have rendered parks 
insignificant in the model.  
Discussion of Additional Resilience Factors Related to Planning 
In addition to the built environment factors, this research also highlighted many factors 
important for resilience that should be noted due to their planning implications.  First, public 
participation in the rebuilding process was seen as beneficial for resilience in communities that 
engaged the public and detrimental in those that excluded residents from the building process.  In 
particular, participation was necessary to understand and respond to the needs of the community.  
This was also witnessed in New Orleans after Katrina, when participation of the public as well as 
communication with the public were crucial for effective recovery, and after the Kobe and 
Northridge earthquakes (Olshansky & Johnson, 2010; Olshansky et al., 2006).  In cases where 
decisions were made in by technocrats, the results lacked substance and focused more on 
beautification, according to residents. 
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By increasing transparency and accountability, public participation can also improve trust 
in leadership, which is also important for resilience.  Some Gulf Coast residents lacked trust in 
the government before the storm, and trust continued to erode after promised funding and aid 
was delayed or did not arrive.  Furthermore, the initial response, particularly evacuation rates, 
may have been hindered by this lack of trust.  According to a recent study (Brodie, Weltzien, 
Altman, Blendon, & Benson, 2006), households are significantly more likely to evacuate if they 
trust the source of evacuation information and are given clear instructions as well as options.  
When the information initiates from a government that the population feels is detached and 
apathetic, this becomes problematic.  By interfacing directly with local residents through 
participatory planning processes, planners are uniquely able to foster transparent government. 
The speed at which rebuilding occurred was also an issue for resilience.  Immediate 
barriers were numerous and included actual roadblocks preventing evacuees from returning and 
issues with debris removal and insurance.  Those who did not leave and those that were able to 
immediately begin clean-up and reconstruction tended to be most successful in rebuilding, 
according to interview subjects.  Whenever possible, planners should be aware of and attempt to 
remove bureaucratic barriers, maintain communications between all responding agencies, and 
provide assistance before and after disasters to ensure residents understand insurance coverage 
and home improvement techniques that increase the capacity of the population to meet their own 
needs after a disaster.  
Another issue raised in interviews was that of temporary housing solutions after the 
storm.  Following Katrina, FEMA trailers meant to house victims for months remained in use for 
years.  Interview subjects noted at the time of Katrina, there was a shortage of trailers, as many 
victims of 1992’s Hurricane Andrew remained in trailers for more than ten years.  FEMA trailers 
purchased after Katrina presented health problems for residents, even forcing families with 
members that could not tolerate formaldehyde to live separately.  As an antidote to the toxic and 
unpleasant FEMA trailers, the Katrina Cottage was designed during the Mississippi Renewal 
Forum, a post-Katrina design charette.  Federal funding was provided to build the structures, 
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which were designed to allow for expansions, and thus could be converted to permanent housing.  
Later, many were repurposed as shops and for other uses.  Katrina cottages were an example of 
sturdy, healthy, and locally appropriate housing that filled the temporary housing gap and 
prevented disruptions in local social structures, understanding that temporary housing is likely to 
be semipermanent and should be accordingly sustainable.  Whenever possible, planners should 
encourage safe temporary housing designed to encourage social networking opportunities and 
continuity of community functions.   
Past experience with hurricanes or, conversely, lack of experience with a hurricane of 
Katrina’s magnitude was an additional factor raised in interviews.  According to the social-
ecological model of disaster recovery, collective knowledge and adaptability of the population 
are engrained over time and over cycles of destruction and reconstruction (Adger et al., 2005).  
In 2005, many residents of Mississippi had not seen a hurricane as destructive as Katrina and 
residents will certainly leverage their experiences in future hurricanes. Although the road to 
recovery has been extremely arduous, few would argue that the Mississippi Gulf Coast has not 
learned from Katrina to become more resilient.  Recently, the lessons learned in Katrina have 
been applied after Hurricanes Irene and Sandy on the east coast.  Sharing this knowledge more 
broadly and systematically and using specialized skills gained from the recovery would 
institutionalize the expertise in the region and beyond.  Furthermore, communities should 
consider crafting recovery plans ahead of a disaster in order to reduce the need to build 
consensus and conduct decision making amid post-disaster turbulence.   
Several additional resilience factors related to the natural environment should also be 
noted, as they pertain to planning and development.  For example, development of the waterfront 
over time has increased the vulnerability of communities on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.  This 
includes dredging of the sound, removal of native fauna, and other interventions that altered the 
forests, coastal marsh, floodplain, and low terrace ecosystems.  According to one interview 
subject, levees built across the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet Canal (MRGO) are likely to 
eliminate the river as an overflow for storm surge, which will protect communities along the 
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Mississippi River but will increase flooding of the Mississippi Gulf Coast.  The dominance of 
human-engineered solutions for managing water resources has begun to diminish, however.  
Since Katrina, the stepped seawalls constructed in the 1920s to protect from erosion and flooding 
have been converted back to storm-buffering sandy beaches and dunes, which also provide 
public space.  The native landscape once consisted of a narrow strip of beach dotted with marsh 
grasses, cypress, and oak trees (Cathcart & Melby, 2009).  Similar plantings on the recreated 
beaches will be allowed to naturally regenerate.   
Along with beaches and vegetation, the Mississippi Sound is dotted with barrier islands 
(Figure 31).  Recent research has shown that land loss rates of between 15.6 and 29.9 acres per 
year were observed between 2000 and 2007 in the Mississippi barrier island chain of Cat Island, 
Ship Island, Horn Island, and Petit Bois Island (Morton, 2008).  Total land losses between 19 and 
60 percent occurred from the 1840s to 2007 due to storms and human interventions such as the 
dredging of deep shipping channels.   Robust barrier islands are a protective buffer against both 
storm surge and wind and, according to interview subjects, are popular recreational areas.  
Barrier islands have traditionally dissipated waves and reduced storm surge risk along the coast, 
and dredging, levees, and channelization have increased the water volume of potential storm 
surges in Mississippi.  Since Katrina, funding has been allocated to restore land mass and 
vegetation to these islands, in large part to mitigate future storm damage.  Uncertain 
environmental factors, such as global climate change and predicted sea level rise and increased 




Figure 31: Barrier islands of Mississippi 
 
In addition to land development and environmental planning interventions, planners may 
be able to participate in or facilitate partnerships that leverage and strengthen existing formal and 
informal networks.  According to interview subjects, immediate clearing and rebuilding efforts 
were often undertaken by nonprofits and other volunteer organizations.  Federal and state 
government was subject its own often bureaucratic protocols, making it difficult to mobilize 
public sector resources.  To fill this gap, faith-based organizations from around and from outside 
the area were particularly helpful in supplying skilled labor and equipment.  Although these 
efforts were often ad hoc, such organizations were able to effectively organize to meet residents’ 
needs.  Partnerships between the public, private, and nonprofit sectors in pre-disaster planning 
efforts would only expand the influence and increase the available resources.  Some current 
examples of successful partnerships exist, and philanthropy and volunteerism on the Gulf Coast 
are notably strong; however, institutionalizing such partnerships, particularly with the private 
sector, is necessary to ensure that partnerships and networks are able to effectively mobilize after 
a disaster.  The private sector may benefit from improving the quality of life of its employees and 
from promoting a positive image in the community in addition to the fiscal benefits of potential 
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tax deductions and market expansion.  Partnerships should be established at a regional level for 
maximum impact.  Ultimately, the efforts of local, national, and even international networks of 
support resulted in many effective short- and long-term recovery efforts in Mississippi.   
Interview subjects also noted economic factors that were important for resilience and 
restoration of the built environment.  The lack of employment opportunities was a limiting factor 
for resilience in Waveland and Biloxi, and the ability of industry in Pascagoula and commercial 
establishments in Ocean Springs to recover boded well for those communities.  In recent 
decades, the tax revenue supplied by casino gambling has provided capital for development, 
including schools and historic preservation.  After Katrina, casinos and resorts lining the shores 
of the Gulf Coast were among the first structures rebuilt.  Although casino revenues fell by 28 
percent immediately after the storm, casinos turned record profits within two years (Rivlin, 
2007).  Unfortunately, this boom and bust cycle is likely to repeat itself with every future crisis, 
limiting the ability to effectively recover from a disaster.  A balanced economy, including 
adequate employment opportunities and a supply of necessary goods and services should be 
taken into consideration by planners, as these are also important for ensuring the resilience of the 
population.  Casinos and other major employers may be persuaded to engage in corporate social 
responsibility efforts such as providing community centers and temporary housing after a 
disaster.  These practices may protect their labor resources and encourage greater community 
resilience through their own employee-based social networks  
Five years after Katrina, the area was tested by another catastrophic event, the explosion 
at the BP offshore rig Deepwater Horizon and resulting oil spill, the worst marine oil spill in U.S. 
history.  The original economic and property damage claims fund for Texas, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Alabama totaled $2.3 billion, demonstrating the enormous value of the Gulf of 
Mexico to the region.  Claims covered included loss of subsistence and other economic damage 
for seafood workers, damage to vessels and lost charter payments, and other property damage.  
The initial amount of the economic settlement has increased several times, and subsequent 
settlements and court decisions have allocated additional funds for criminal fines, medical 
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damages for clean-up workers, funds to revive tourism, funding for local nonprofits, and funding 
for coastal restoration such as the aforementioned barrier island restoration.  Although the oil 
spill severely impacted the economy at a time when the region was still recovering from Katrina, 
careful investment of these funds is an opportunity to increase resilience.  
Ideas for Further Research 
This research provided a greater understanding of one aspect of resilience – the return of 
households – and how this is influenced by a built environment that supports social networks.  
Because of limitations such as the length of time that has elapsed since Katrina, the difficulty of 
reaching interview subjects that lack strong social networks, and other methodological 
shortcomings, additional research would strengthen the findings and improve validity.  First, the 
use of path analysis would improve the validity of the findings.  Given the nature of the 
relationships in the conceptual model, including the direct and indirect effects of social networks 
and the built environment on resilience, path analysis would better clarify the magnitude of each 
individual effect.  However, inclusion of social network activity in the model would be difficult 
because of the effort required to quantify social networks. In addition, nonlinear statistical 
analysis, such as artificial neural network modeling, may also be employed, perhaps using the 
detailed information from the four case study communities as test cases.  A neural network 
technique would test the ability to predict resilience from the independent variables and would be 
well suited for handling the complex and possibly interconnected relationships between these 
variables.  Other next steps could include using the Stage 1 model output to select additional case 
study communities for interviews.  The Stage 1 variables were used in selection of the Stage 2 
case study communities, although final model results were not yet available to inform the 
selection process.  Since Stage 1 regression analysis is complete, paired comparison communities 
framed by the Stage 1 results could be selected.  In addition to advancing this research on post-
Katrina Mississippi, a comparison analysis of other regions and other disasters would improve 
the reliability of the findings.   
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Conclusion 
The most devastated areas of Mississippi required more than ten years to regenerate after 
Hurricane Camille in 1969.  Based on the slow progress post-Camille, one interview subject 
estimated that it could take 25 to 30 years for the Gulf Coast to fully recover from Hurricane 
Katrina.  In that time, another major hurricane will almost certainly strike, given past trends.  
Therefore, it is important for the region to reduce the time necessary for long-term recovery and 
increase the likelihood that the community will rebound.   
Seven years after Hurricane Katrina, recovery is still in progress.  There are many 
considerations that impact the built environment: physical restrictions, such as zoning, 
environmental impacts, and building codes; cost restrictions such as financing and insurance 
standards; and market demand.  Rebuilding after a hurricane produces an influx of public and 
private money that can stimulate the local economy and spur spontaneous decision making by 
public and private entities.  Yet, hurricanes are only one stimulus that has altered the Gulf Coast 
over time.  For example, in the last century, dredging and development eroded barrier islands and 
coastal marshes, and, like many other small and midsized cities in the U.S., historic business 
districts were systematically abandoned for suburban strip and shopping malls.  These activities 
have largely made the population more vulnerable; however, post-Katrina recovery and planning 
efforts appear to be reversing this trend with a focus on creating civic centers and locally 
appropriate design that better support social networks.  Although the factors influencing 
resilience and recovery are complex and wide-ranging, planning and policy interventions that 
influence private real estate development, as well as direct public and private interventions in the 
built environment, can make an enormous impact on a community’s ability to withstand and 
recover from a disaster. 
As seen after Katrina, disasters have the potential to disturb every aspect of daily life.  
Security and stability are compromised and household resources are drained when faced with 
unexpected catastrophe.  Recovery is clearly difficult in the face of these obstacles.  It is 
increasingly apparent to the disaster management, psychology, sociology, public health, and city 
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planning professions (among others) that the strength of preexisting social networks influences 
the rate of recovery at the individual and community levels by leveraging a larger pool of 
resources and increasing access to employment.  Disasters can also place a significant strain on 
social networks; however, stronger networks are able to endure the strain more readily and 
actually increase the effectiveness and rate of recovery efforts.  This research shows that the 
effect of the built environment on social networks and resilience should not be discounted.  
Urban design features with the greatest capacity to increase resilience were also useful features 
for social networking. Although the findings differ somewhat from past work in the area of 
social networks and urban design, the elements of the built environment found to support social 
networks and resilience in coastal Mississippi overlap with many best practices in planning. 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION: 
How long have you lived in this community?  How long have you been associated with 
your organization [for community leaders]?  Did you evacuate or stay during Katrina?  If so, 
when did you return? 
SOCIAL NETWORK QUESTIONS: 
Think of organizations, networks, associations that you or any member of your household 
belong to.  These could be formally organized groups or just groups of people who get together 
regularly to do an activity or talk about things. Of how many such groups are you or any one in 
your household a member?  Please describe them. 
Which of these groups or networks were you engaged in most actively before Katrina?  
During?  After? 
Which of these groups or networks disbanded or have been formed after Katrina? 
RESILIENCE QUESTIONS: 
Think about how your community has coped after Katrina.  Resilience is the ability of a 
community to rebound, or to bend but not break, after a disaster.  In your opinion, how resilient 
is your community to disasters? (1-10, 1 being not at all resilient, 10 being very resilient) 
On what factors do you base your score?   
By your estimation, what percent or proportion of your neighborhood has returned after 
Katrina?  Of your city? 
Have vulnerable populations returned, such as the elderly or very poor?  Why or why 
not? 
BUILT ENVIRONMENT QUESTIONS: 
Think about the physical characteristics of your community – homes, buildings, open and 
green space, streets and sidewalks, landmarks and monuments, historic sites, businesses, 
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institutions, natural features.  Which of these places or features are most important, memorable, 
or symbolic to your community in your opinion before Katrina?  After? 
What locations are used by your formal and informal social networks for gathering before 
Katrina?  After?  
With respect to the community pre- and post-Katrina, does your community offer 
amenities in walking distance to your home? What is the availability of parks and open space? 
OTHER: 
Do you have any additional comments about resilience and your community that you 
wish to mention? 
RECRUITMENT: 
Who else should I talk to in your neighborhood? 
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APPENDIX B: CONSENT FORM 
CONSENT DOCUMENT FOR  
COMMUNITY RESILIENCE STUDY 
 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
Project Title: Resilience in the Social and Physical Realms: Lessons from the Gulf 
Coast  
 
Investigator: Ann Carpenter 
 
Protocol and Consent Title: H12079, approved 9 April 2012 
 
You are being asked to be a volunteer in a research study.  
 
Purpose:    
 The purpose of this study is to evaluate what makes a community more or 
less resilient, or able to recover, after a disaster.  The study uses Hurricane 
Katrina as an example. 
 
Procedures:  
 If you decide to be in this study, your part will involve an interview of 
approximately 30-45 minutes.  You will be asked a series of questions about 
your community, including what kinds of social groups you encounter, the 
kinds of buildings and features in your community, and how the community 
survived and rebuilt after Katrina. The total amount of time should be less 
than 45 minutes.  Remember, you may stop at any time. 
 
Risks or Discomforts:  
 The risks involved are no greater than those involved in daily activities.  The 
questions focus on a disaster with a huge emotional impact, although they 
are not personal questions.    
 
Benefits: 
 You are not likely to benefit from joining this study. We hope that what we 
learn will someday help others.  
 
Compensation to You:   









 Your privacy will be protected to the extent allowed by law.  To protect your privacy, 
your records will be kept under a code number rather than by name.  Your records 
will be kept in locked files and only study staff will be allowed to look at them.  Your 
name and any other fact that might point to you will not appear when results of this 
study are presented or published.  We are only interested in group information. The 
reporting of the experimental results will only contain group mean results and will 
contain no personal information about individual participants including performance 
on the experiment.  Audiotapes will be transcribed and destroyed; no link will be 
maintained that could connect your identity with your responses.  The tapes will be 
accessible only to the research team and the tapes will be destroyed after data analysis 
is complete.  To make sure that this research is being carried out in the proper way, 
the Georgia Institute of Technology IRB may review study records.  The Office of 
Human Research Protections and/or the Food and Drug Administration may also look 
over study records during required reviews. 
 
Participant Rights: 
 Your participation in this study is voluntary. You do not have to be in this 
study if you don't want to be. 
 You have the right to change your mind and leave the study at any time 
without giving any reason and without penalty. 
 If you decide not to finish the study, you have the right to withdraw any data 
collected about you.  If you withdraw, all records of your input and 
participation will be destroyed.   
 Any new information that may make you change your mind about being in 
this study will be given to you. 
 You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 You do not waive any of your legal rights by signing this consent form. 
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Questions about the Study: 
If you have any questions about the study, you may contact Ann Carpenter at telephone 
404-407-8044 or acarpenter@gatech.edu.  
 
Questions about Your Rights as a Research Participant: 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact  
 
Ms. Melanie Clark, Georgia Institute of Technology 
Office of Research Compliance, at (404) 894-6942 
or 
Ms. Kelly Winn, Georgia Institute of Technology 
Office of Research Compliance, at (404) 385- 2175 
 
 
If you sign below, it means that you have read (or have had read to you) the information 
given in this consent form, and you would like to be a volunteer in this study. 
 
______________________________________________ 












APPENDIX C: RECRUITMENT MATERIALS 
Re: request for short interview 
 
 
Dear coastal Mississippi resident, 
 
A Georgia Tech research project is defining the networks of support and other features that 
contributed to how well Mississippi was able to withstand and recover from Hurricane Katrina. 
Georgia Tech is seeking the participation of residents of your community to be interviewed about 
the characteristics that are most important in making the area resilient.  
 
The interview will take approximately 30 minutes. Participants can participate during one of 
several interview sessions in your area between July 9 and July 13, 2012.  Additional dates are 
pending and a phone interview may also be scheduled at your convenience. 
 
Whether or not you are willing to participate, please consider passing this notice to someone else 
living in your neighborhood.   
 
Please contact Ann Carpenter at 404.407.8044 or acarpenter@gatech.edu to learn more about 
how to participate. 
 




Georgia Institute of Technology 
School of City and Regional Planning 
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APPENDIX D: EXERPTS FROM COMPREHENSIVE PLAN 
DOCUMENTS 
Goals of comprehensive plans from Biloxi, Pascagoula, Ocean Springs, and Hancock County are 
below: 
Biloxi (East Biloxi) Comprehensive Plan  
Vision: The best of Biloxi’s past—its cultural heritage, natural resources, and the spirit of its 
people—is carried forward and enhanced in a prosperous, resilient city for the 21st century. The 
City’s 21st century renaissance is based on: a diverse, thriving economy that capitalizes on 
Biloxi’s assets: its natural and cultural resources, economic anchors, status as a premiere visitor 
destination, and the entrepreneurial spirit of its people; a healthy environment that supports 
quality of life, sustains the economy, and protects against storm damage and flooding; a 
welcoming community that celebrates Biloxi’s unique character and sense of place; provides 
opportunities for all citizens; and takes care of those in need. 
 
Goals: 
Land Use Goal: Create a resilient pattern of future land use that:  
1. Retains the character of “Old Biloxi.”  
2. Provides for orderly and cost-effective growth and redevelopment.  
3. Maximizes positive relationships and reduces incompatibilities between different 
types of uses.  
4. Protects sensitive environmental resources and reduces storm vulnerability. 
Transportation Goal: Provide a multimodal, interconnected network that provides choices for 
people to move safely inside and outside Biloxi via vehicular, transit, bicycle, pedestrian, air, and 
waterborne transportation. 
Natural, Historic, and Cultural Resources Goal: Protect and restore natural, cultural, and historic 
resources and maximize the benefits they provide for the economy, environment, and 
community. 
Community Facilities and Services Goal: Provide quality, cost-effective community facilities 
and services that meet citizens’ needs based on objective standards, support desired future land 
use, and protect environmental resources. 
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Housing Goal: Provide safe, decent, and affordable housing that meets the needs of all residents 
and socioeconomic groups in Biloxi. 
Economic Development Goal: Promote a healthy, diversified, and sustainable economy that 
provides a strong tax base, needed goods and services, and employment opportunities for 
Biloxi’s residents. 
Pascagoula Comprehensive Plan 
Vision: Pascagoula will be a vital, attractive place to live, work, and visit. The elements that 
make Pascagoula a great community—its neighborhoods, shopping and employment centers, 
civic uses, open spaces, and natural resources—will be strengthened and enhanced. The diverse 
range of housing and work environments will be sustained and expanded to create more choices 
for all income levels. All Pascagoula neighborhoods will be improved, each to have public 
gathering spaces, essential services and pedestrian amenities, to encourage less reliance on the 
automobile. 
 
Pascagoula will provide accessible, attractive, economically viable and environmentally sound 
transportation options that meet the needs of residents, employers, employees and visitors for 
safe, convenient and efficient travel by a variety of methods. Streets will be safe and attractive, 
and designed to enhance the quality and aesthetics of Pascagoula neighborhoods. Emphasis will 
be placed on alternatives to the automobile, including walking, bicycling, public transit, and car 
and van pooling. The adverse impacts of automobile traffic on the environment in general and 
residential streets in particular, will be reduced. Solutions that reduce the growth in the number 
of automobiles on City streets, calm or slow traffic, and save energy will be supported. It is 
hoped that individuals will reduce their automobile trips by 10 percent by 2020, as alternative 
transportation methods are implemented. The City will seek out innovative funding sources and 
approaches to construct and maintain needed transportation systems. Pascagoula recognizes the 
regional nature of our transportation system, and will be a leader in seeking regional 
transportation solutions through long-term planning. 
 
Pascagoula will aggressively pursue a variety of housing opportunities that enhance the 
character, diversity and vitality of the City. The City is committed to increasing the development 
of affordable and market-rate housing. Existing housing, particularly rental units, will be 
conserved and rehabilitated or replaced. Pascagoula will continue its strong commitment to 
supporting agencies that assist households with special needs. The City will foster an 
environment free of discrimination and the barriers that prevent choice in housing. It will place 
special emphasis on family housing and housing that addresses the health care, child care, transit, 
recreation and social service needs of all Pascagoula residents. 
 
Pascagoula will meet today’s needs without compromising the needs of future generations. 
Pascagoula will respect and manage natural resources in a way that sustains the natural 
environment and protects our wetlands, bayous, parks, wildlife and open space legacy. Elements 
of the natural environment will be conserved where they remain intact and restored where they 
have been degraded by past development. A portion of the City will remain as open space. Even 
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in built-up areas, a network of parks will provide access to nature and an urban forest will 
provide ecological benefits and a source of beauty for residents. Pascagoula will strive for 
cleaner air and cleaner water. Its policies and programs will foster energy and water 
conservation, reduced solid waste generation, and cleanup of contaminated sites. The City will 
be well prepared for natural disasters and will grow and change in a way that minimizes public 
exposure to hazards like fire, flood, and hurricanes. 
 
Pascagoula will provide high quality community services to its residents, businesses, and 
visitors. Its schools, libraries, parks, community facilities, and performing arts and cultural 
centers will be enhanced to serve current and future generations. Its police and fire services will 
be managed to provide consistently high levels of public safety. The City will continue to 
provide services and programs that meet the needs of special populations—including children, 
seniors, and people with disabilities—as well as programs in recreation, lifelong learning, and 
the arts that benefit all populations. Pascagoula's success in providing these services will be 
expressed and measured by the satisfaction of its customers, the public at large. The City will 
pursue new ways to deliver community services in the most efficient and cost-effective way 
possible. It will coordinate its efforts with other public agencies, nonprofits, and the private 
sector to reduce overlap and maximize the use of resources. 
 
Pascagoula's business environment will be exciting, dynamic and vital. Businesses will have 
access to a wide array of support services and will enjoy positive relationships with Pascagoula 
residents, officials, and City staff. The competing needs of residents and businesses will be 
balanced so that neighborhoods are protected and enhanced while business districts are 
competitive and attractive. The local economy will thrive, and a diverse array of goods and 
services will be provided to Pascagoula consumers. Most development will occur within 
Pascagoula's employment areas, and will be consistent with the role and character designated for 
each area by this Plan. 
 
Pascagoula will maintain a positive civic image and be a leader in the regional, state, and 
national policy discussions affecting the community. The City will work with neighboring 
communities to address common concerns and pursue common interests. The public will be 
actively and effectively involved in City affairs, both at the Citywide and neighborhood levels. 
Where appropriate, the City Council will delegate decision-making responsibilities to local 
boards and commissions. The Council will also assign advisory roles to these bodies as well as 
other community groups. Residents, businesses, and elected and appointed officials will work 
collaboratively to address the issues facing the City in a timely manner. This inclusive, 
participatory process will help build a sense of community. 
 
Goals: 
Land Use and Community Design Goals: 
A well-designed, compact city, providing residents and visitors with attractive neighborhoods, 
work places, shopping districts, public facilities, and open spaces. 
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An enhanced sense of “community” with development designed to foster public life and meet 
citywide needs. 
Safe, attractive residential neighborhoods, each with its own distinct character and within 
walking distance of shopping, services, schools, and/or other public gathering places. 
Inviting, pedestrian-scale centers that offer a variety of retail and commercial services and 
provide focal points and community gathering places for the city’s residential neighborhoods and 
employment districts. 
High quality employment districts, each with their own distinctive character and each 
contributing to the character of the city as a whole. 
Well-designed buildings that create coherent development patterns and enhance city streets and 
public spaces. 
Conservation and preservation of Pascagoula’s historic buildings, sites, and districts. 
Attractive and safe civic and cultural facilities provided in all neighborhoods and maintained and 
used in ways that foster and enrich public life. 
Attractive, inviting public spaces and streets that enhance the image and character of the city. 
Transportation Goals: 
Planning and development of transportation modes offering alternatives to single-occupant 
automobiles. 
A convenient, efficient, public transit system that provides a viable alternative to driving. 
Effective opportunities for public participation in local government facilities, services, and 
programs that encourage and promote walking and bicycling. 
An efficient transportation system to meet the present and future mobility needs of people, 
goods, materials, and services. 
A transportation system with minimal impacts on residential neighborhoods. 
Reduction of the adverse environmental impacts of existing and future transportation systems 
through a combination of careful planning and mitigation techniques. 
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Mobility for people with special needs. 
Attractive, convenient public and private parking facilities. 
An influential role in shaping and implementing regional transportation decisions. 
A local airport with minimal off-site impacts. 
Land use planning that maximizes transportation efficiency for all modes and considers the 
economic development of the city. 
Planned transportation system in a coordinated and cost-effective manner utilizing a fair, 
equitable and sufficient method of funding. 
Housing Goals: 
A supply of affordable and market rate housing that meets Pascagoula’s share of regional 
housing needs. 
Conservation and maintenance of Pascagoula’s existing housing stock and residential 
neighborhoods. 
Housing opportunities for a diverse population, including very low-, low- and moderate-income 
residents, and persons with special needs. 
An end to housing discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national origin, age, sex, sexual 
orientation, marital status, physical handicap, or other barriers that prevent choice in housing. 
Reduced housing expenses for energy. 
A citywide open space system that protects and conserves Pascagoula’s natural resources and 
provides a source of beauty and enjoyment for Pascagoula residents. 
Conservation of bayous and riparian areas as open space amenities, natural habitat areas, and 
elements of community design. 
A thriving “urban forest” that provides ecological, economic, and aesthetic benefits for 
Pascagoula. 
Water resources that are prudently managed to sustain plant and animal life, support urban 
activities, and protect public health and safety. 
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Clean, healthful air for Pascagoula and the Mississippi gulf coast area. 
An environment free of the damaging effects of biological and chemical hazardous materials. 
Reduced volumes of solid waste; solid waste disposed in an environmentally safe, efficient, 
manner. 
Natural Environment Goals: 
An environment that minimizes the adverse impacts of noise. 
A clean, efficient, competitively-priced energy supply that makes use of cost-effective renewable 
resources. 
Protection of life and property from natural hazards, including hurricanes, flooding, and fire. 
Community Services and Facilities Goals: 
Effective and efficient delivery of community services. 
A commitment to excellence and high quality customer service among Pascagoula officials and 
employees. 
Improved quality, quantity, and affordability of social services, particularly for children, youth, 
seniors, and people with disabilities. 
Attractive, well-maintained community facilities that serve Pascagoula residents. 
Equal access to educational, recreational, and cultural services for all residents. 
Business and Economics Goals: 
A thriving business environment that is compatible with Pascagoula’s residential character and 
natural environment. 
A diverse mix of commercial, retail, and professional service businesses. 
New businesses that provide needed local services and municipal revenues, contribute to 
economic vitality, and enhance the city’s physical environment. 
 193 
Attractive, vibrant business centers, each with a mix of uses and a distinctive character. 
Thriving employment districts, such as chevron, Northrop Grumman, and the singing river 
medical center that complement the city’s business and neighborhood centers. 
Governance and Leadership Goals: 
Effective opportunities for public participation in local government. 
Informed and involved civic and neighborhood organizations and residents. 
A leadership role on regional issues. 
Active involvement of local citizens as volunteers in the delivery of community services. 
New ways to encourage collaboration among the public, property owners, and the city in areas 
where change is desired. 
More clearly defined procedures, standards, and expectations for development review. 
Ocean Springs Comprehensive Plan 
Vision: Ocean Springs is a community that preserves and respects its character, history and 
charm; maintains a pedestrian-oriented scale; protects its natural resources, environment and 
trees; respects its relationship with the Gulf and Bayou; promotes appropriate business 
development; and recognizes the importance of Bienville Boulevard and other major 
thoroughfares to define and connect places. 
Goals: 
Land Use Goal: Maintain a sustainable and compatible mix of land uses in the City of Ocean 
Springs through effective, coordinated growth management. 
Bienville Boulevard (Hwy 90) Goal: Enhance Bienville Boulevard (Hwy 90) corridor through 
Ocean Springs to support economic development, multi-modal transportation and high quality 
community character. 
Downtown/Central Business District Goal: Foster a vibrant mixed-use downtown that retains the 
historic character of existing commercial and residential neighborhoods, while providing 
increased opportunities for residents who wish to live within walking distance of neighborhood 
amenities and work places. 
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Neighborhoods and Housing Goal: To provide high quality residential neighborhoods with a 
variety of compatible housing types to serve the various needs of Ocean Springs residents. 
Economic Development Goal: Maintain and enhance a sustainable local economy that provides 
employment opportunities and supports a high quality of life. 
Community Design Goal: To establish Ocean Springs as a community that showcases high 
quality design for the benefit of its residents, businesses and visitors. 
Historic Resources Goal: To preserve and enhance historic and cultural resources that reflect the 
heritage and character of Ocean Springs. 
Natural Resources Goal: Protect and preserve natural resources including marshes and wetlands, 
habitat for flora and fauna, water and air quality. 
Hazard Mitigation Goal: To protect life and property throughout Ocean Springs. 
Facilities and Services Goal: To efficiently provide for and equitably fund high quality facilities 
and services to meet the needs of all businesses residents and visitors to Ocean Springs. 
Parks and Leisure Goal: To provide a parks and recreation system that meets the needs of all 
segments of the Ocean Springs community. 
Arts and Culture Goal: To maintain and enhance Ocean Springs as an “artistic” community, 
supporting and celebrating local arts and cultural events. 
Transportation Goal: To provide safe and convenient mobility and a variety of mode choices for 
all of Ocean Springs residents and visitors. 
Hancock County (Waveland) Comprehensive Plan 
Vision: Hancock County will be a model for sustainable coastal living, respecting our unique 
natural setting, our heritage and communities, while providing diverse, safe housing 
opportunities in its thriving communities and rural areas and diverse employment opportunities 
for all residents. 
Goals: 
Character and Identity Goals: 
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To preserve the small town character and identity of the cities and communities in Hancock 
County. 
To maintain or improve the quality of Hancock County’s natural resources. 
To protect sensitive floodplains, wetlands and wildlife habitat from inappropriate development. 
To protect people, property and water quality by limiting inappropriate development in 
floodplains and wetlands. 
Economic Goals: 
To promote a healthy, sustainable, balanced economy that capitalizes on the community's 
natural, recreational, cultural and human resources. 
To promote, recruit, and maintain a wide variety of tourism attractions, including high-tech 
attractions, gaming, unspoiled beaches, natural resources-based tourism and social, cultural and 
historic tourism. 
To retain existing businesses as vibrant part of the economy. 
To keep communities in Hancock County viable. 
Land Use Goals: 
To develop a coordinated growth management strategy in conjunction with Bay St. Louis and 
Waveland. 
To maintain and enhance the diverse, small town charm of the County's communities as they 
recover, while preserving the character of rural areas and integrity of natural resources. 
To promote the concept of land use compatibility with Airport operations on lands surrounding 
Stennis International Airport. 
Housing Goals: 
To have affordable housing choices that serve residents of all ages, from young working families 
through senior citizens. 
To rebuild and grow in a manner consistent with the diverse historic forms (e.g., single family 
homes, garden homes, townhomes, apartments, etc.) of Hancock County. 
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Transportation Goals: 
To maintain a transportation system that safely and efficiently meets the needs of residents, 
businesses and visitors. 
Community Facilities Goals: 
To coordinate growth decisions with the provision of infrastructure. 
To provide safe drinking water for every citizen in Hancock County. 
To maintain reliable, secure emergency services. 
To ensure the public's safety. 
To provide high quality educational opportunities for residents of all ages. 
To establish and maintain a coordinated county-wide parks and recreation system which also 
includes native and passive recreation opportunities that serves all residents and attracts tourists. 
To maintain a high quality library system that serves all ages. 
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